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Under what conditions do informal workers organize? Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom, informal workers organize in nearly every major city on every conti-
nent and officials often encourage them to do so. I demonstrate that under certain
conditions, governments offer private benefits to informal workers who organize self-
regulating associations, which solves the workers’ collective action problem. This
leads to another puzzle: why do governments pay people to organize, especially peo-
ple who routinely violate the law? I argue that where the state cannot stop violators,
it may prefer to pay violators to organize a self-regulating group rather than enforce
the law itself. The state can then bargain over legalization, regulation, and enforce-
ment with a representative group.
The project challenges assumptions about collective action in marginalized
communities and offers a new theory of collective action where informal workers in-
teract strategically with the state. I argue that where enforcement is costly, states
may take an active role in encouraging potential violators to organize and, once orga-
nized, regulate themselves. Recent work on the politics of enforcement demonstrates
ix
that governments reap political benefits by not enforcing laws against poor citizens
in informal work and housing. However, foregoing enforcement can create additional
political, public health, and material costs. I extend this work by using enforcement
costs to explain why informal workers organize. I suggest that where governments
successfully encourage potential violators to organize, governments keep the political
benefits of forgoing enforcement while civil society organizations assume partial re-
sponsibility for enforcement.
My fieldwork included 14 months in Bolivia and Brazil working as a street
vendor, gathering 92 interviews, and administering two surveys. Chapter 1 of the
project develops the puzzle—why do informal workers organize, given barriers to col-
lective action—in the context of current research. Chapter 2 presents the theory and
then formalizes it in a game theoretic model of collective action. Chapter 3 justifies
the model’s assumptions and demonstrates how its dynamics work in an ethnography
of street vendor organizations and their interactions with the city government in La
Paz, Bolivia. Chapter 4 illustrates how the model explains variation across people
and places by comparing street vendors in La Paz to their counterparts in the neigh-
boring city of El Alto. I then compare the highly organized street vendors in La Paz
to the sparsely organized vendors in São Paulo, Brazil. Chapter 5 tests the theory
on out-of-sample data: 26,304 self-employed respondents in 17 countries from the
Latin American Public Opinion Project. I analyze the data with logistic regressions
and then move to a nonparametric machine learning framework to address concerns
about identifying assumptions. I find similar patterns in different types of data across
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On Saturdays in La Paz, Bolivia, Rosa sells champagne, photographs, and car
decorations to newlyweds in the neighborhood plaza. Rosa is the founding secretaria
general, or director, of the neighborhood’s new street vendor union. The position
is unpaid and the $10 to $50 that she makes as a champañera every Saturday sup-
plements the money that she makes scavenging recyclables at night. In São Paulo,
Brazil, Renato sells cheap electronics from a cardboard box on 25 de Março, Brazil’s
largest street market. Renato can make up to $100 on a good day, even though he
spends a third of his time running from the military police. Like Rosa, he works as a
vendor to scrape by on rent and support his daughter, but unlike Rosa, Renato does
not belong to a street vendor organization and he dismisses work-based organizing as
futile.
Informal workers like Rosa and Renato make up roughly 50% of the global
workforce (Vanek et al., 2014, p. xi). Scholars (e.g., Castells and Portes (1989))
and policymakers (e.g., Perry (2007)) often view informal workers as a hindrance to
political and economic development. The conventional wisdom holds that informal
workers break laws, avoid taxes, produce less and participate less in civil society than
1
formal workers (King and Rueda, 2008; Schneider et al., 2010). Governments from
Nigeria to Brazil launch formalization programs to bring workers into state-regulated
market and political structures, often aided by international organizations like the
World Bank (see World Bank 2008), but these programs usually see anemic enroll-
ment. Additionally, external program evaluations find uneven or negligible benefits
for the informal businesses and individual that do enroll (Bruhn and McKenzie, 2014).
For decades, comparative research has found that informal workers rarely or-
ganize or participate in civil society and political life, and that this atomization stunts
political and economic development (Castells and Portes, 1989; Perry, 2007; Rueda,
2007). For example, Castells and Portes (1989) conclude that, "The more the infor-
mal economy develops, the more economy and society become relatively autonomous
spheres of social action" (p.32), and argue that informal work is "disenfranchisement
of the institutionalized power conquered by labor" (p.11). Scholars explain informal
workers’ low political participation with their high barriers to collective action, par-
ticularly an uncertain legal status, high turnover, low income and education, and high
costs to organizing (King and Rueda, 2008; Naylor, 2004; Kurtz, 2004, p.265).
However, recent research documents extensive variation in the degree to which
informal workers organize and participate in civil society and national political sys-
tems (Agarwala, 2013; Bhowmik, 2012; Holland, 2014). While plenty of workers
eschew any organization, others form groups of dozens to hundreds of workers, often
encouraged by bureaucrats and politicians (WIEGO, 2016; Bhowmik, 2012, p.23-24,
197). Renana Jhabvala, a former chairperson of an international network of street
vendor activists, claims that "In every city in the world, there is always some or-
ganizing among street vendors (Bhowmik, 2012, p. xvi)." In Bolivia, Chile, South
Africa, South Korea, and India, national informal worker organizations can represent
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millions (Agarwala, 2013; Bhowmik, 2012; Lazar, 2007a).
Why do informal workers organize to lobby the state? Why did Rosa found
a street vendor union while Renato did not? Both are young, poor street vendors
in Latin American metropolises, but their organizational and, by extension, political
participation is very different. Hundreds of studies on collective action in disparate
contexts find that resources are key to organizing: in places and among individuals
with more resources—especially experience, money, and time—labor, civic, and po-
litical organizations are much more likely (Hochstetler, 2012; McCarthy and Zald,
1987; Ostrom, 1990, 2007; Putnam et al., 1994; Tilly, 1978). Yet people with few
resources do organize and stand to benefit significantly from political participation:
where informal workers organize, they can improve their working conditions and win
concessions from the state, like licenses, health care, and subsidized loans (Bhowmik,
2012; Blofield, 2012, p.6).
For example, street vendors typically1 hold jobs in the informal sector, where
their pay is low, precarious, and variable, their work conditions dangerous and stress-
ful, and social security or health benefits are rare (Neuwirth, 2012; de Soto, 1989).
While most do not belong to any work-based organization, a growing and politically
active minority does (Agarwala, 2013; Tassi et al., 2013; Fernández-Kelly and Shefner,
2006). In India and Bolivia, where street vendors formed national informal worker
organizations, the organizations have negotiated with the state to largely regulate
themselves (Tassi et al., 2015, p.92), receive money for public works, and extend
health benefits (Agarwala, 2013, p.3-4). Lazar (2007a) argues that in El Alto, Bolivia
1Formal street vendors can exist, though they are rare. For example, owners of licensed food
trucks or permanent artisan stalls at municipal markets that pay taxes and follow all local regulations
could simultaneously be street vendors and formal businesses.
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"street traders construct themselves as collective political subjects with the capacity
to confront and negotiate with the state" (p.179). How did supposedly atomized in-
dividuals achieve this level of political engagement?
I argue that where enforcement costs are high, the state benefits from encour-
aging violators to organize self-regulating groups. I show that governments can offer
private benefits to informal workers who organize self-regulating associations, which
solves the workers’ collective action problem. Political entrepreneurs in informal sec-
tors can use state-supplied selective incentives to make it worth their colleagues’ time
to join and participate in informal workers’ organizations. Once workers organize, the
state can bargain over legalization, regulation, and enforcement with a representative
group. The group, in turn, enforces laws more thoroughly than the state could itself.
However, state payments2 to informal workers lead to another puzzle: why do
governments pay people to organize, especially people who routinely violate the law?
Where people find it easier to violate a policy than to comply, many will break the
law, which drives up enforcement costs for the state. I argue that states with lower
capacity are particularly constrained by enforcement costs because they do not have
the material or political resources to cover increasing costs. When enforcement costs
rise, most states respond but lower capacity states in particular look for solutions
that do not draw on budgetary or human resources. One option that governments
2Some governments offer cash payments to informal workers and other violators: vendors reported
that past city administrations in La Paz paid leaders to cooperate and El Alto has an agreement to
return half of all licensing fees to street vendor organizations (see chapters 3 and 4). In India, the
government issues organized street vendors debit cards for health care expenses (Agarwala, 2013,
p.3-4). In many more cases, governments offer potential violators incentives that can be used for
material gain. In this project, I primarily discuss licenses, which in Bolivia, Brazil, and many other
places are resold on secondary markets for cash and can make an informal business more predictable,
stable, and lucrative. Thus, I use "payment" broadly to mean cash payments as well as less liquid
benefits, like licenses or restricted-use debit cards.
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in Bolivia, India, and other countries have found is to delegate enforcement to civil
society, and, in the process, materially encourage new civil society organizations to
form.
In this project, I use the cases of Bolivian and Brazilian street vendors to argue
that state enforcement costs and individual resources like education shape resource-
poor actors’ decisions to organize. Street vendors are 4% to 15% of workers in major
cities like Lima, Hanoi, and Johannesburg (Vanek et al., 2014, p.47). Street vendors
typically have little formal education or other social capital relative to other workers
and earn roughly minimum wage (Bhowmik, 2012, p.8). Globally, most street ven-
dors eschew organization, but a sizable minority unionizes and some of these form
city- and country-wide federations, making the population empirically relevant and
theoretically appropriate for developing the theory.
The dissertation presents twin puzzles—why do some people with very few
resources organize while most do not, and why do states sometimes pay potential
lawbreakers to organize—and resolves both with a theory of strategic state interven-
tion in civil society. I use cases of organized and unorganized street vendors in La
Paz and El Alto, Bolivia and São Paulo, Brazil to develop the theory, formalize the
theoretical core in a game theoretic model, and provisionally test its implications with
a dataset of self-employed people in Latin America.
1.1 Contributions
The main contribution of this dissertation is to formally demonstrate broad conditions
under which low-resource actors like informal workers organize. Half of all workers
are informal and the few studies on informality and political participation find that
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informality decreases participation (Castells and Portes, 1989; King and Rueda, 2008;
Kurtz, 2004; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014; Perry, 2007; Roberts, 2002). In contrast, I
find that where workers increase enforcement costs for the state—which is much more
likely in informal markets than formal employment—the state may incentivize orga-
nized political participation. This may be the main avenue for low resource actors
like informal workers to overcome collective action problems, since effective selective
incentives tend to demand significant resources. The state—as a large, established,
and resource-rich organization—can provide selective incentives where individual ac-
tivists cannot. Members benefit from resulting organizations that advocate for better
policy, coordinate interests and information, and provide services.
The dissertation also contributes to comparative political science by formal-
izing political context (Tarrow, 2011). The formal model demonstrates that these
outcomes stem from interactive as opposed to top-down processes: informal workers
and authorities create the environment in which they make decisions about collec-
tive action. Additionally, the model endogenizes selective incentives and in doing so,
partially endogenizes collective action to the political process. The model includes
equilibrium outcomes where people who would not otherwise organize do so in antic-
ipation of policy input or legal benefits.
Political bargaining processes can involve legalizing or formalizing people and
activities that were previously outlawed. This process brings marginalized workers
and communities into state regulatory structures while giving them reasons to partic-
ipate in and support government projects. In this was, legalization and formalization
can contribute to state building projects and strengthen civil society. Additionally, I
demonstrate that the dimensions and characteristics of informal work and gray mar-
kets are endogenous to state actions. Bruhn and McKenzie (2014), Soto (2000), and
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others find that most formalization policies have minimal effects and many states
know that large informal sectors are a persistent reality. For policymakers who are
willing to work with informal businesses on development and civil society projects,
paying workers to organize and then delegating enforcement to those organizations
is a strategy that has legalized workers while strengthening civil society and local
bureaucracies.
1.2 Definitions
The estimates of informal workers relative to formal workers stay relatively consis-
tent across different operationalizations of informality, like self-employed, working for
a micro-enterprise, or not receiving legally mandated compensation (Ronconi, 2010,
p.719). Due to these overlapping but contested definitions, it may be more intuitive
to think of informality as a continuum (Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007, p.3). On one
end, unregistered street vendors sell counterfeit goods, do not work under labor reg-
ulations, and pay no taxes and fees. These workers may have some colleagues who
sell imported counterfeits but also locally-produced goods and who pay licensing fees
to the municipality. Moving along the continuum, a corner café may be registered
and licensed by the health department, but have an owner who does not report cash
revenues on taxes and pays employees under the table to avoid social security. Even
large businesses that we reflexively consider anchors of the formal end of the con-
tinuum regularly skimp on labor laws, falsify documents to under-report taxes, and
subcontract operations to less formal firms (Castells and Portes, 1989; Lopez, 2007;
Nordstrom, 2007).
The project takes individual street vendors as the primary units of analysis
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and their decisions to create work-based organizations or not as the outcome of in-
terest. The project definitions in Table 1 designate a large and heterogeneous part of
the workforce as informal, while acknowledging that most workers and markets use
a mix of formal and informal practices. The empirical literature has not reached a
consensus on definitions of informal economic activity, and so I construct my defini-
tions to be comparable with the most prominent studies, particularly Holland (2016),
Castells and Portes (1989) and de Soto (1989).
1.3 Methods
The dissertation employs an integrative multi-method research design to support the
weaknesses of each method with the strengths of another (Seawright, 2016, p.9) and
because informal sector research is plagued by data paucity. The project employs
ethnography for its in-depth observation of micro-level processes over time (Katz,
1997; Auyero, 2012). Surveys and interviews enable initial comparisons to larger
groups of people within the same city. Game theoretic models can then assess the
logical consistency of the theory and formalize the qualitative findings in order to
derive clear expectations for other cases (Clarke and Primo, 2012; Wagner, 2010). Fi-
nally, logistic regression and machine learning analyses on a dataset of self-employed
people allow for a provisional test of the theory’s predictions on out of sample data
(Breiman, 2001a).
I selected La Paz as a case because the metropolitan area hosts one of the
largest street vendor organizations in the world: the Confederation of Street Vendors
of Bolivia has over 700 affiliated groups, which range in size from 24 to over 20,000.
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Table 1.1: Project definitions
Term Definition
Informal work: Any transaction of money, goods, or services in which the partici-
pants ignore relevant tax, reporting, or licensing requirements.
Informal worker: A worker who does not pay taxes on taxable earnings, does not
hold a license for her work when one is required, or is not part of
a mandatory social security system. Falling into any one of these
categories makes a worker informal for the purposes of this study.
Street vendor: A person who sells any good outside and on public land at least
once a week. Note that street vendors are not inherently informal




A registered group whose members are mostly street vendors from
the same urban area and that states it represents street vendors in
its bylaws.
Selective incentive: A private benefit that people receive for participating in a collective
endeavor (Hardin, 1982; Ostrom, 2007).
Negative externality: A cost that an actor’s actions create for an external actor.
Collective action
problem:
Any issue that prevents people from working together when doing
so is in their mutual interest (Olson, 1965).
Public good: Anything that everyone can benefit from without reducing its value
once it is provided; a good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous
(Ostrom, 1990, 2007).
9
Mine and others’ interviews (Lazar, 2007a; Tassi et al., 2013) suggest that it has at
least 250,000 members from its strongholds of El Alto and La Paz, as well as members
in other Bolivian cities. Lazar (2007a) claims that most adults in El Alto belong to
informal sector unions (p.53). Thus, the Confederation is one of the largest informal
workers’ organizations in the world. Conversely, the largest informal workers’ organi-
zation, the Self-Employed Women’s Association in India, claims 1.9 million members
and includes many street vendors (SEWA 2009). Proportionally, the Bolivian con-
federation is the largest street vendor and informal worker organization, as Bolivia’s
entire population is 10 million.
São Paulo, Brazil serves as a comparison because its street vendors and their
organizations are typical of large cities, according to surveys and histories of street
vendor organizations globally (Bhowmik, 2012; WIEGO, 2016). Like Lima, New York,
and Hong Kong, tens of thousands of people work in São Paulo as street vendors. The
sector serves a "shock absorber for the labor market" (Pamplona, 2013, p.226), with
people turning to street vending when they find themselves out of work. While many
people cycle in and out, a core of career street vendors anchors the sector. Career
street vendors control the best selling spots and may have a higher level of job security
and certainty from licenses and informal contracts. Still, most career street vendors
in São Paulo, similar to many other large cities, do not join vendor organizations.
Ethnography is particularly suited for studying processes and systems of in-
formal rules because it uses in-depth observation and interaction over time, making
it ideal for both collective action and informal sector research (Katz, 1997; Auyero,
2001). Ethnographic methods use participant observation—observing actions, in-
teractions, and conversations repeatedly—to assess what participants have told the
researcher in conversations and interviews (Geertz, 1973). Through repetition and ob-
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servation over months, ethnography offers far more opportunities to falsify hypotheses
and revise expectations than purely interview-based methods (Jerolmack and Khan,
2014).
Formalizing ethnographic findings through a game theoretic model develops
the internal logic of the theory and facilitates generalization. Game theory makes
explicit the underlying assumptions that every theory relies on, and once these as-
sumptions are clear, readers can evaluate if the assumptions logically lead to the
stated conclusions (Clarke and Primo, 2012). Furthermore, the model’s assumptions
are grounded in ethnographic data. For example, the model assumes that informal
workers approach organizing decisions with a rational, cost-benefit calculation and
that once formed, organizations self-regulate. The ethnographic data demonstrates
that street vendors in La Paz and their organizations do both. Finally, formalization
yields clear observable implications that can be falsified or confirmed with new data.
Moving to new analyses and data, machine learning is much more flexible than
standard statistical models because it requires no parametric assumptions about the
data (Breiman, 2001a; Muchlinski et al., 2016). This feature is particularly useful
for large datasets that violate core regression assumptions, like the regional survey
data that I use as a provisional test. It is also useful for theoretical areas in which
proper model specification is largely unknown and widely debated, which is the case
in collective action research. Finally, machine learning models can accurately find
what data predicts other data, and typically outperform logistic regression and other




People with shared interests often fail to work together due to a set of common
challenges known as collective action problems (Axelrod, 1984; Marwell and Oliver,
1993; Hardin, 1982). Olson (1965) demonstrates that people do not have an incentive
to work together for their common interest unless they receive a private benefit.
Overcoming this problem is particularly difficult for large, diffuse groups and, in
most times and places, informal workers constitute a large, diffuse group.
Research on the informal economy shows that informal workers exist in every
country and that informal jobs make up most employment opportunities in many
places (Vanek et al., 2014; WIEGO, 2016). Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010)
estimate that 19% of the world’s GDP comes from informal activity, ranging from
national highs of 68% of GDP in Bolivia and Georgia to lows of 8% in the United
States and Switzerland (p.20-24). Informal workers typically work long hours to make
approximately minimum wage, their jobs are often stressful and dangerous, and many
also maintain a household (Bhowmik, 2012, p.6-8, 20-21). Most do not have extra
time or money to attend meetings or pay dues, and when they do, family, health
care, or rest come first. Due to these barriers, informal workers face common but
intractable collective action problems.
Scholars disagree on how people overcome collective action problems. Olson
(1965) demonstrated that selective incentives—private benefits for participants—can
resolve problems, but Oliver (1980) shows that providing selective incentives presents
another collective action problem. Axelrod (1984) demonstrates that with enough
time and interaction, groups evolve stable participation norms and Ostrom (1990)
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shows that these can be complex institutions. Still, many longstanding groups do
not create these arrangements. Marwell and Oliver (1993) demonstrate that large,
diffuse groups can solve collective action problems if one resource-rich actor provides
the outcome or covers costs (p.10, 20). Similarly, Hardin (1982) demonstrates that
actor heterogeneity makes it easier for actors to coordinate contributions (p.67-69),
which empirical studies confirm (Grossman and Baldassarri, 2012).
Researchers disagree on why informal workers organize. Many scholars assume
that they do not organize (Naylor, 2004; Perry, 2007). These expectations follow
the predictions of the larger collective action literature, which finds that people with
fewer resources are less likely to participate in social movements, political parties, and
unions than people with more (Ostrom, 2007; MacCarthy and Zald, 1973; Tarrow,
2011). However, Table 2 lists studies that document informal worker organizations
all over the world.
Resources and political context shape who participates in civil society (Cook,
2012; Hochstetler, 2012; Holland, 2015; McAdam, 1982; Ostrom, 2007; Putnam, 2001;
Tarrow, 2011; McAdam et al., 2003). On an individual level, resources largely ex-
plain who organizes and participates and who does not: people with more education,
income, free time, and social connections form and participate in civil organizations
while people with less tend to abstain (Hochstetler, 2012; Murillo, 2001; Karcher
and Schneider, 2012). On a national level, political context largely explains why
some places see much higher levels of participation than others: states that create a
political context with opportunities for participation—for example, through voting,
participatory budgeting, free public association, or broad consultation laws, among
many other possibilities—see higher levels of participation (Flavin and Hartney, 2015;
Ostrom, 1990; Tarrow, 2011). Conversely, as states encourage less of this behavior
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Table 1.2: Selected case studies on informal workers and their organizations
Study Location Workers Level of Organization





Global Street vendors Range: Neighborhood to
national organizations
Blofield (2012) Bolivia & Costa Rica Domestic workers National
Cross (1998) Mexico City Street vendors Neighborhood
Duneier and
Carter (1999)
New York Street vendors None
Gowan (2010) San Francisco Recyclers None
Goodfellow
(2015)
Kigali & Kampala Motorcycle taxis Citywide
Grossman (2017) Lagos Market vendors Citywide





Los Angeles Domestic workers Citywide
Itikawa (2010) São Paulo Street vendors Neighborhood




Paris & Brazzaville Import & export None
WIEGO
Database (2016)
Global Varied Range: Neighborhood to
national
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or discourage participation with restrictive laws and outright repression, they see less
participation overall and individuals factor this environment into their political deci-
sions (Davenport, 2007; Ritter and Conrad, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Researchers do not agree on which theoretical components or empirical factors
matter most for participation or how they interact. Only a few studies, like Ostrom
(2009), Tarrow (2011), and Schelling (1978), consider civil society formation as a
process that brings various parts together at different points and in potentially inter-
active ways. However, these studies operate at a level of abstraction that complicates
operationalization and falsifiability in empirical studies.
Ostrom (1990) and Tarrow (2011) might characterize this project’s argument
as a political context explanation: where political context is favorable or political op-
portunities expand, states offer selective incentives and we expect to see more collec-
tive action. Conversely, where the context is unfavorable and opportunities contract,
we expect less. While this conjecture is widely accepted, it is too broad to be falsi-
fiable. This study builds on political opportunities by formalizing political context
in a simple way to show the conditions under which the state incentivizes collective
action. In doing so, I demonstrate that political context is interactive (Goodwin,
2001, p.24-25): street vendors help create the conditions under which they then make
collective action decisions.
1.4.2 State Capacity
States’ ability to enforce laws is a central component of state capacity, according
to the many scholars who argue for a behavioral-based definition of state capacity
(Amengual, 2013; Besley and Persson, 2010; Goodfellow, 2015). States with more
capacity may produce the same laws as states with less (Amengual, 2013, p.527), but
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because increased capacity means increased implementation, higher capacity states
interact more with civil society in the process. Therefore, defining state capacity as
a state’s ability to implement policy implies that states with more capacity are more
active in their citizens’ lives.
Scholars generally agree that more state capacity leads to better outcomes,
like higher rates of development, higher GDP growth, more and high quality services,
and less armed conflict (Besley and Persson, 2010, p.1-2). They disagree on how
to build state capacity. Besley and Persson (2010) model state capacity as invest-
ments in public infrastructure while (Grindle, 1997, p.484) and many others find that
investments alone increase costs without necessarily increasing capacity; Amengual
(2013) stresses investments and linkages to civil society (p.528-529). To the contrary,
Huntington (1968) cautions that an active civil society in weak institutional contexts
could lead to chaos, not capacity (p.4).
The literature largely ignores the possibility that states can build capacity by
making investments in areas outside of the public sector. I suggest that lower ca-
pacity states may prefer to invest in civil society over enforcement infrastructures.
Encouraging civil society can be cheaper than investing directly in the public sector
and can build state capacity over time, contrary to Huntington (1968). Civil society
linkages build state capacity by returning resources to the state in the form of taxes,
information, and qualified personnel (Amengual, 2013, p.544).
1.5 The Argument in Brief
Under what conditions do informal workers organize? I argue that where enforcement
is politically and materially costly, states may pay informal workers to organize and
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regulate themselves. Where the cost of direct enforcement is higher than the cost of
collective action, states can benefit from paying potential violators to form and par-
ticipate in civil society organizations. States can then save resources by delegating
enforcement functions to those organizations.
In the proposed theoretical process, state capacity, enforcement costs, and in-
dividuals’ resources affect civil society formation and participation through two the-
oretical mechanisms. The process begins with state capacity: lower capacity states
spend less on enforcement than higher capacity states because they have fewer re-
sources to work with. In the first mechanism, states may pay people to participate
in self-regulating organizations, under the condition that delegation costs less than
direct enforcement. In the second mechanism, individuals with more resources lever-
age them to participate in civil society in order to capture selective incentives. Thus,
when lower capacity states provide benefits to informal workers, informal workers
form, join, and participate more in civil society, whereas higher capacity states that
ramp up enforcement do not see these developments in civil society. The people in
the sector who participate typically have more education, income, time, and other
resources than those who do not.
The project advances a general argument about when governments intervene
in collective action, and the conditions under which intervention pushes individuals
to organize. The project uses street vendors in three cities as cases of state interven-
tion in collective action. The scope of the argument covers all governments facing
unorganized citizens. However, I expect democratic governments to intervene more
readily than authoritarian ones. Democratic governments face regular referendums
on governance and enforcement issues through elections. Additionally, authoritarian
governments may have more opportunities and resources to enforce harshly without
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public outcry and may prefer to do so instead of delegating power and responsibility
to civil society groups.
1.6 Alternative Explanations
Scholars suggest that grievances (Gurr, 1970), identity politics (Yashar, 2005), and
emotional cycles (Eﬄer, 2010; Seawright, 2012) can help people mobilize, but these
factors appear to play little to no role in street vendor organizations or other infor-
mal worker organizations documented in existing research. As others have argued,
grievances are omnipresent in low resource actors’ lives (Scott, 1987; Goodwin, 2001,
p.26) but unions and protests are not; therefore, grievances cannot explain variation
in participation. Additionally, informal workers describe forming organizations in
cost-benefit terms with little mention of identity (Bhowmik, 2012, p.29-33), actively
compete with their colleagues (Goldstein, 2016, p.xi), and publicly express their dis-
like for other people in their organizations (Lazar, 2007a, p.184, 198). For example,
working with domestic workers’ associations, Blofield (2012) highlights the role of
personal organizing costs, particularly experience, as well as state incentives in the
form of legal resources (p.6), not identity, emotions, or grievances, though domestic
workers could base claims in all three.
Corruption and clientelism could also explain why officials encourage infor-
mal worker organizations: organizations could facilitate bribes or vote buying. Re-
searchers consistently find that bureaucrats and politicians extract votes and bribes
from informal workers (Bhowmik, 2012; Holland, 2015; Lazar, 2007a). However, cor-
ruption and clientelism exist around the world and target both organized and unor-
ganized informal workers. Organizations do not exist in all of the same places. For
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example, organized and unorganized street vendors in São Paulo describe a bribery
racket where both types of vendors bribe inspectors under the threat of confiscation
(Itikawa, 2006, p.141). Likewise, vendors in La Paz described paying small bribes to
police and bureaucrats before they organized and paying fewer but larger bribes to
bureaucrats in the same offices after organizing. These patterns suggest that officials
target informal workers with clientelism and corruption whether or not they are or-
ganized, but that clientelism and corruption do not drive organizational dynamics.
Clientelism certainly exists in La Paz’s street vendor organizations: I observed
appointed bureaucrats and elected officials making clientelistic appeals to organized
and unorganized vendors. However, in private, vendors scoffed at the parties and
professed their vote choice for another party. Additionally, if clientelism were driving
organizing dynamics, we should observe organizations starting around election sea-
son and state incentives following electoral cycles; instead, organizations start outside
of election season and bureaucrats and vendors sustain incentives and relationships
across electoral cycles. Organization might centralize clientelistic appeals, but the
unions do not monitor clients’ vote choices, suggesting that organizational incentives
make for an ineffective vote buying strategy (Muñoz, 2014, p.79-80). Modes of clien-
telism and corruption may change with organization but do not appear to drive state
intervention in collective action.
Bolivia has experienced massive cycles of mobilization from the 1952 revolu-
tion to the gas and water wars of the early 2000s and the broad social movements
that propelled the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) to power (Dangl, 2007; Madrid,
2012). One alternative explanation is that prior forms of mass collective action create
or enable abnormally large informal workers’ organizations in Bolivia, and that Bo-
livia is an outlier because of idiosyncratic historical factors. However, South Korea,
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South Africa, India, and Chile all have national informal workers’ organizations and
very different histories of mass participation, particularly in Chile and South Korea
(Bhowmik, 2012, p. 40, 232). Additionally, Bolivian street vendor unions began or-
ganizing in the 1800s (Rojas, 1992, p.111, 115-116) and while individual unions come
and go, the national confederation and most citywide federations began in the 1950s
and 1970s, prior to Bolivia’s most recent wave of contention. Finally, while some
individual vendors participated in the gas war or campaigned for MAS, most did not,
and very few mention past collective action as a factor in starting street vendor orga-
nizations. Instead, street vendors discuss the state and potential costs and benefits
of organizing.
Scholars argue that variations in political variables like state institutions facili-
tate informal workers’ collective action (Agarwala, 2013; Cross, 1998; Holland, 2015).
However, the inclusive institutions that facilitate organizing, according to scholars
such as Agarwala (2013), p.15, and Cross (1998), p.229, exist in countries like the
United States and France which have few to no informal workers’ organizations. To
the contrary, anthropologists argue that particularly complex forms of cooperation—
like long-lived community associations and self-regulating unions—occur precisely
when the state neglects informal markets and actors (Goldstein, 2016; Lazar, 2007a;
Tassi et al., 2013). However, informal workers frequently discuss their interactions
with the state and the biggest organizations are often in capital cities where the state
is most present (Blofield, 2012; WIEGO, 2016), strongly suggesting that state absence
does not explain when and why informal workers organize.
I contend that scholars miss the role of strategic interaction between govern-
ments and informal workers, and that without this interaction, both bottom-up and
state-based explanations are incomplete. States can benefit by materially encouraging
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organization, but only when informal workers’ actions make enforcement particularly
costly. This interaction explains why informal workers rarely organize in places like
the United States, occasionally organize in places like Brazil and Peru, and massively
organize in Bolivia and India.
1.7 Organization of the Dissertation
Chapter 1 has introduced and situated the puzzle of organized street vendors in the lit-
eratures on collective action, civil society, informal work, and state capacity. Informal
workers do not organize, according to most scholars, which makes Rosa’s champañeras
union and its affiliation with a national street vendor confederation puzzling. The
chapter has outlined an explanation for why informal workers organize and assessed
alternative explanations. Specifically, I argue that where enforcement costs are high,
the state benefits from encouraging violators to organize self-regulating groups.
Chapter 2 develops a theory of state intervention in collective action. I ar-
gue that as unorganized people create negative externalities for the state, the state
increasingly has an incentive to offer private benefits to people that organize self-
regulating organizations. If the state intervenes in this way, it removes the barriers
that kept people from organizing beforehand, and can then bargain over regulation
and enforcement with representatives instead of a mass of individuals. The theory
builds on contributions from Olson (1965), Ostrom (1990), and Holland (2016). I then
formalize the theory in a game theoretic model to show that the state and workers
are strategically linked. I use the model to demonstrate the exact conditions under
which we expect organization as a result of intervention. The theory specifies two
mechanisms: first, lower capacity states have more difficulty covering enforcement
21
costs, which creates pressure to compromise with civil society. Conversely, higher ca-
pacity states face less pressure from enforcement costs and are more likely to enforce
laws directly. Therefore, the theory expects that the lower (higher) a state’s capacity,
the more (less) it delegates to civil society, and that the more (fewer) incentives a
state offers, the more (less) people participate. Second, state incentives encourage
individuals to participate where they otherwise would not, leading individuals to use
their preexisting resources to take advantage of state incentives. Therefore, the theory
expects that people with more (fewer) resources participate to receive state incentives
more (less) than people with fewer (more) resources.
Chapter 3 develops an ethnography of street vendors and their organizations
in La Paz, Bolivia. The chapter is based on nine months of ethnographic fieldwork
in the city, which included interviews, participant observation at dozens of meetings
between bureaucrats and organized vendors, and working as a street vendor in a
clothing market. I ground the game theoretic model’s assumptions in observations:
I show that unorganized street vendors create negative externalities, street vendors
approach collective action decisions with a cost-benefit analysis, the state offers pri-
vate benefits to organized street vendors, especially leaders, and that once organized,
vendors self-regulate and bargain with the state. I then discuss how street vending
has changed in the city and how the state intervened in collective action decisions
as the sector grew. I turn to the theory’s observable implications and show that the
state increased benefits to organized vendors as the costs of regulating the sector
increased. Additionally, the leaders that take advantage of these offers tend to have
more resources than their colleagues, and as the offers increased, so did the level of
organization among the city’s street vendors.
Chapter 4 develops the theory in comparative context, by adding case studies
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of organized and unorganized street vendors in El Alto, Bolivia and São Paulo, Brazil.
Comparing La Paz to the neighboring city of El Alto holds many national-level fea-
tures constant but varies city government capacity. São Paulo—the large, modern
metropolis of the region’s richest country, with many employment opportunities, ser-
vices, stable laws, and a history of labor organizing—should have more organized
street vendors than La Paz, according to resource- or political context-based theories
of collective action. Instead, only 2% of São Paulo’s 100,000 vendors are organized,
compared to 75% of La Paz’s 60,000. I explain this difference with the interaction
between individual resources and state capacity.
Chapter 5 provisionally tests the theory on a subsample of self-employed re-
spondents from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) combined with
World Bank development indicators. The logistic regression and machine learning
analyses serve as preliminary evaluations of the theory with out-of-sample data. Re-
searchers often use self-employment as a proxy for informality because most informal
workers are self-employed and self-employment is easier than informal employment to
define and measure cross-nationally through survey research (Hussmanns, 2004, p.2-
10). Additionally, while some self-employed individuals work as white-collar lawyers
or web designers, globally most self-employed people make roughly minimum wage
as domestic workers, day laborers, recyclers, or street vendors (Fiess et al., 2010,
p.211-212).
Chapter 6 summarizes the project and discusses the broader implications of
the argument for informal workers and other citizens. I advance the theoretical claim
that when individuals break the law, they can paradoxically get help from states to
organize. I elaborate implications for humane and effective formalization policies, us-
ing the mixed success example of a tax reform in Bolivia. The chapter concludes the
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dissertation with implications for state intervention in civil society, as well as issues
of corruption, violence, and state building.
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Chapter 2
Theory: State Intervention in
Collective Action
Natalia started working at 8 years old, selling toys and candy to other children
outside of a school after her mother died. Decades later, she supports two daughters
by working the same stall every day from 7 am to 7 pm, with no breaks because she
fears being robbed. Though she helped found a street vendors’ association before she
had children, she and the other vendors on her block are now unaffiliated because
organizing would take too much time away from work and family. Natalia’s story
is common; street vendors typically work long hours to make minimum wage, their
jobs are often stressful and dangerous, and many also maintain a household. Most
do not have extra time or money to organize and attend meetings or pay dues, and if
they have some discretionary time or income, family, health care, or rest come first.
Street vendors can list out the potential benefits of organizing with their colleagues:
coordinating cleaning, fair dispute resolution, or hiring a block security guard. Still,
they would rather leave it to someone else to spend the time and money necessary
to put a group together. Street vendors typically will not organize unless they can
get an additional, private incentive for participating. Thus, street vendors frequently
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face a common but intractable collective action problem.
In this chapter, I discuss the relevant literature and alternative explanations
for why informal workers organize. I then present my own argument: where enforce-
ment is costly, states may take an active role in encouraging potential violators to
organize and, once organized, regulate themselves. I present a theory in which state
capacity, enforcement costs, and individuals’ resources affect civil society participa-
tion. In the theory, individuals’ disposable income is the most important resource
that they can mobilize; empirically, I track individuals’ educational levels as a proxy
for income (Brady et al., 1995, p.273-274). For individuals, time and money form
the primary costs of organizing. In this theory, governments’ enforcement costs are
primarily material: the money that it costs to pay police and bureaucrats to enforce
laws and process paperwork.
The process starts with state capacity: lower capacity states typically spend
less on enforcement than their higher capacity counterparts. States may materially
encourage people to participate in self-regulating groups, as long as delegating en-
forcement to civil society costs less than government enforcement. People with more
use their resources to participate in order to take advantage of these state incentives.
Therefore, when lower capacity states target incentives to informal workers, people
participate more, whereas higher capacity states that increase enforcement instead
of incentives do not see an increase in participation. The individuals within a target
population who participate tend to have more preexisting resources than their col-
leagues who do not participate. The theory contributes to work on collective action
by demonstrating that state intervention and delegation to civil society can encourage
people to organize where they otherwise would not.
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2.1 The Dependent Variable: Organization
Collective action forms the core of many research puzzles in political science (Ostrom,
1998): why do people cooperate or not, and what implications do these decisions have
for institutions, policies, and civil society? Many studies ask why people organize,
particularly in unexpected situations, and offer building blocks and alternative expla-
nations for the theory developed here.
In this project, I focus on organization as the outcome of interest. Collective
action can lead to dozens of outcomes and different studies take cooperation (Ol-
son, 1965), protest (Kitschelt, 1986), social movements (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998),
cooperatives (Ostrom, 2015), public goods (Olken, 2010), or other phenomena as the
dependent variable of interest. This study examines organizations because they can
be clearly operationalized through both qualitative and quantitative work, and are
durable and possible to track through time. Additionally, study participants con-
firmed that their professional organizations were their most important vehicle for col-
lective action, and that much of their civil society and political participation revolved
around establishing, maintaining, and making demands through their organizations.
By looking at organizations, I largely avoid the methodological pitfalls of other pos-
sible dependent variables, like systematic under-counting of small events or units,
which bedevils research on protests (Earl et al., 2004, p.67-68), or unclear conceptual
boundaries, which is an enduring problem for social movement research (Della Porta
and Diani, 2009, p.5-8).
I define an organization as a registered group with bylaws (refer to Table 1
of the introductory chapter). In the qualitative chapters, I focus on street vendor
organizations, which I define as registered groups whose primary membership base
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consists of street vendors. In the quantitative data, I look at people who attended
a professional association meeting because such associations are typically registered
groups with bylaws that primarily represent people of the same profession. In both
cases, the dependent variable is a clearly defined unit that I and other researchers can
track and verify over time through interviews, documents, archives, and survey data.
2.1.1 Research on Collective Action
Building on decades of collective action research, Ostrom (2007), Tarrow (2011), and
Hardin (1982) offer theoretical frameworks for analyzing and explaining why people,
including street vendors and other informal workers, form and join organizations.
Their frameworks form the foundation of my theory.
Olson (1965) demonstrated that individuals have incentives to free ride on
others’ efforts where possible. As a result, individuals do not always cooperate when
they can improve collective outcomes. A rich formal research agenda developed out of
Olson’s thesis as scholars tried to establish why people cooperate in some situations
but not others (Axelrod, 1984; Hardin, 1982; Oliver, 1980; Schelling, 1978; Snidal,
1985). This work established that self-interested individuals with no central author-
ity can still cooperate in many situations: for example, Hardin (1982) demonstrated
that people with different preferences can coordinate mutually beneficial cooperation
(p.67-69). Axelrod (1984) and his collaborators demonstrated formally that individ-
uals interacting indefinitely can establish stable expectations that facilitate cooper-
ation (p.11, 20-21). These findings have found widespread support in observational
and experimental evidence, most notably in a global collaborative project between
economists and anthropologists Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel Bowles, Colin
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Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Herbert Gintis that conducted ethnographic fieldwork and
economic games in 15 remote communities and found an even greater diversity of
cooperative strategies (Henrich, 2004). However, by looking at anarchic situations
where cooperation is least likely, many of these scholars overlooked a key player in
many citizens’ real-world collective action decisions: the state.
Elinor Ostrom launched one of the most productive and applied research agen-
das on collective action by looking at when individuals, communities, and states co-
operate to preserve common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom’s work examined
and compared collective action in the absence and presence of a central state author-
ity. Ostrom, like Henrich (2004), found a wide variety of cooperative strategies, as
well as many examples of failed attempts (Ostrom, 2009, p.14, 139, 180, 190).1 Her
later work (Ostrom 2007, 2009) developed broad frameworks for analyzing, under-
standing, and facilitating different types of collective action. Ostrom acknowledged
the role of external authority and intervention in collective action, and criticized how
policy interventions are designed, but did not elaborate a theory of state intervention
(Ostrom, 1990, p.22-24, 29, 40-41, 190). My theory builds on Ostrom’s work and
adds the explicit logic that explains when states have incentives to intervene in and
facilitate collective action, and clear conditions under which they free ride, intervene,
or abstain.
Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and Doug McAdam developed collaborative re-
search agendas around collective action, informed by decades of experience working
with social movements and in historical archives (Tilly, 1986; McAdam, 1982; Tilly,
1Elinor Ostrom tackled questions about informality and informal workers’ organizations in side
projects, most notably Guha-Khasnobis et al. (2007), where she and collaborators discussed what
makes for successful formalization policies.
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1978). Their combined efforts culminated in a comprehensive framework for under-
standing cycles of contentious politics, which brought together many factors and fo-
cused on the mechanisms behind collective contention (McAdam et al., 2003). Tarrow
has continued this work by focusing on the emergence, maintenance, and decline of
social movements and contentious politics more generally and developing a theory of
political opportunity structures (Tarrow, 2011). However, Tarrow’s work on political
opportunity structures is primarily qualitative and does not offer clear guidelines for
formalizing the theories or operationalizing concepts. My theory offers one solution
for formalizing the relationship between a government and a potentially contentious
group, and gives conditions under which the government will create opportunities for
a potential group.
In summary, I expand on Ostom and McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow’s frameworks
for analyzing diverse forms of collective action. I add an explicit governance-based
logic that explains state intervention in citizens’ collective action decisions. I develop
the theory informally and formally and operationalize the concepts that I use with
qualitative and quantitative data.
2.1.2 Research on Informal Workers’ Organizations
Anthropologist Keith Hart coined the term "informal economy" in a 1973 paper (Hart,
1973, p.68), which contributed to the emergence of an interdisciplinary network of
scholars studying unregistered economic exchanges. The first prominent studies on
informal markets focused on the emergence or maintenance of these markets and
their implications for international political economy. Initial studies documented un-
organized and politically atomized workers; for example, in one of the first major
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sociological studies of informal markets Castells and Portes (1989) and their collabo-
rators argued that informal workers, because they were unorganized, threatened the
gains made by formal unions in the last century (p.11, 30, 32). In one of the most
prominent economic studies, de Soto (1989) documented the complex incentive struc-
tures that informal workers face and argued that changing that incentive structure
could include millions of poor workers in inclusive growth, but made no mention
of informal workers’ unions or organizations. Many later studies building on this
work either assume that informal workers are categorically unorganized (Kurtz, 2004,
p.265) and politically atomized (Perry, 2007, p.1), or empirically establish that many
are (King and Rueda, 2008).
Scholars outside of political science have tackled why and how informal work-
ers around the world organize, and what explains the variation in their organizations.
A number of studies responding to the first wave of research on informal markets
document wide variation in the social and political participation of informal workers
and offer explanations for this variance.
Bhowmik (2012) and his collaborators document startlingly wide variation
in the level and types of organizations that street vendors participate in around the
world. Bhowmik and his collaborators catalog street vendor organizations, their scale,
and the problems that they face in dozens of countries, with representation from ev-
ery region. For informal workers more generally, the online WIEGO database keeps
a user-updated record of informal workers’ organizations all over the globe. The
database suggests that, in most countries, at least some informal workers in sectors
from street vending to manufacturing to sex work organize.2
2The database is very useful for establishing wide variation across countries and economic sectors.
However, it is user-driven and an incomplete record of informal workers’ organizations and therefore
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Other studies, by contrast, seek to explain these outcomes. Cross (1998) stud-
ied street vendor unions in Mexico City and their successful mobilization against the
city government during PRI-controlled administrations. Cross (1998, p.229) argues
that disagreement between state bureaucrats and politicians enabled the vendors’ suc-
cess at forming and maintaining politically active organizations. Additionally, Cross
(1998, p. 6, 7, 230) argued that the authoritarian structure of the Mexican state gave
these organizations autonomy that they could exploit, but speculated that a transi-
tion to a multiparty state would not take that autonomy away.3 Similar to Cross, I
argue that informal workers interact strategically with bureaucrats and politicians,
and that the state has incentives to intervene in informal markets instead of ignoring
them.
Agarwala’s (2013) work on informal workers’ organizations in India establishes
the foundations for my work in Bolivia and Brazil. Along with Bhowmik (2012), Agar-
wala’s work provides examples outside of Latin America that corroborate the dynam-
ics that I document in Bolivia and Brazil. Agarwala (2013) argues that informal
workers use their power as voters to demand policy change and that these demands
succeed where mass politics rules and governments pursue economic liberalization. In
many ways, my study corroborates Agarwala’s research: workers’ relationship to the
state is key to their individual profits and organization, and in Bolivia they have been
successful at translating demands into policy in an age of mass politics. However, I
find that informal workers have launched successful organizations even in places where
I do not use it in the quantitative analyses. For example, the largest organization that I worked with
in Bolivia is not in the database and I had difficulty verifying the existence of some organizations
recorded as being active in São Paulo. I suspect that if I had these problems with coverage in Bolivia
and Brazil, it is likely that these problems exist for other countries.
3Interestingly, Cross’s (1998) study and Elyachar (2005) are some of the only studies of informal
workers’ organizations under authoritarian regimes.
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the government actively rolls back economic liberalization, like Bolivia. Additionally,
Agarwala acknowledges that many informal workers choose not to organize or join
existing organizations (2013, p. 13) but she does not seek to explain variation at an
individual level.
Holland’s (2014, 2015, 2016) work on enforcement and forbearance has put
Latin American street vendors on political scientists’ radars. Holland (2016) asks
why states selectively enforce laws and argues that politicians strategically choose
which laws to enforce based on voting incentives. Holland (2014) establishes that
these forbearance strategies amount to massive transfers or subsidies from the state
to poor voters.4 Holland (2015) uses multiple types of evidence from Bogotá, Santi-
ago, and Lima to establish that, similar to Agarwala’s argument, pro-poor parties are
more likely to forbear and elitist parties are more likely to enforce. I build on Holland’s
work by taking her dependent variable, enforcement, as one of my key independent
variables. I also diverge from Holland on the concept of state capacity: Holland
(2016) argues at length that state capacity and enforcement costs are separate expla-
nations for enforcement outcomes; I suggest that state capacity shapes enforcement
costs. Finally, Holland’s theory of forbearance and my theory of delegated regulation
lead to different predictions for informal workers and markets: Holland predicts that
high enforcement costs lead to forbearance which leads to continued informality, par-
ticularly under pro-poor parties, while I predict that high enforcement costs lead to
delegated enforcement which leads to increased organization and the partial formal-
ization of informal markets.
4In higher enforcement contexts like the United States, recent sociological research corroborates
her argument by demonstrating that when governments aggressively enforce formality laws that
primarily affect poor people, enforcement decimates household finances and violently disrupts daily
life (Desmond, 2012; Goffman, 2015).
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Finally, other researchers have noticed and studied the massive organizations of
informal workers in Bolivia. Working with street vendors in El Alto, Lazar (2007a) ex-
amines how neighbors organize themselves into politically powerful groups like street
vendor unions to make citizenship claims. My work corroborates hers on the internal
dynamics of street vendor organizations and I use her research in my case study on
El Alto in Chapter 4. Tassi et al. (2013) work with street vendors across Bolivia and
argue that the absence of the state gives businesspeople the space to build their own
institutions that take on state-like roles in many places, including La Paz, El Alto,
and Santa Cruz. However, the largest street vendor organizations are in the country’s
largest cities, which also house state bureaucracies, and one of the main roles of the
organizations in my and others’ research (Agarwala, 2013; Bhowmik, 2012; Lazar,
2007a) is to build and maintain relationships with local and national governments,
which calls Tassi et al.’s state absence thesis into question. Working in Cochabamba,
Daniel Goldstein offers a more nuanced thesis of "organized disorder" and "disregula-
tion" of intermittent and selective state engagement with informal markets and their
organizations (Goldstein, 2016, p.7). Goldstein asks a different research question than
this project: why and how do the poorest informal workers survive? He argues that
poor workers survive through the state’s hands-off reproduction of informality. His
research corroborates the dynamics that I observed in La Paz and El Alto. In the
following section, I use these past theoretical arguments and empirical examples of in-
formal workers’ organizations around the world to build a theory of state intervention
in collective action.
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2.1.3 Partisanship, Clientelism, and Corruption
Other studies document clientelistic relationships between street vendors, organiza-
tions, and administrations, and develop a partisan logic to explain these relationships
(Cross, 1998; Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015). I also observed clientelist exchanges
between officials and vendors in Bolivia and Brazil and interviewees elaborated on
vendors’ bit role in the partisan game between candidates, especially in local politics.
I suggest that some governments directly intervene in collective action in order to
increase compliance and regulate informal sectors and as an alternative to clientelis-
tic strategies. The strategy can exist alongside clientelistic practices and within a
partisan logic, as it does in India and Bolivia (Agarwala, 2013; Lazar, 2007a). As I
discuss in the following chapter with ethnographic evidence, partisanship and clien-
telism exist in street markets in La Paz but do not appear to be a deciding factor in
forming and maintaining organizations.
Corruption is common in La Paz’s markets and organizations help perpetuate
it (see chapter 3 for a longer discussion on how this happens). However, corruption
also does not appear to cause street vendor organization. Instead, corruption appears
to be a byproduct of weak institutions, poor enforcement capacity, and delegating
power individual civil society leaders. First, no street vendor attributed organization
or membership to corruption, even though many openly discussed corruption and the
reasons they joined or formed organizations. In contrast, bureaucrats and vendors
frequently discussed state delegation as a primary reason for organizing. Still, one
might wonder if interviewees intentionally hide corrupt organizational roots. Second,
corruption has existed at all levels of the La Paz city government for decades if not
longer, as a former mayor admits in a book he wrote on reducing corruption in cities
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(Klitgaard et al., 2000, p.12). MacLean states that he delegated municipal duties to
professional associations—in the example, the city delegated developer licensing to
an architectural association—because it freed up resources and reduced corruption.
"In fact, even if corruption had not existed, the formula’s anti-corruption
"medicine" turns out in many areas of city government to be perfect for
avoiding costly inefficiency and delays as well as an expensive burden on
municipal resources... I decided to propose that the professional associa-
tion of architects make it possible for members to become certified by the
city, so they could grant the construction permits on behalf of the city,
complying with city norms and regulations, and for a fee which the market
would set... The architects’ association had to agree to help implement,
monitor, and if need be sanction (Klitgaard et al., 2000, p.33)."
MacLean cites governance reasons, not partisan ones, for delegating municipal roles
to a professional association. MacLean’s description of delegation to the architects’
association for capacity and enforcement reasons is strikingly similar to the strategy
the city followed with street vendor organizations and continues to pursue today. In
later years, as the city reorganized street vending administration under a new policy
framework (see chapter 3 for a longer discussion), it wrested a source of bribes away
from police, but mid-level bureaucrats and higher officials participated in corrupt
exchanges with vendors both before and after the reorganization.5 On the other
hand, state delegation increased with this policy, as did the magnitude of the street
vendor organizations.
Governments intervene to encourage collective action, and they also engage
5Unfortunately, I do not have information on the magnitude of bribes before and after the policy,
which would be ideal.
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in corrupt, clientelistic, and partisan strategies. Local and national governments
across Latin America employ a bundle of strategies in their dealings with civil society,
and the process I discuss in this project coexists with other strategies that include
corruption and clientelism or follow an explicitly partisan logic. However, corrupt
or clientelist incentives do not appear to be driving government actors to encourage
street vendors or other citizens to organize and regulate themselves. Instead, state
actors like former mayor MacLean cite governance issues as the reasons behind their
policies that encouraged civil society. The following sections elaborate the strategic
logic of state intervention in collective action.
2.2 Theory
I argue that where enforcement is costly, states may take an active role in encouraging
potential violators to organize and, once organized, regulate themselves. Holland
(2016) demonstrates that governments reap political benefits by not enforcing laws
against poor citizens in informal work and housing. However, foregoing enforcement
can create additional political, public health, and material costs: forbearing on public
space laws with street vendors can anger business owners and homeowners (Holland,
2015, p.358) while forbearing on building codes leads to deaths and scandals when
buildings burn or collapse. Holland’s contributions explain variation in enforcement; I
extend this work by using enforcement costs to explain why informal workers organize.
I suggest that where the state successfully encourages potential violators to organize,
it keeps the political benefits of forbearance while civil society organizations assume
partial responsibility for enforcement.
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2.2.1 States
States pay enforcement costs while individuals pay organizing costs. When a state
decides to attempt to enforce or not, that decision involves material costs like police
salaries, training, and equipment. Enforcement costs also involve political considera-
tions (Holland, 2015): does an action undermine a constituent or build relationships
with new voters? Relatedly, with limited public resources, enforcement costs involve
opportunity costs: every police officer or $1,000 spent patrolling a market cannot
support a homicide investigation or train new officers. States can create their own
enforcement costs by deciding to regulate previously unregulated areas—for example,
criminalizing new drugs or developing new intellectual property rights potentially
increases enforcement costs. Citizens’ actions can also directly create enforcement
costs or increase negative externalities. If citizens’ actions lead to negative externali-
ties and the state decides to control those externalities by ramping up enforcement,
then enforcement costs increase as a result of citizens’ actions. Enforcement costs go
up as budgetary resources decline, and as the number of violations increases.
Where the costs of compliance are more than the costs of breaking the rules,
at least some people will decide to break the law. Noncompliance creates problems
and costs for states, which must decide to expend resources on enforcement or accept
the consequences of noncompliance (Holland, 2016). States can selectively enforce
laws or reduce regulation to make compliance easier, as work on firm- and state-
level regulation and compliance incentives demonstrates (Malesky, 2015). However,
noncompliance or watered-down regulations can result in negative externalities like
electrical fires, polluted water tables, or epidemics, and voters may punish parties for
decreased law and order or social problems (Holland, 2015, p.359, 363). States can
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also curtail violations by increasing enforcement to where the cost of breaking the law
becomes higher than the cost of compliance, but doing so is materially and politically
expensive for states (Ronconi, 2010, p.719). For example, the Brazilian government
spends tens of millions of dollars every year on federal and military police tasked with
confiscating counterfeit consumer items like off-brand dolls from suppliers and retail-
ers, many of them informal importers or street vendors (Pinheiro-Machado, 2011,
p.290-295).
Not all states have the capacity to increase their budgets and personnel by
millions to catch misdemeanors. For example, law enforcement budgets in Bolivia are
low and have few discretionary funds: with recent raises, Bolivia now pays entry-level
police officers slightly above minimum wage. The state recently began paying for
uniforms but requires officers to buy their own guns (Rojas, 05 July 2014; Villareal,
27 June 2012). Even if a municipality wanted to enforce all street vending laws, Bo-
livian police lack the training and discipline to carry out their work (Project, 2014;
Goldstein, 2005). Thus, lower capacity states typically spend less on enforcement
than their higher capacity counterparts.
States may benefit from encouraging organizations where unorganized people
generate negative externalities and punitive enforcement is materially and politically
costly. For example, where food vendors individually cut corners on the health code,
they create negative externalities through food-borne illness, which may use more
public health dollars and decrease economic productivity (Holland, 2015, p.358). If
the state can incentivize a food vendors’ association and then reach a deal with the
association to enforce the health code, the state and vendors create a situation in
which potential violators regulate themselves. Typically conservative constituencies
like homeowners and developers can demand that cities clean up streets and markets.
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However, in places where most voters know someone who routinely breaks minor reg-
ulations, punitive enforcement may alienate voters across the ideological spectrum.
Collective action incentives may be one strategy that local administrations can use
to enforce laws while building electoral coalitions with informal workers. For exam-
ple, Palmer-Rubin (2016) finds that ideologically varied state governments in Mexico
strategically offer incentives to micro-business organizations to build temporary and
long-term coalitions. Where states can offer an incentive that is less than enforcement
costs, states benefit from offering potential non-compliers an incentive to organize and
then self-regulate.
State incentives include licenses, cash, public jobs, political positions, policy
input, increased access, or shorter wait times. In this project, licenses are the pri-
mary state-supplied selective incentive. States may prefer to offer licenses because
they serve multiple purposes simultaneously: licenses help states monitor and reg-
ulate an industry by making market access traceable, revocable, and dependent on
compliance. Additionally, licenses move informal workers along the formalization
continuum. Still, licenses do not fully formalize workers because many licensed work-
ers ignore some regulations and remain outside of national tax and social security
frameworks. For street vendors, vending licenses can mean the difference between
subsistence and a business that generates a middle class income (Goldstein, 2016,
p.x). Other research documents examples of states strategically allocating licenses
to organization members: Cross (1998) finds similar arrangements with street ven-
dors in Mexico City (p.229-230), and Goodfellow (2015) documented the Rwandan
government revoking permission from informal transportation workers until they or-
ganized a self-regulating organization (p. 137). Ironically, in these examples, the
organizations make the licenses more than a piece of paper by enforcing the rules in
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the license more than the state. It is the actions of the organizations and the backing
of the state that makes a license valuable.
As capacity increases, states can implement a wider range of laws and ade-
quately fund enforcement. States typically triage law enforcement spending and put
more resources toward serious crimes like homicide while lightly policing minor infrac-
tions like littering. Only high capacity states like the United States have the option
to pursue broken windows policies, where authorities heavily police all violations, es-
pecially visible minor infractions (Goffman, 2015). This theoretical process suggests
that as capacity increases, states offer fewer direct incentives for participation in self-
regulating groups and put more resources toward enforcement. With fewer incentives,
few informal workers organize. Additionally, the theory implies that with increased
enforcement, informal workers in higher capacity states are more likely to interact
with the criminal justice system than their colleagues in lower capacity states.
2.2.2 Workers
People pay material costs for organizing, like registration fees or dues, which can
add up quickly for people working in poverty. Opportunity costs can also be high:
for a person barely making rent and supporting children, an evening meeting that
detracts from work and childcare constitutes a significant cost. People have varying
levels of material and non-material resources that can help defray organizing costs.
A person’s disposable income is the resource that matters most. Vendors with sav-
ings or hundreds of dollars in disposable income can easily pay upfront registration
and administrative costs of setting up an organization. They can also easily meet
the dues and additional fees involved in maintaining membership in an established
organization. They can contribute to rent costs for an association’s headquarters or
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meeting space, and they feel less pressure to work whenever possible, which makes
participating in organizational activities easier. Empirically, measuring income is
tricky. Instead, I proxy income with education, because education correlates highly
with income and is much easier to measure (Brady et al., 1995, p.274). While income
as proxied by education is the resource I focus on, individuals can pull on other per-
sonal resources as well. For example, a person with preexisting organizing experience
has lower organizing costs than a person without that resource because they do not
have to expend time learning how to manage logistics or build networks (Brady et al.,
1995, p.273); personal attributes like age and formal education can similarly reduce
organizing costs.
Empirically, informal workers typically start working as atomized individuals
(Perry, 2007). States may initially ignore them or choose some level of enforce-
ment. If the state offers organizing incentives, officials may make an offer when
unorganized individuals approach the bureaucracy or seek redress after the state has
punitively enforced. Groups of individuals with more resources—particularly income
or education—are more likely to become political entrepreneurs who take advantage
of state incentives and organize others (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002, p.650-651, 658).
Note that when states offer incentives to organize, they are not necessarily organizing
a sector; they are offering resources that political entrepreneurs can use to create
independent organizations. This tactic can be cheaper for states than organizing a
sector directly, and is more likely to give rise to a representative organization that
has leverage at the bargaining table.
Once workers organize, states can negotiate with group representatives instead
of chasing thousands of individuals. States can negotiate for compliance with existing
policy—for example, no vending in certain areas, no sale of counterfeits, the payment
42
of fees—which they can induce by offering compromises on policy and further mate-
rial incentives. Sector leaders can offer new policies or negotiate for more benefits for
their members. Representatives can offer monitoring and self-regulation, which lower
states’ enforcement costs, in exchange for policy concessions, or to gain leverage they
can threaten noncompliance and protests if no deal is struck.
To whom do states offer incentives for participation? States are more likely
to compromise with people committing minor violations because the smaller the in-
fraction, the smaller the payoff for enforcement. Similarly, states are more likely to
compromise with large groups of people than small ones because as groups grow,
adequate enforcement becomes more expensive. Therefore, states may compromise
more with street vendors, squatters, and undocumented migrants, especially where
they constitute large groups of nonviolent, minor offenders. Conversely, states less
frequently compromise with counterfeit suppliers or traffickers because if they have
the resources, most states prefer to enforce laws against these smaller groups of more
serious violators.
2.3 Model
The formal model demonstrates how interaction between the state and informal work-
ers creates levels of organization ranging from atomized actors to small groups to uni-
versal organizations, as well as the conditions that lead to these different outcomes.
The simplification of the model enables precise causal analysis, but the trade-off is
that the model necessarily leaves out complexities that are important to collective
action decisions and that the ethnographic account captures.
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2.3.1 Why Use Game Theory?
I model the theory mathematically because the argument that states pay potential vi-
olators to organize is counterintuitive and the model demonstrates that the argument
is logically consistent. There are sound theoretical and empirical reasons to expect
that informal workers would not organize: organizing requires money and time that
informal workers typically do not have (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990) and informal
workers typically do not organize in the OECD cities where many academics live and
work (King and Rueda, 2008; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014).
It is counterintuitive that the state steps in and helps or pays people who are
breaking laws. I use game theory to show when and why that happens. Addition-
ally, I start with a canonical collective action model, an n-person public goods game,
and show that the situation I model builds on existing canonical work. The model
that I create contains Olson (1965) and Ostrom’s (1990) equilibria as well as others.
The modeling exercise makes it clear that we need only a few additional and realistic
assumptions—namely, that another player exists that has a payoff distinct from the
vendors but dependent on the public goods game—to have a situation in which a
state pays people to organize. The model contributes to collective action theory by
endogenizing selective incentives to a political bargaining process.
The model also addresses the alternative explanation that informal workers
organize in a few places like Bolivia because those places are culturally distinct in
an idiosyncratic way that facilitates organization. While culture can certainly play
a role in collective action that is not addressed here (Peredo Beltrán, 1992; Tilly,
1986), the model demonstrates that we do not have to model or include culture to
explain situations in which informal workers organize. Modeling the theory in this
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way facilitates moving from the illustrative case of street vendors in La Paz to a more
general explanation of why informal workers organize in some places but not others.
2.3.2 Basic Assumptions
I assume that all actors are rational in that they have goals in any given decision, are
aware of their goals, and make decisions in pursuit of those goals. Note that rational-
ity in a game theoretic model is different from the colloquial meaning of rationality
(Quackenbush, 2004). Here, rationality means that an actor has stable preferences
about the available choices for the duration of the game and does not sabotage them;
in other words, actors know what they want and choose accordingly. Relaxing the
rationality assumption may not change the results as much as one might think: for
example, modeling bounded rationality with an error term, in line with random util-
ity models or stochastic discrete choice games (Fischer and Qaim, 2012; Signorino,
2003), would probably produce high and low contribution equilibria similar to the
existing model’s results.
I assume that informal workers want to maximize their profits and their benefit
from public goods and state incentives. Benefits could be material—for example, a se-
lective incentive like a license for a larger stall increases the volume that a vendor can
sell while a public good like market security decreases losses to theft—or immaterial,
like symbolic representation in policy negotiations. In the empirical section, I show
that vendors primarily consider material benefits in their organizing decisions; how-
ever, the model can accommodate workers with other considerations. Additionally,
I assume that the government wants to minimize costs. This model’s assumptions
about actors, their costs, their options, and their interactions are listed in the nota-
tion table in Table 2 and illustrated in the game tree in Figure 1.
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The model’s results are robust to a range of changes: if costs are private instead
of public, if the distribution of costs changes, if there is no k threshold, or there are
more specific cost and benefit terms, the model produces similar equilibrium results
(see appendix for robustness checks and extensions with club goods and a separate
move for people joining an existing organization).6
What are the limitations of the model? The model explains organization
with endogenous selective incentives; it does not directly model self-regulation. Self-
regulation is an empirical fact in the ethnographic case study developed in the next
chapter: virtually all street vendor organizations in La Paz that receive state incen-
tives enforce at least some local ordinances. Additionally, public goods games are one
way to model collective action decisions; a moral hazard or coordination game would
model different aspects of the decision and produce different results.
2.3.3 Set Up
In the model, a state chooses to intervene in informal workers’ decisions to cooperate
or not. First, a group of workers plays a public goods game; in public goods games,
players decide to contribute to a public good or not. This reflects the empirical
situation of many informal workers, who start working as unorganized individuals
and then decide to form a group or not. In this model, every worker who decides
to join an organization pays a personal cost of time and money, and if at least k
workers contribute, they generate a public good. The public good could be compliance
with local laws or the order, safety, and steady flow of traffic that a street vendor
organization can bring to an open-air market. While citizens may value a public good
6I thank Scott Wolford for suggesting game theoretic robustness checks; see Bell and Wolford
(2015).
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differently—for example, vendors in a market may value a clean and orderly market
more than neighbors who shop there, who in turn value it more than residents across
the city—all citizens can potentially benefit from public goods of compliance or order7.
Every worker who does not join the organization benefits from the public good but
does not pay an organizing cost and they generate a negative externality for the
state. Organized workers then enter a bargaining stage where the state offers them
a selective incentive, which we can think of as licenses, cash, or policy input. In this
game, the selective incentive is endogenous to the model.
The game has complete information, which means that workers can anticipate
if they will receive a selective incentive when they make their organizing decisions,
even though the state offers the incentive in the following stage. This feature is
similar to observed state behavior, in that governments often say that they will extend
benefits to group members, but only deliver once an organization has formed. Finally,
each person has an opportunity to accept or reject the offer. Table 1 summarizes the
model notation and Figure 1 illustrates the structure of the game.
In the model, a state and n vendors play a finite and complete information
game; therefore, subgame perfect equilibrium is the appropriate solution concept for
finding the equilibrium (all proofs in the appendix). The model shows that the state
offers an incentive that will encourage workers to organize as long as x < e+ g
k
, in other
words, as long as the incentive is less than the public good and enforcement savings
that compliers generate. The workers’ calculus depends on whether the actions of their
7A more canonical example would be a park: any citizen can visit a public park and enjoy it as
a public good. However, some people will value a given park much more than others. Many people
will never go near the park, but that does not change the park’s status as a public good. We can
think of a clean and orderly public market in a similar way. The differences in valuation do not
change the market’s status as a public good.
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Table 2.1: Game notation
vi a given worker; worker i.
s the state.
x the state’s offer, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
n total number of workers.
k the number of workers needed to provide
the public good, where 0 < k ≤ n.
m the number of workers who organize.
g the public good, where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1.
e the state’s cost of enforcement where 0 ≤
e ≤ 1.
ci the cost of organizing to workeri, where
ci ∼ U [0, 1].












colleagues are enough to provide the public good, and whether the state’s incentive
sufficiently offsets their personal organizing costs.
2.3.4 Equilibrium, Outcomes, and Comparative Statics
The model has equilibrium strategies (stated formally in the appendix, with proofs)
that account for organizational outcomes ranging from no organization to universal
organization. These outcomes reflect the empirical record and existing collective ac-
tion research. First, the model produces an equilibrium outcome in which no one
contributes that is similar to Olson’s (1965) work, where g is large but the state
does not intervene and informal workers do not organize. Second, the model leads to
an equilibrium outcome that resembles Ostrom’s work (1990, 2007): some informal
workers will organize to capture a sufficiently large public good, even without state
intervention. This project shows that the state can free ride on workers’ efforts: the
state benefits from the public good and reduced externalities without contributing.
This model’s contribution is in the following three equilibrium outcomes: if
the public good is lower than the kth worker’s costs, the state offers an incentive that
offsets the kth worker’s costs. In this situation, the state would rather offset workers’
organizing costs than be left with the negative externality that the workers generate if
they stay unorganized. This leads to a low contribution outcome where some workers
with costs lower than the incentive organize, and a high contribution outcome where
k informal workers organize. Finally, if enforcement costs are higher than any other
parameter, the state will offer an incentive that induces universal organization. Under
this condition, the state prefers to save money by paying everyone to organize, which
prevents unorganized workers from creating a larger negative externality.
Relative costs explain variation in this model. To see this, fix the parameters
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at given values save one and then examine how an endogenous variable moves with
changes in that parameter (proofs in the appendix). Here, we look at how the state’s
offer, an endogenous variable, changes with the public good, organizing costs, and
enforcement costs. First, as the value of the public good increases, the state’s offer
increases. Both the state and the vendors enjoy the public good, and as the public
good increases, it frees up resources that the state can then spend on incentives. We
can also fix g and restate this result in terms of individual organizing costs: as the
workers’ costs increase, they require higher offers from the state to organize.
The state’s enforcement costs have a different relationship with its offer. Where
enforcement costs are less than the kth worker’s organizing costs minus the value of
the public good, the state offers nothing. Once enforcement costs pass that threshold,
however, the state will make an offer that maximizes the number of organized infor-
mal workers while still being less than its enforcement costs. The intuition here is
that where enforcement costs are high, it is cheaper for the state to induce organiza-
tion than pay for enforcement. Relative costs explain variation in these outcomes: as
enforcement costs decrease, the state makes smaller offers and workers form smaller
organizations. As they increase, all else equal, the state makes larger offers and con-
sequently workers use them to form larger organizations.
To summarize without notation, the model presents a situation in which un-
organized informal workers create costs for the state but organized workers provide a
public good. Knowing this, the state can pay to change the structure of the workers’
decisions by offering organized workers an endogenously determined private benefit.
The negative externality pushes the state to endogenously incentivize a k group—the
group of people that must contribute in order to provide a public good—because col-
lective action helps the state avoid the burden of negative externalities. The model
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shows the conditions under which the state will not intervene: when intervention costs
more than the negative externality or where it can free ride on the informal workers’
efforts. It also shows that the state will intervene when paying the workers to orga-
nize is cheaper than paying enforcement costs. Variation in relative costs explains
variation in organizational outcomes: as informal workers’ personal costs increase,
they accept a smaller range of offers, decreasing the parameter values under which
we observe organization. On the other hand, as enforcement costs increase, the state
makes larger offers and workers form larger organizations.
2.3.5 Observable Implications
The theory specifies two mechanisms: first, lower capacity states have more difficulty
covering enforcement costs, which creates pressure to compromise with civil society.
Conversely, higher capacity states face less pressure from enforcement costs and are
more likely to enforce laws directly. Therefore, the theory expects that the lower
(higher) a state’s capacity, the more (less) it delegates to civil society, and that the
more (fewer) incentives a state offers, the more (less) people participate. Second, state
incentives encourage individuals to participate where they otherwise would not, lead-
ing individuals to use their preexisting resources to take advantage of state incentives.
Therefore, the theory expects that people with more (fewer) resources participate to
receive state incentives more (less) than people with fewer (more) resources. The
theoretical process and its mechanisms imply observable patterns for qualitative and
quantitative data, summarized in Table 2.
The theoretical mechanisms imply that some states offer incentives to civil
society while others do not and that some people participate because of those incen-
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Table 2.2: Variables, theoretical mechanisms, available data, and predictions





















































tives while others do not. Each mechanism also implies specific patterns that different
types of data can evaluate. Table 2 summarizes the theoretical mechanisms and the
data that can evaluate aspects of those mechanisms. Table 2 then specifies what case
data builds support for a mechanism and implications for the quantitative analyses.
The theory generates predictions for different conditions. The theory does
not expect organization where individuals have few resources, regardless of state ca-
pacity. Where individuals have some resources and state capacity is low, the theory
expects the state to encourage organization. The more resources individuals have, the
more organizing we should see. Conversely, as state capacity increases, governments
should offer fewer incentives. Where state capacity is high and individual resources
are low, we should expect to see no organizing activity. However, if individual re-
sources increase, we should expect to see small amounts of organizing without state
intervention.
To summarize, I argue that informal workers are more likely to organize where
governments benefit from negotiating with a representative group and provide incen-
tives that help workers overcome barriers to collective action. This process is in-
teractive in that informal workers’ potential for noncompliance affects governments’
enforcement costs. If violators push enforcement costs high enough, they create the
condition under which governments may find it more efficient to solve their collective
action problem than to enforce.
2.4 Conclusion
Using a formal model, I have argued that informal workers organize where their in-
teractions with authorities increase the state’s enforcement costs to where the state
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prefers to solve the workers’ collective action problem by offering selective incentives.
This is surprising because scholars and policymakers rarely expect informal workers
to organize and observers do not expect the state to pay potential lawbreakers to
organize. However, the model demonstrates how strategic interactions between state
actors and informal workers lead to outcomes that appear counterintuitive given ex-
isting research. Additionally, state intervention in collective action decisions often
makes budgetary and political sense. States use these tactics to support national
informal workers’ organizations in countries including Bolivia and India (Agarwala,
2013; Bhowmik, 2012).
I develop the theory generally through a formal model. In chapter 3, I il-
lustrate the model’s dynamics with an ethnographic case study of street vendor or-
ganizations in La Paz, Bolivia. The theory should explain organization 1) where a
group of unorganized people creates negative externalities for a large, external ac-
tor, typically a government; 2) where organization reduces those externalities; and
3) where the external actor can credibly pay a group that organizes. Returning to
the theory’s scope conditions, I expect that these dynamics can exist anywhere but
are more likely in poor democracies. First, parties in democratic regimes can build
loyal voters by incorporating people who are violating quality of life regulations into
new political projects instead of punitively enforcing (Agarwala, 2013; Holland, 2016;
Palmer-Rubin, 2016). While other regimes need supporters, they do not have the
same immediate electoral incentives and richer democracies and autocracies may be
quicker to punitively enforce when they can. Second, poor democracies may feel
both the political and material components of enforcement costs more acutely than
richer democracies, making poor democracies more likely to delegate to civil society
instead of increasing law enforcement budgets. In poor democracies, voters demand
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deliverables like orderly streets and markets. However, alienating informal worker
voting blocs with enforcement can lose elections for parties of all ideologies. In these
situations, local administrations may be more likely to offer selective incentives to
self-regulating groups.
States offer organizing incentives to civil society actors in many contexts. This
project contributes to collective action theory by elaborating the strategic logic be-
hind policies that intervene in collective action and then delegate to civil society. This
may be the main avenue for low resource actors like informal workers to overcome col-
lective action problems, since effective selective incentives tend to demand significant
resources. The state—as a large, established, and resource-rich organization—can
provide selective incentives where individual activists cannot (Marwell and Oliver,
1993, p.6-7, 20, 181). Even weak administrations, like local governments in Bolivia,
are vastly more resource-rich than the average citizen. The people that belong to
the resulting civil society organizations stand to benefit. As chapters 3 and 4 will
demonstrate, informal workers benefit from work-based organizations that bring pre-
dictability to markets and advocate for better policy. However, the following chapter
also shows that those who benefit most are leaders who skim off the top, bureau-
crats receiving substantial bribes, and politicians collecting favors, not rank and file
members or unorganized free riders. While state incentives solve large collective ac-
tion problems, the following chapters show that they create opportunities for leaders,
politicians, and bureaucrats to exploit collective action for private gain.
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Chapter 3
An Ethnography of Street Vending
in La Paz
In La Paz, Bolivia, the crowded western market district begins at the Witches’
Market off Sarganaga Street, extends through the Black Market on Graneros Street
and the Tumusla Street clothing market and peters out after the produce, flower,
skull, and tattoo vendors around the cemetery. Between 50,000-60,000 people—5%
of the capital’s population—work as street vendors and 31,906 of these hold vending
licenses (de La Paz, 2015). Of La Paz’s street vendors, a staggering 75% belong to
a street vendor organization. Street vendors are part of the approximately 80% of
working-age people in Bolivia who hold informal jobs (de Bolivia, 2013). Shamans,
photographers, tattoo artists, shoeshine boys, and bakers all work as street vendors
in La Paz and the hundreds of associations they belong to are just as varied: there is
a wisemen’s union and a champagne ladies’ association, as well as the more common
micro-retailers’ unions and bread vendors’ associations. The oldest of these organiza-
tions is an anarcho-syndicalist flower sellers’ union founded in 1936 (Peredo Beltrán,
1992, p.1), and new organizations form every year. Each association belongs to one
of four citywide federations, which are affiliated with the Bolivian Labor Central or
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the Confederation of Street Vendors of Bolivia.
In La Paz, many people make a decades-long career out of street vending while
others rotate in and out of the occupation to fill gaps in employment and make ends
meet. Established vendors sell high-margin products like clothes and beauty prod-
ucts at licensed stalls, which can be permanent kiosks, carts, or tents and platforms
that are reassembled every day. Less established vendors walk continuously while
selling anything from gum to plants to coat hangers from small boxes or sacks. Most
vendors make roughly minimum wage, but a significant minority make a middle class
living—for example, 34% of La Paz survey respondents were homeowners—and a few
have become wealthy (Tassi et al., 2013).
This chapter discusses the history and structure of street vendor unions in
La Paz. I rely on original interviews with longstanding street vendor leaders as
well as published oral histories, feminist, anarchist, and post-colonial historical work
to construct a history of these organizations stretching back to the 1800s. Original
ethnographic and survey data then establishes the plausibility of the modeling choices
in chapter 2. Finally, original ethnographic work outlines the effects and implications
of state intervention in informal market organizations in La Paz.
3.1 Methods
Over nine months, I conducted fieldwork with one of La Paz’s four street vendor fed-
erations, where I observed meetings, engaged in conversations, interviewed vendors
and bureaucrats, and worked as a street vendor. I worked as a street vendor once a
week in a prominent open-air market from March to May 2015 and helped out at the
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stalls of individual street vendors in other markets.1 All quotes and anecdotes come
from the ethnographic data and have been anonymized, due to the semi-legal nature
of participants’ work. The names I use are pseudonyms and details like merchandise
and location have been changed to ensure confidentiality.2
Research on informal work suffers from data paucity in part because actors
have incentives to hide semi-licit activity (Jensen et al., 2010; Olken and Pande, 2012).
Interview and survey methods capture some self-reporting, but respondents rarely
trust enumerators and typically under-report the extent of their informal activities
(Olken, 2009; Jensen and Rahman, 2015). Ethnographic methods rely on routinely
triangulating sources’ words with theirs and others’ actions, and investigating dis-
crepancies and changes over time (Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). Many ethnographic
projects, including aspects of this one, revolve around the significance of documented
discrepancies between words and actions (Lazar, 2007a; Lopez, 2007). Additionally,
ethnography requires the researcher to build trusting relationships, which are particu-
larly important for research on informal activities and other topics where sources have
an incentive to misrepresent (Auyero, 2001; Goffman, 2015). In these ways, ethnogra-
phy overcomes several of the limitations that researchers encounter with survey and
interview methods, making the method particularly well-suited for studying micro-
1All money I made as a street vendor I gave to the vendor I was working with. Additionally, I
did not approach vendors and ask to work for them. After I made acquaintances with a vendor, I
would ask to observe them while they worked and ask if I could do anything to help. Vendors asked
me to help with babysitting, making change, running errands, filling an order, cleaning, or watching
the stall and attending to customers while they ran an errand. Several times over the nine months,
a vendor asked if I would work for them. I decided to work with one vendor that I knew well and
for several months set up, worked, and packed up her stall the one morning a week that she was in
church. Each week, we would meet up afterwards to talk about the day and I would give her any
money I made, as well as the day’s accounting
2Changes follow Institutional Review Board and National Science Foundation confidentiality
guidelines. Anonymized field notes and interview transcripts are available on request.
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level informal activity (Contreras, 2012; Nordstrom, 2007).
I began fieldwork by approaching the leadership of one federation and asking
to observe meetings and work, as well as interview consenting vendors. The leader-
ship agreed on the grounds that I would give something back to the federation, and
the ampliado—the meeting of the governing council of the federation, consisting of
the elected leadership of the 142 affiliated street vendor associations—voted to let me
observe.3 The federation leadership initially suggested that I give back by teaching
classes in Marxist philosophy and economics, but the ampliado asked me to teach
workshops on street vending policies and regulations in the U.S. and Brazil instead.
I gave two presentations, disseminated a final report on my work, and helped out
around the office and in the markets where possible, primarily by running errands,
watching stalls, and babysitting, and occasionally by translating or teaching English
or computer skills. Most people in La Paz’s markets are bilingual or trilingual, and I
also learned some Aymara to improve my rapport with older vendors. I made contacts
by meeting people at the federation and city offices, and when research participants
introduced me to colleagues in the markets.
Finally, in April 2015, a team of five survey administrators and I conducted
a survey of 207 randomly selected vendors in 16 randomly selected neighborhoods
in April 2015 (see appendix for survey instruments, sampling, protocol, and results).
No ideal sampling frame exists for street vendors in La Paz, which is a common
methodological issue in informal market research (Bodea and LeBas, 2016; Schneider
et al., 2010). The city maintains a database of the 31,906 street vendors with licenses,
3This vote was taken after a debate between two leaders during the ampliado of whether or not I
was an espia yanqui (Yankee spy), or an hija del pueblo, or (daughter of the people). The ampliado
came to the consensus that I was a representative of the people of the United States, not American
capitalist interests, and could continue working with them.
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but this only accounts for 50-70% of street vendors in La Paz, depending on whose
estimate one uses. Additionally, the city is extremely resistant to granting database
access. Finally, bureaucrats illicitly grant extra licenses for favors and bribes, which
allegedly results in fake names in the database. To create a sample, I randomized
districts and my team approached every other vendor in randomly selected districts
until we had surveyed 200. The neighborhoods are fairly representative of the city.
Unless otherwise noted, all descriptive statistics on street vending in La Paz are from
this survey.
3.2 A History of Street Vending Organizations in
La Paz
Oral histories, historical photographs, and newspaper articles show that La Paz has
a long and rich market history that pre-dates the republic and most likely began
before the colonial invasion (Rojas, 1992, p.107). As a crossroads and then a capi-
tal, La Paz developed large street markets dominated by women whose business and
community networks bridged the city and the countryside (Aramayo Cañedo, 2015;
Dibbits et al., 1986). Based on interviews with small artisans, Rojas (1992, p.111)
attributes the first vendor unions to independent craftsmen who sold their work in
the street markets and founded gremios, guilds, in the 1850s. According to Rojas,
the gremios became the first street vendor unions and started Bolivia’s urban labor
movement (1992, p.111). To this day, street vendors in Bolivia are known as gremi-
ales—guildsmen—and call their unions gremios.
Gathering oral histories from a dozen anarcho-syndicalist street vendor orga-
nizers, Lehm and Cusicanqui (1988) trace an anarchist organizing tradition back to
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the early street vendor unions. In the early 1900s, a few small, new unions were
founded and run by former miners who had come into contact with Italian labor ac-
tivists and anarchist philosophy while working in Chilean mines. When the miners
returned to Bolivia, they brought labor organizing strategies and anarcho-syndicalist
philosophy back with them. Some then became street vendors in La Paz and other
cities and organized their new colleagues into unions. The street vendor unions, while
small proportional to the city population, became active and well-known players in
local and national politics, joining campaigns for expanded labor rights, shorter work
days, and minimum wage (Lehm et al., 1988, p.274).
La Paz’s street markets historically have strongly gendered boundaries (Bar-
ragán, 2005; Rivera Cusicanqui, 2004). Most street vendors are and have been women
(Aramayo Cañedo, 2015; Peredo Beltrán, 1992). Men work as street vendors with
specific trades, like cobblers and locksmiths, or corner the market on specific types
of goods, like hardware and, increasingly cellphones, computer parts, and other con-
sumer technology. Women have historically dominated food markets (Barragán, 2005;
Peredo Beltrán, 1992).
The 1952 revolution fundamentally changed Bolivia’s social and political land-
scape, especially with regards to labor (Kohl and Farthing, 2006, p.46). Revolting
workers seized the mines and agricultural land from the ruling elite and ushered in
a revolutionary coalition that nationalized the mines and instituted agrarian reforms
(Albó, 2008). The government extended suffrage to women and the country’s in-
digenous communities, including the majority of Bolivians in the state’s definition of
citizen for the first time (Kohl and Farthing, 2006, p.47). Activists connected to the
revolutionary government founded a national street vendor and artisan organization
(Rojas, 1992, p.116). However, this national federation, like many of the other ini-
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tially revolutionary groups, became a largely symbolic organization that at best was
a vehicle for patronage (Rojas, 1992, p.118).
In the late 1950s and early 1960s, government agents at various levels pushed
street vendors in La Paz to start vendor unions. As several participants discuss later
in the chapter, bureaucrats sometimes required vendors to unionize as a precondition
for meeting with them, while other street vendors decided to unionize to capture
newly legislated protections and privileges for union members. These small, local
unions retained much more autonomy than the sector-wide organizations and proved
more durable (Rojas, 1992, p.122). At least two dozen street vendor unions founded
in the 1950s and 1960s are active in La Paz today.
In 1972, 70 street vendor leaders from the La Paz department4 founded the
Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores Gremiales, Artesanos, Comerciantes Minoris-
tas y Vivanderos de Bolivia; the National Confederation of Street Vendors, Small
Retailers, Artisans, and Food Sellers of Bolivia (from here on referred to as the Na-
tional Confederation of Street Vendors or the Confederation). The Confederation
is an autonomous organization by and for street vendors that pushes street vendor
issues with the national government (Rojas, 1992, p.122). The Confederation likely
represents between 200,000-300,000 street vendors around the country, which would
make it one of the largest street vendor organizations in the world and potentially the
largest proportional to national population. Over the decades, the Confederation’s
power has waxed and waned and while it has occasionally allied with specific admin-
istrations (Rojas, 1992, p.118-123), it remains a largely grassroots labor organization.
The Confederation’s membership rolls boomed after the passage of Decree
4In Bolivia, department is a subnational administrative designation similar to a U.S. state.
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21060 in 1985 (Pereira Morató, 2008, p.1). The law was the centerpiece of a pack-
age of economic and political reforms, supported by international organizations and
Bolivia’s creditors, that was designed to stop runaway inflation and prevent worse
economic crises in the future (Kohl and Farthing, 2006, p.73). In a massive blow
to labor and formal employment, the law closed many of Bolivia’s state-run mines
and dismissed thousands of unionized government workers. Hundreds of thousands
of people—some former unionized miners but many more unemployed people reeling
from the spillover effects of Law 21060—migrated to Bolivia’s cities seeking work in
the next decade (Kohl and Farthing, 2006, p.74). The reforms did stop inflation and
Bolivia has not experienced as profound an economic crisis since, but the solution cost
the country’s poor and middle class their savings and their jobs. Tens of thousands of
people turned to street vending because it was an occupation that any person could
try and that could bring daily cash flow (Pereira Morató, 2008, p.2). Pereira Morató
(2008, p.1) uses municipal records and interviews to estimate that in 1951, La Paz
had 369 street vendors. In the 1980s, that number had ballooned to 18,217. The rate
of the sector’s growth started to steady in the 2000s after reaching nearly 40,000 in
2003 (Pereira Morató, 2008, p.1). The number of street vendors continues to grow
and the city government estimated in 2015 that between 50,000-60,000 people worked
regularly as street vendors.
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3.3 The Structure of Street Vendor Organizations
in La Paz
All street vendor organizations that I came in contact with follow a remarkably sim-
ilar structure and operational procedures. The organizations that Tassi et al (2013,
chapter 4), Lazar (2007, chapter 6), and Goldstein (2016, prologue) work with in
Santa Cruz, El Alto, and Cochabamba follow very similar organizational structures
as well. These structures reflect union practices across Bolivia and contemporary Bo-
livian history (Dibbits et al., 1986; Peredo Beltrán, 1992; Rojas, 1992). While there
are many similarities between organizations, the extent to which leaders and members
follow each group’s rules and uphold democratic principles varies widely.
Interviews, interactions, and participant observation at official and unofficial
meetings established the following typical trajectory and structure of a street vendor
union in La Paz: once a group of street vendors decides to found a new union, they
buy a libro de actas, or book of acts, and write a founding statement. All founding
members sign the notarized statement, which may also be notarized or signed by a
federation or confederation leader. Under Bolivian law, a group needs 24 members to
register as a union. Many but not all organizations try to round up 24 founding mem-
bers to meet this requirement. Most street vendor organizations eventually register
as unions because official unions receive personería jurídica or legal personhood, and
this extra document from the Labor Ministry facilitates some bureaucratic processes
and gives leaders more standing vis-a-vis officials.
Once the group has a founding document, the members elect a secretaría gen-
eral as leader. The group typically elects additional officers. Practically all groups
have a secretaría de hacienda, or treasurer, and a secretaría de actas, who records all
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of the group’s activity and is in charge of documents. The secretaría de hacienda or
secretaría de actas can act as a vice president of the group, or the union can elect a
secretaría de relaciones, who may also corral members or act as a second-in-command
representative to officials. Larger groups may have a secretaría de organización, whose
job is to call meetings and make sure members attend. Groups commonly also elect
a press secretary, a health secretary, who collects donations from members if another
member gets sick, a sports secretary, who organizes social events for the group, and
a standard bearer, who carries the group’s pennant in parades. Organizations can
also have appointed or elected fiscales, older members who have served as leaders and
form a semi-independent oversight committee to investigate allegations of corruption
or abuse. Finally, the group may designate spokespeople and substitute represen-
tatives to attend bureaucratic or federation meetings. These one to 20-odd elected
positions constitute the group’s directorio, or elected leadership committee, which
must be present to make demands to the government, represent the group to larger
groups, and make decisions with members.
Groups then decide on their bylaws. Established unions or larger city or state
federations often suggest a roughly standard collection of bylaws. These bylaws in-
clude but are not limited to the terms of all elected leaders (typically two years), how
leaders call elections, how many members must be present for quorum, how frequently
the membership meets, how much dues are and how often they are paid, what the
procedure is for admitting new members (typically a membership-wide vote), what
behavioral and business rules members agree to abide by, how to resolve disputes
between members (typically a hearing in front of the full directorio), and a graduated
schedule of punishments for members who break the rules.
Once a group has formed with its founding membership, it can admit new
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members. Each group has its own process written into its bylaws; a typical process
is that a prospective member approaches the directorio with a letter of intent. If
accepted, the prospective member then presents her case to the full membership in a
meeting. The membership then votes on her candidacy. If approved, she pays a join-
ing fee of a few hundred bolivianos to a few thousand dollars. Some groups actively
recruit new people while others are highly restrictive: for example, one organization,
founded in 1965, that I worked with restricted their membership to 36 people and
would only add a new affiliate if an older member retired. In other words, street
vendor unions in La Paz are selective and highly structured groups that actively and
extensively screen their members.
Take union pennants as an example of how minutely organized most of the
street vendor groups are and how similar organizational practices are across groups.
Shortly after they form, practically all groups make a pennant to carry in marches,
protests, and at celebrations and parades. As the picture below shows, the pennants
have very similar designs and carry the name and founding date of the organization
and the seal of the city that the union operates in.
Punishments vary more across organizations than pennants but are still rel-
atively standardized. If a member catches another member breaking a rule, she is
supposed to report the offending member to the directorio. The directorio then calls
the member to a meeting where she can present her case. Making a case can involve
photographic evidence, witness testimonies, testimony of hardship, or a heated ar-
gument. If the directorio decides that a member has broken a rule, they can levy a
fine or bar the member from selling for a number of days. Many bylaws let vendors
choose between paying a fine or not selling. While fines vary widely in amount—and
directorios may levy fines proportional to individual members’ income or offense—
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Figure 3.1: Unionized street vendors with union pennants outside of the La Paz city
hall.
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suspensions are more standardized: for a first offense, a vendor cannot sell for five
days. For a second offense, she cannot sell for 15 days. For a third offense, she may
be expelled from the union and the union leadership may make a formal request for
the Markets Office to suspend her license.
In practice, different groups vary widely in how closely they follow their by-
laws. Likewise, some groups are extremely democratic, while others exist as a club or
cash cow for a long-term leader. Some groups do not formally elect leaders but instead
rotate leadership and all members are required to serve for two year terms when it is
their turn. For example, the small champañeras—champagne sellers—union consists
of 12 affiliated champagne sellers and photographers and functions more as a coopera-
tive with jointly-held property than a union. Technically, all members vote on leaders
and decisions, but the group typically reaches a consensus before making a decision.
On the other hand, another union I worked with had been headed by the same woman
for over 30 years who had a reputation for intimidation, particularly through arson.
She was reelected every time she called an election, which was sometimes every two
years, as stipulated in the bylaws, and sometimes not. As members left, she often
appropriated their stalls for herself or her family. Across La Paz, plenty of other
groups exhibit an impressive level of deliberative democracy, like the champañeras,
or a discouraging level of corruption, like the arsonist’s association, and plenty more
fall somewhere in between.
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3.4 Grounding the Model’s Assumptions in Ethno-
graphic Data
The model in Chapter 2 makes several assumptions about informal workers and state
interaction that are grounded in the experience of street vendors, which I demonstrate
in this section. In particular, the model assumes that unorganized vendors create
negative externalities, or additional costs, for the state. Interviews with police officers
demonstrate that unorganized vendors create larger enforcement costs than organized
vendors. Second, the model assumes that informal workers make organizing decisions
based on a straightforward calculus: they consider the costs and benefits of each
action and choose the action that gives them the most utility. Discussions with street
vendors and field notes from markets and bureaucratic offices show that many vendors
do approach organizing in a highly rational, cost-benefit fashion. Third, the model
assumes that the state makes offers that have concrete value to informal workers. In
this section, quotes from vendors and bureaucrats demonstrate that the state offers
cash, licenses, and policy input on a regular basis. Finally, the model assumes that
once formed, organizations self-regulate. Ethnographic evidence from police, vendors,
and field notes show that vendor organizations regulate much more thoroughly than
the state can alone.
3.4.1 Paceño Vendors
Who are La Paz’s street vendors? The average5 vendor who we surveyed holds a
license for a food stall, belongs to a street vendor association but does not identify
5This composite holds continuous variables at their means and uses the most common category
for categorical variables.
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Table 3.1: Binary variable proportions
Variable
Organized 81% Nonparticipants 19% Participants
Licensed 61% Rural 39% Urban
Fixed Stall 81% Voter 19% Nonvoter
Gender 68% Men 32% Women
with a political party, and has worked as a vendor for 23 years. Demographically,
she is a 45 year-old indigenous woman who completed eight years of school6 and
who owns a television, refrigerator, and cell phone but does not have a vehicle or
regular internet access. Women comprise 80% of street vendors in La Paz, though as
vending has become more profitable, more men have joined and are overrepresented in
leadership (Hummel, 2016). In other words, the average vendor in La Paz is a career
street vendor who makes enough to get by and has some social capital. Figures 2 and
3 summarize descriptive statistics from the street vendor survey.
3.4.2 Negative Externalities
The La Paz municipal government employs 150 city guards to police commerce, in-
cluding street vending. This is relatively small number considering that the city also
employs 150 full-time traffic cops. The guards split their time between routine pa-
trols, where they spot-check licenses, inspect merchandise, and sanction unlicensed
vendors, and operations, where they send squads to remove repeat violators. Oper-
ations are the most costly for the state, which must pay several squads of guards to
6The average is eight but the distribution is skewed. 30% completed high school, which is the
highest bar in Figure 2’s education histogram. The second highest bar is at the end of primary
school.
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Figure 3.2: Sector descriptive statistics
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deal with a small number of violators, and for individual guards, who run personal
risks.
For example, Elisa is a city guard who patrols markets in the afternoons and
is frequently on-call for larger operations at irregular times. Like other guards, she
makes a salary slightly above minimum wage and is not paid extra for late night or
hazardous operations. She explains the different types of operations she participates
in.
"When the operation is one stall, we can go during the day. But if we
have to remove several, we have to go at night when [the vendors] aren’t
there. This happens when, for example, there are people that have per-
mission to sell for one fair day and they stay for a week. Then, we go at
night to remove them. In big operations, we are 50, up to 100 guards...
Every time, there are more vendors, more illegals. Now we are receiving
complaints that there are a lot of illegal vendors around Eguino at night.
So we have to go at 11 pm."
On a police ride along, Elisa’s colleague Jhonny talked at length about his least fa-
vorite parts of his job. He described the fights that occasionally break out between
city guards and vendors:
"Sometimes they start fights, there have been guards that were hit or had
their faces cut trying to confiscate. This can be a problem when we’re in
markets, especially around meat. A lot of times we check for expired or
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uninspected meat, and if we find it we confiscate it, but the women have
large knives and sometimes try to cut the guard."
The guards speak to how vendors create sizable negative externalities for the state
by breaking laws repeatedly. Negative externalities contribute to enforcement costs.
As discussed in chapter 2, states can try to ignore these negative externalities or try
to control them, both of which come with associated costs. If the state attempts
to control negative externalities, it must absorb the enforcement costs of doing so.
These costs quickly spiral if vendors break laws en masse or if the number of non-
compliant vendors increases. While plenty of organized vendors clash with the city
guard, unorganized vendors create the most problems and the highest costs. These
quotes suggest that if street vendors in La Paz were not as organized, the state would
have to spend much more material and human resources on monitoring and enforcing
basic public health and public space regulations. In short, these quotes demonstrate
that unorganized street vendors do generate negative externalities for the state.
3.4.3 Vendor Cost-Benefit Analyses and State Offers
Organizing requires time, money, and skills that few vendors have in surplus. Ven-
dors will only organize with their colleagues when they expect significant benefits. If
vendors are not reasonably certain that they can get significant private benefits from
the state by organizing, few choose to. Natalia, a former vendor leader who currently
works as an independiente, or licensed but unaffiliated vendor, explained her situation
in March 2015:
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"We are 15 here and we have discussed it, I could organize the 15. Don
Jaime (the federation leader) told me that we can start with this. But
when you are a leader it absorbs you. You don’t have time to work or to
spend with your family."
Natalia goes on to explain that she does not need an association anymore because
she has a license that she received through a now defunct union.7 In contrast, when
vendors expect that they can get significant private benefits out of organizing, they
do. In most cases, the biggest benefits come from the state in the form of licenses.
Amelia points to these benefits when explaining why she founded a union:
"First, I wanted to help my colleagues. Second, I wanted more stalls...
I’ve had a lot of stalls. I fought with the other founders, but I got four
stalls in front [of her original stall] and three stalls in back. I have had
others. First, I organized [a market street] and then the next street. Some
stalls I sold, others I gave to my daughters."
In explaining her actions, Amelia pays brief lip service to altruism: she wanted to
help. She then talks at length about the licensed stalls she has accumulated as a
vendor leader, which are worth $10,000 to $80,000 each in the market where she
works. While Amelia does not explicitly mention the state, only bureaucrats can
7The Markets Office issues licenses to individuals who belong to a union. If that union disbands,
members with licenses keep them. Most choose to join another organization but some, like Natalia,
become independientes. While it is legally possible for an individual to be licensed without going
through an organization, it is very rare; I do not know of a single person who obtained a license
without an organization.
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issue licenses. Bureaucrats facilitate a gray market in vending licenses by legalizing
dubious name changes on licenses and, vendors report, issuing additional licenses to
vendor leaders as side payments. When the state offers incentives to individual street
vendors for becoming leaders, it creates opportunities for leadership as well as rent
seeking. Natalia recounted in March 2015:
"In past administrations, the city paid a monthly stipend to vendor lead-
ers. All of us wanted to be the leader; who wouldn’t want to earn a stipend
on top of what you can get from the members? There were many fights
between street vendors."
The state offers valuable incentives to street vendors who organize, particularly their
leaders. In these quotes, the state selectively offers material incentives like valuable
market licenses and even cash. In some instances—like the licensing scheme discussed
in the following section—the state offers organized vendors policy input on the regu-
lations that the vendors care about most. Vendors use these offers to evaluate their
organizing options through cost-benefit calculations. In some cases, like licenses and
input, it is ironically the vendors’ actions that make some incentives so valuable. To
the city government, licenses cost paper and time; it is the vendor organizations that
enforce the rules printed on the licenses and make them valuable.
Natalia and Amelia embody the survey statistics for unorganized and orga-
nized vendors: both are middle aged women of indigenous descent with over 20 years
in the sector. Natalia is slightly younger and has slightly less experience than Amelia,
as well as slightly fewer assets. The main difference between them is in their cost-
benefit analyses: Amelia has organized other vendors when she expected to receive
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additional licenses from the state while Natalia does not organize her coworkers now
because she does not need or expect this benefit.
Amelia’s and Natalia’s experiences demonstrate typical organizing sequences
in La Paz, which are captured by the model: vendors start working as unorganized
individuals, typically in an area with few or no street vendor organizations. For exam-
ple, Amelia works in a hectic market square in central La Paz, but when she founded
her first union in the 1980s, "Plaza Mamani used to be empty, not full like it is now.
There were just a few of us, women who were selling some food." When the city
finds unlicensed vendors, it intervenes punitively by issuing citations or confiscating
wares. Officials or vendor leaders with access to officials tell the unorganized ven-
dors that they can only get a license by starting a new union or joining an existing
one. Some vendors organize, typically those with more resources, while others try
their luck avoiding local authorities. Once organized, vendors receive licenses and
can negotiate with the state over other problems or benefits in the future. The game
theoretic model simplifies the steps, but captures the basic process: an unorganized
group has a range of costs and concerns, members of the group decide to organize or
not, a state actor makes an offer conditional on organization, and given the vendors’
decisions, the state actor delivers on its offer.
3.4.4 Self-Regulating Organizations
Street vendor organizations in La Paz have clear statutes and organizational hier-
archies that help them adjudicate disputes. Most associations’ statutes and written
agreements with the city include a clause stipulating that vendors will follow all
relevant municipal and organizational rules and cooperate with their colleagues, or
face expulsion from the organization and revocation of any license. Street vendors
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frequently invoke these clauses. Isabel, a unionized clothing vendor, explains how
agreements work between the city and the associations that operate in the market
she works in:
The associations sign an agreement with the city government that they
will follow the city’s regulations. In effect, this means that the association
enforces most things. The city government just enforces a few things in
the licenses: time and place and having one. But if the city government
finds something wrong, they’ll just write a letter to the association saying
"Your affiliates are doing this and you need to stop it.".
City guards and their commanders volunteered that street vendor organizations ac-
tively collaborate with them in enforcing these rules. Guardswoman Elisa explains,
"It’s the street vendors themselves, the leaders, who call us. When we arrive, they
are waiting to help us, and they facilitate our work."
In additional interviews, city guards and their commanders volunteered that
street vendor organizations actively collaborate with them, as exemplified by a quote
from city guard commander Major Rodríguez:
Frequently, the street vendors themselves make reports, about someone
who is selling outside of their hours, or new illegal vendors, or people
selling outside of their space... The street vendors regulate each other.
Since it hurts them to have more street vendors, and they know when a
new person shows up, they are the ones that regulate.
Additionally, street vendors actively seek out police and have established regular
meetings with leaders and police managers where vendors and law enforcement co-
ordinate their efforts. Major González, one of the officers charged with managing
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the municipal guard, explained that, "They come here [to the city guard station] to
coordinate. Every 15 days we have a meeting with the leader of the sector."
When 5% of the city sells on the street, it is prohibitively expensive for the
state to effectively police them. In La Paz, the law enforcement unit that polices
street vending relies heavily on organized street vendors to reduce costs. Outside of
the guards’ spot-checking patrols, street vendors are the primary monitors and sanc-
tioners of other street vendors. Both guards and street vendors make it clear that
the organizations self-regulate, internally enforce local ordinances as well as their own
rules, and coordinate with the city.
For example, I worked at a licensed stall in a large clothing market, where
over 6,000 people work in self-policed shifts from 5 am to midnight. The licensed
vendor I worked for began enlarging her stall by tenths of a centimeter every week.
The city guard walks past her stall every morning, but did not notice these minute
violations. Instead, colleagues reported her to her association’s leadership, which con-
ducted a surprise inspection. Fifteen leaders crowded around her stall, declared her
in violation of her license, gave her a time and date to appear before the full elected
board to determine a punishment, and threatened to report her to the city if she did
not comply. She complied, attended the association’s hearing, and was barred from
selling for 15 days. When we discussed the punishment, she told me that even if
leadership reported her, the city would probably tell the association to sanction her
themselves. She complied because her association can prevent her from working by
directing members to destroy her merchandise or stop her from setting up her stall,
not because she feared the city guard. In extreme cases, the association leadership
presents testimonies that a member does not follow regulations and asks the Markets
Office to revoke their license.
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In this example and others, street vendors carefully monitor each other, use
their own institutions to enforce city ordinances, and only call the city if their own
adjudication fails. While the city supplies incentives that encourage this behavior,
the organizations’ management and regulation of the markets make incentives like
licenses and market stalls valuable to vendors. In doing so, the organizations enforce
local laws more thoroughly than the state.
3.5 Observable Implications
Using the assumptions discussed in chapter 2 and above, the model generates equi-
librium outcomes and comparative statics about state behavior and workers’ organi-
zations. If this model is useful for explaining state intervention in collective action,
the model implies that we should observe specific empirical patterns. In particular,
we should observe that a) states make increasingly large offers to workers as negative
externalities increase; b) as offers increase, the level of worker organization should
increase; c) workers with more resources are more likely to take advantage of the
state’s offers.
3.5.1 Increasing Offers and Increasing Levels of Organization
As discussed in the history section of this chapter, activist miners returning from
Chile with anarcho-syndicalist strategies founded some of La Paz’s first street ven-
dor organizations (Lehm et al., 1988; Dibbits et al., 1986). These became active in
the city’s labor movement, at turns cooperating and clashing with the government
over public space and labor laws. These small organizations came and went until
after the 1952 revolution, when the Bolivian Labor Central was founded and the new
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regime pressured street vendors to affiliate with it (Rojas, 1992, p.118-120). In re-
sponse to local politicians, many of the several hundred street vendors in the city
(Pereira Morató, 2008, p.1) formed small unions in the 1950s and 1960s, like Elena’s
union, which was founded in 1965:
"[My mother’s union] was organized because of the problems they were
having with the city administration. [The city] said they needed licenses,
so the women formed a union."
In this brief history, we see no organizations and then a few experienced individ-
uals founding small organizations that wax and wane with their leaders and their
interactions with the state. At first, this pattern is consistent with the model’s first
and second equilibrium outcome at different times: no organization in the absence of
state intervention, despite common interests, and at other times some organization
by particularly motivated individuals in the absence of state intervention. We see
more vendors forming and joining organizations after a revolutionary regime inter-
venes in the 1950s, consistent with the third class of equilibrium outcomes, but their
organizations are still small. This changed in the 1980s.
During the hyperinflation and resulting economic crisis of the 1980s, over
18,000 unemployed Bolivians in the capital turned to street vending to survive (Pereira Morató,
2008, p.2). This dramatic increase in vendors also increased the city’s enforcement
costs materially and politically: the city needed more personnel to enforce public
space laws but evicted street vendors could not find alternative employment amidst
rampant unemployment. New unions formed in response to the city government’s
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carrot and stick approach to street vendors, which licensed organized vendors who
supported the government and evicted others, as Amelia experienced:
"One day, the municipal guard came to remove us. We asked ourselves,
what will we do, what will we do? I had a friend who worked for the
mayor and she said, why don’t you form an association? ...We got the
people, we went to the federation to affiliate, then we went to the city
to ask for help... Dr. MacLean [mayor from 1987-1991] said, "Help the
party and I will help you." So we went to the party, we helped, and Dr.
MacLean followed through. After a year, we all received licenses."
In Amelia’s story, we see evidence of forbearance—the city selectively enforces in order
to extract political support (Holland, 2016, p.232)—but also something more. The
city does not just ask for votes, it requires vendors to organize and then distributes
a large, concrete individual benefit to those who do. As its enforcement costs from
street vending increased, the city actively pursued a strategy of selective enforcement
against atomized actors while also increasing legal benefits for people who formed
organizations, in line with the model’s observable implications. As the state’s offers
to organized vendors increased, the vendors’ levels of organization increased as well,
with more and more unions forming and affiliating with umbrella organizations at the
local and national level.
In the 2000s, the city and the federations began bargaining over a new licensing
system—the pago único municipal—that would give semi-permanent licenses and
other incentives primarily to organized street vendors. After rounds of public protest
and closed-door negotiations, the city and the organizations agreed to the new system:
all vendors who could demonstrate sentaje payments—an arbitrarily-collected daily
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tax—since 1994 could apply for a license, which they would maintain by following
city vending ordinances and paying an annual fee. On paper, licenses are issued
to any individual with a legitimate claim, but in practice, the rules are so vague
and contradictory that bureaucrats only approve applications that are filed with a
known vendor leader. Still, bureaucrats and vendor leaders claim the pago único as
a victory that institutionalized organized street vending. Jorge, a former Markets
Office bureaucrat, describes the importance of and changes wrought by the licensing
program:
"This unified, clear tax was a victory. This creates institutional relation-
ships, an institutional relationship between the city and the federation...
The street vendors achieved recognition from the government, and since
then it has been much more stable, people don’t have to worry about what
will happen tomorrow. The conflicts are no longer about stalls, they are
about rules and schedules."
In this quote, Jorge explains that the pago único municipal is mutually beneficial for
vendor organizations, the city government, and many vendors because it strengthens
vendor organizations and reduces conflict. The pago único municipal gives street
vendors an important benefit—semi-permanent licenses—in exchange for a small fee.
Importantly, it is the street vendor organizations that facilitate those licenses and
channel this benefit from the government to individual members. This creates more
stable and longer term relationships between the organizations and the city gov-
ernment. These established, mutually beneficial working relationships then reduce
conflict between the city and the sector and encourage new vendors to form or join
organizations that follow the city’s laws in order to get and maintain licenses and
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other benefits.
Vendor leaders state that the pago único municipal brought important and
positive changes to street vending. They claim the program as their achievement, as
federation leader Don Jaime declared many times in meetings and rallies, for example,
"The pago único municipal was our victory. It was the federation, we worked hard
for it for many years, it was our struggle."
In the fall of 2014, street vendors mobilized protests against a city council
proposal to make restrictive changes to the pago único. Among the protest chants,
printed and distributed to marchers on slips of paper, was "Long live the pago único
municipal !" Protesters also chanted for the long life of the federation and for the
death of opposing city council members. This protest, which ended in a meeting with
the city council, is one of many instances in which street vendor organizations, once
organized, engage the state to bargain over policy and enforcement. It is also a sign
that while the vendor organizations work with the government and enforce local laws,
they remain independent and autonomous.
Why did the city negotiate a partial legalization of street vendors in 2003? In
the 1990s and 2000s, thousands of new, largely unorganized vendors were joining a
sector that was growing, but at decreasing rates. Thus, new vendors drove up the
city’s enforcement costs, but not as drastically as they had in the 1980s. However, ne-
gotiations over a new licensing system occurred under a conservative city government
after citywide vendor protests and during nation-wide mobilizations that forced the
resignation of presidents. The city government faced moderate increases in material
enforcement costs from increasing numbers of vendors but potentially high political
costs from continued protest. Conversely, the city stood to gain significant benefits
from an institutionalized and cooperative street vending sector: it would save money
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by shifting more enforcement and monitoring responsibilities to the federations and
benefit from their political support. In fact, the administration did maintain control
of city hall while conservative parties across the country lost to the Movimiento al
Socialismo (MAS) party over the following decade and successfully shifted monitoring
and enforcement to street vendor organizations. Therefore, following the expectations
of the model, growing enforcement costs over time led to increasing offers from the
state to organized vendors, which in turn boosted the levels of organization among
street vendors.
Similar patterns occur spatially. In established neighborhoods, street vendor
associations internally regulate existing vendors and the city refuses to issue new li-
censes. This arrangement is mutually beneficial: a stable, regulated street vending
sector limits competition and uncertainty, which benefits existing vendors, and keeps
the city’s enforcement costs low. In new neighborhoods without organizations, unor-
ganized vendors set up shop and the process repeats itself.
I accompanied the champañeras ’ union, a small cooperative that sells wedding
services in a peripheral neighborhood plaza, through part of this process. Like most
new vendors, the champañeras began working as unorganized individuals, selling in
the plaza after infrastructure improvements increased traffic and made it a poten-
tially profitable location. Shortly after, the city guard began issuing them citations
for selling without licenses. The women went to the Markets Office and asked es-
tablished vendors how to obtain licenses. Other vendors told them to form a union
and affiliate with the main street vendor federation, which they did. Once affiliated,
they negotiated over licenses with the Markets Office. The champañeras reported
that the city guard ceased patrolling the plaza as soon as they submitted their union
paperwork and licensing petition, even though none of them were legally allowed to
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sell until years later.
The city tacitly bolsters the organizations’ authority by making it exceedingly
difficult for unorganized vendors to access the bureaucracy. In the above anecdote,
the champañeras had to form a union and affiliate with a federation before meeting
with the Markets Office director. In interviews, bureaucrats confirm that they en-
courage vendors to form and join specific groups. Bureaucrats like Markets Office
director Ángel Gómez state that they prefer to work with specific organizations:
"If there are conflicts between organizations, we have a meeting with the
leadership that supports us. It would be better if there were only one
federation."
As Gómez went on to explain, anyone can come with their organization or as an
individual, but he prefers to work with one specific leader, makes exceptions for that
leader, and supports him over others in inter-organizational conflicts. As vendors
explained and I witnessed dozens of times, the office’s official scheduling process
serves to screen out the unorganized: individuals submit a notarized petition and
letter into a city-wide system, take the receipt to the Markets Office, follow up in
person a week later to receive a meeting date and additional letter, and return to be
rescheduled or told to wait for hours until they leave, at which point the process is
dropped and must be restarted. As Auyero (2012) finds in the welfare bureaucracy
in Buenos Aires, the waiting and bureaucrats’ arbitrary discretion over poor people’s
lives grinds them down and encourages individuals to give up. Faced with maddening
futility if they try to petition bureaucrats as individuals, the bureaucracy pushes
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vendors to organize if they want access.
Ricardo, a photographer in the champagne sellers’ association, explains the
process he and his colleagues went through:
Our licenses came this year. For this, we joined the champagne sellers,
because [city bureaucrats] do not want to give licenses to individuals, but
an association helps... The first month, people from the city came by
asking for our licenses. You know, the day we submitted our paperwork
they disappeared, they haven’t come back to bother us.
Ricardo states the common knowledge: The city will not license individuals but it will
license union members. Ricardo then explained that photographers typically work in
private buildings where they do not need vending licenses. The photographers only
joined the union to get licenses and would not have joined if the city had not insisted.
Once the union could demonstrate that they had begun the process of registering an
organization—which is not a requirement for legally vending—the city guard stopped
issuing warnings.
3.5.2 Who Leads and Who Follows?
Why do some street vendors organize while others do not? In line with the model’s
observable implications, the 25% of surveyed vendors who do not belong to a street
vendor organization tend to be slightly younger, newer to street vending, and have
fewer assets than organized street vendors, though none of these differences are statis-
tically significant in logistic regression analyses (see appendix and Table 2). Descrip-
tively, 89% of organized vendors hold licenses but only 46% of unorganized vendors
do, and this difference is statistically significant (see Table 2).
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Logistic regressions on original survey data from La Paz (see Methods section
of this chapter and appendix for sampling strategy, protocol, and instrument) exam-
ine these differences between organized and unorganized vendors by looking at the
predictors of organizational membership.
The analyses take a dichotomous variable for the outcome variable: did a
respondent report belonging to a street vendor organization or not? Following the
theory, the analyses include several proxies for individual attributes that should con-
tribute to individual costs: whether or not the respondent went to college, whether
they have been a vendor leader, and a measure of their assets. Instead of asking for
respondents’ income, which people tend to misreport or refuse to report, we asked
respondents whether or not they had a cellphone, refrigerator, television, internet
access, extra stalls, car, or owned their own house, and then made an index out of
a simple count and then a weighted count as a robustness check. Additionally, the
analyses include information on vendors’ license status, gender, ethnicity, age, and
merchandise. For the ethnicity variable, mestizo is the omitted category; for mer-
chandise, food is the omitted category. Table 2 presents the results of two logistic
regression models on the survey data, with and without licenses as a control. Note
that the reported numbers are odds ratios.
Table 2 presents trends in the directions that the theory implies: people with
more resources, like education, assets, and experience, are more likely to be organized
(in other words, the coefficients on these variables are positive when predicting or-
ganizational membership) but the only consistently significant variable is whether a
respondent is licensed or not. However, per the theory, licensing may be endogenous
to organization. If the analyses omit license as a control, gender and ethnicity ap-
proach significance.
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Table 3.2: Logit regressions on street vendor survey data
Models
Logit 1 Logit 2






















Clothes & Accessories 2.87 2.03
(2.03) (1.27)
Books & Newspapers 3.06 2.54
(3.79) (1.85)
Other Merchandise .95 .60
(.66) (.36)
Original Data N = 169
Standard errors in parentheses below odds ratios. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .1
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This is evidence in support of the observable implication that states offer li-
censes to vendors who organize. While the survey is a snapshot and cannot tell us
if vendors get licenses because they organize, or if vendors organize because they are
licensed, ethnographic evidence can help disentangle possible endogeneity.
Compare Amelia, a longstanding union leader, and Natalia, an unorganized
independiente: on one hand, both are women of indigenous descent who started work-
ing as children and have decades of experience in the sector. Both have licenses, an
important factor that this informal comparison holds constant. However, Amelia has
38 years of union experience, much of it as a leader. Additionally, Amelia has more
time and resources than Natalia: at 56, Amelia has adult children and more material
assets than Natalia, who at 40 supports two children in a rented house. Descriptively,
Amelia and Natalia illustrate the model’s implication that vendors with lower costs
organize more.
In line with research that finds that people with more resources participate
more than people with less (Ostrom, 2007; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002), vendor leaders
tend to be better off relative to other street vendors: rank and file vendors actively
promote leaders with a college education, and leaders are disproportionately male and
mestizo (Hummel, 2016). For example, the head of La Paz’s main vendor federation
has a social science degree from a French university and his second in command has
an architectural degree from Bolivia’s main university, while the leader of the sec-
ond largest federation holds a law degree from the same Bolivian university. These
leaders have spent decades as vendors, but they are much more educated than most
of their colleagues: we found that only 6% of survey respondents reported attending
university.
Additionally, only relatively well off vendors tend to accept leadership posi-
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tions because they have enough income to redirect their time to the organization and
away from vending. However, income may be endogenous to leadership: many lead-
ers engage in corrupt exchanges and can use their positions to embezzle funds and
acquire multiple vending licenses, which can be worth tens of thousands of dollars
each.
3.5.3 Partisanship and Clientelism
In the case of La Paz, state intervention in collective action explains street vendor
organization while clientelism does not and the strategy is not restricted to one ide-
ology. In La Paz, the elitist, conservative government delegated enforcement to and
worked with street vendor organizations. Of the four federations in La Paz, one was
affiliated with the MAS party, one with the conservative party in control of the city
government, and two were unaffiliated with a party. The federation I worked with
was openly Marxist, but worked with the conservative local party. In El Alto, the
leftist MAS government worked extensively with the street vendor organizations as
well. When an opposition party won in El Alto, it made overtures to the El Alto
vendor organizations.
While I observed officials making clientelist offers to street vendors and orga-
nizations, most vendors brushed those offers aside as either petty, in the case of party-
branded clothing, or suspect, in the case of promises of expedited licenses. Clientelist
offers did not appear to drive organization; instead, they existed as a byproduct. For
example, one organized vendor that I talked with at a rally for the city government’s
party during the 2014 presidential elections said, "I have my stall and well, they need
more people... I’m here because there’s so few, look. It makes me sorry for them. It’s
pitiful, isn’t it?"
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3.6 Who Benefits from Organized Street Vendors?
When governments pay street vendors to form organizations that monitor and enforce,
the government does not necessarily give up control. Governments can manipulate
the number and leadership of organizations by offering incentives only if organizations
unify or only to a preferred leader and her followers. If the state does not want to
negotiate with a unified and therefore more powerful sector, the state can fracture
existing organizations by offering incentives to breakaway organizations. Unifying or
dividing street vendor organizations curtails an organization’s potential to benefit its
members, either by favoring leaders who are dependent on the state and therefore
reluctant to bargain hard, or by cleaving an organization and therefore reducing its
potential bargaining power. Luisa, a prominent vendor leader, explains, "The parties
divide us with money. And then there’s the government, the Markets Office, they
give things to one [organization] but not others."
For example, El Alto, Bolivia had a unified street vendors’ federation for over
a decade that represented over 200,000 vendors. The leftist city government, run by
a street vendor and former federation leader, would only work with vendors asso-
ciated with the federation. Additionally, the city and federation had an agreement
that returned 50% of vending license fees to the federation to use for public works.
However, when an opposition candidate won in 2015, the federation lost its monopoly
and threatened not to cooperate with the new mayor. A breakaway federation im-
mediately sprang up, allegedly supported by the new, conservative city government
(Columba, 2015). In this example and others in Bolivia, parties across the ideological
spectrum court street vendors and their organizations. The wide appeals and post-
election timing suggest that, in this case, governance concerns like enforcement impact
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state intervention in informal workers’ collective action more than ideologically-driven
electoral strategies or other motivations.
In the model, actors exchange incentives and the model is agnostic on whether
those incentives are legal or normatively desirable, but empirically, corruption is one
way to supply or manipulate incentives. Vendor leaders and officials allegedly par-
ticipate in corruption—the misuse of public office for private gain (Treisman, 2000,
p.400)—either when officials use public funds to illegally pay leaders or when leaders
bribe bureaucrats for favors. Vendors commonly state that federation leaders are
on the city and national governments’ payrolls, and these accusations are repeated
in the national press (Columba, 2015). No vendor leader admitted to me that they
had received money this way—which is illegal—but both bribery and the accusation
are common enough to suggest that state actors sometimes offer cash payments to
vendor leaders (Lazar, 2007a). Fabiana, an unaffiliated former leader, explained how
governments can use incentives to control organizations as well as encourage them:
The city and national government buy off leaders; they get extra stalls. If
you’re complaining a bunch they take you aside and say, look, why don’t
you be quiet and we’ll give you another spot.
These quotes illustrate the model’s second and third implications: The government
targets vendors with incentives, including cash, to induce organization, and vendors
increase organizing activity when offered more incentives. The state materially and
politically encourages street vendors to form self-regulating organizations because
it benefits from delegating monitoring and enforcement. Organizations give street
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vendors greater certainty, dispute resolution, and institutional support, which allow
them to plan for and invest in their business. These benefits outweigh the costs of
joining an association and dealing with manipulative leaders and officials. However,
vendor leaders and bureaucrats can extract favors and rents through the organizations
and benefit much more than the rank and file vendors, or unaffiliated free riders.
3.7 Manipulating Collective Action for Private Gain
In La Paz’s street markets, the work status and careers of tens of thousands of vendors
depend on dozens of minute regulations and decisions made by a handful of bureau-
crats in the Markets Office and then enforced by the unions. Bureaucrats interpret
local ordinances and decide what and where vendors can sell, how many vendors can
work legally, how large their stalls can be down to the tenth of a centimeter, and
what they can be made of, to name a few issues, which are then enforced by street
vendor organizations. This section shows how state intervention in street markets
can incentivize street vendor leaders to become intermediaries between bureaucrats
and vendors negotiating bribes for favorable, and in some cases illegal, decisions.
Street vendors frequently engage in corruption when they interact with the
local bureaucracy. When a street vendor has a problem, he goes to a street vendor
leader, and then accompanies the leader to the Markets Office. At the office, the
street vendor files a request for a change or an audience with a bureaucrat and enters
the official request, called a tramite, into the city’s computerized tracking system,
along with any required supplemental information. The vendor will follow up with
the office until he gives up or receives a meeting with a bureaucrat. Typically, the
bureaucrat is a lawyer in charge of licensing decisions. Street vendors report that bu-
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reaucrats will not accept bribes from people they do not have a previous relationship
with.
For example, Juanita is an older, former vendor leader, who prides herself on
having turned a profit on everything from unregulated pharmaceuticals to packing
tape. As a former leader, she does most of her own paperwork, and explains that
individual leaders and bureaucrats have mutual bribery agreements. The agreements
block rank-and-file vendors from bribing bureaucrats directly, which is why they give
money to an established leader to resolve their issues with the Markets Office:
"Members give money to their leader to do a specific thing. And this
leader will pocket part and give the rest to the official. They have an
agreement... They will not accept just anyone."
In private, street vendors confirm that most of them pay bribes to resolve problems,
especially legally dubious problems, at the Markets Office. For example, the city
issues vendor licenses to individuals, who are legally allowed to transfer the license
to another person only if the vendor can no longer work, the family can demonstrate
hardship, and the new license holder is a family member. In practice, vendors treat
licenses similar to real estate deeds and sell them to unrelated people for thousands
of dollars. A license’s value depends on the stall’s location and the status of a license:
a centrally located stall with a full day license and no outstanding license issues can
sell for $50,000 or more. Open bureaucratic processes can halve the value of a license
while licenses in peripheral markets sell for a few thousand dollars to a few hundred.
Bureaucrats accept bribes, typically percentages of the estimated sale price, to rub-
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berstamp these legally dubious license transfers as officially sanctioned changes to
the license. Street vendors resent corruption and extortion in street markets, but
most prefer paying a bribe for a favorable and illegal decision, like selling a license,
to receiving an unfavorable legal resolution.
Many career street vendor leaders work for years with the same mid-level bu-
reaucrats. Vendors know that these specific leaders have muñeca—which literally
means "wrist" or "doll," but that colloquially means influence—with specific bureau-
crats. Street vendor leaders typically charge members and other leaders for their
services. Some expect payment on delivery or that vendors pay for taxis to the Mar-
kets Office and lunch, while others charge set amounts for small services like writing
official letters or finding supplementary documents.
Juanita states that all leaders participate in these exchanges, "All of the lead-
ers take money." Eliana explains what rank-and-file vendors are expected to do when
they ask for one prominent leader’s help, who is widely regarded as fair, but only
somewhat effective:
"Here’s how it works: Keep [him] company, pay for the taxi there and
back, go back with him, pay for food. You pay him at the end but he
doesn’t ask for it, you give him what you think it’s worth. I paid him but
it was not that much."
I observed street vendor leaders accepting taxi rides and lunch from mem-
bers they were helping and routinely taking small amounts (10-30 bolivianos or U.S.
$1.50-4.50) for typing up supplemental documents and letters on official letterhead.
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Rank-and-file vendors and leaders agree that this is common and acceptable, but that
most leaders ask for more from members or take more from association bank accounts.
One association member waved away questions about electing clean leaders with the
Aymara word for stealing, "They all lunthatapjje." Juanita followed up with, "They
are all extortionists... The problem isn’t the extortion, everyone does that, but how
it is handled."
Juanita went on to explain that when street vendors elect new leaders who are
not corrupt, most quickly decide to make extra money from bribes when given the
chance. When a rare leader refuses to participate in corruption, bureaucrats refuse to
work with them. The leader then becomes sidelined because they cannot use extrale-
gal channels to help their members resolve problems with the Markets Office. On the
other hand, if a leader cultivates working relationships with bureaucrats, they can
pull strings for their members and position themselves as indispensable representa-
tives, advancing their careers as civil society leaders.
Once civil society leaders start working as intermediaries in corrupt transac-
tions, they become implicated in and dependent on corruption and are unlikely to
denounce the officials they work with. Street vendors are small business owners who
typically work hard for small profits; those who become organization leaders have lit-
tle incentive to denounce corruption and lose that additional income. As one vendor
puts it, "There are people who like being leaders, they get economic benefits from it."
Silvia, an occasional intermediary herself, explains that the collusion is too profitable
to denounce: "Everyone knows, but they make money off of this."
Corrupt vendor leaders help bureaucrats advance their careers by limiting
who witnesses bribery and therefore who can make a compelling denunciation. When
leaders take and deliver money, bureaucrats have plausible deniability. In interviews,
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bureaucrats deny corrupt activities and blame the street vendor leaders who take
money from their members. For example, Benjamín López, a Markets Office bureau-
crat, places all of the responsibility on street vendor leaders:
"People think that there are economic agreements, bribery agreements,
between me and the leaders and that is a disadvantage. That’s another
reason why I [was promoted]: transparency... We’ve made the Markets
Office much more transparent. I don’t like that [the leaders] charge their
members so much. We know that they take a lot of money out of them."
Privately, Silvia detailed bribing López and many more retold stories of others brib-
ing him. Three vendors independently repeated the same story about one association
giving López a truck, and he publicly discussed the gifted truck in front of me and
other vendors. Beyond the accusations, which I could not independently verify, López
and others exhibit a level of consumption much higher than their official salaries could
allow. For example, López’s salary should have been around 9,000 bolivianos or U.S.
$1,304 per month, given his position and the city’s public salary grades at the time of
research. Yet he publicly discussed international vacations, wore designer shirts that
cost hundreds of dollars, wore a designer watch, and owned a large house in a wealthy
neighborhood where houses cost hundreds of thousands of dollars—supposedly paid
for with a public salary of around U.S. $15,000 a year. Other bureaucrats were less
conspicuous, but often showed up to work in designer shirts and accessories that
would be difficult to afford on a public salary.
Bureaucrats do not ask for money directly, despite prevalent corruption. Un-
certain about the informal rules and blocked from bribing bureaucrats directly, street
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vendors ask their association leaders for help. Leaders then capitalize on their re-
lationships with bureaucrats and their members’ uncertainty, and take a cut before
passing bribes on to bureaucrats.
Vendors expect that association leaders help their members—for a fee—as a
matter of course. Sometimes leaders charge more for clearly illegal requests or to help
more successful vendors or people who are not affiliated with their associations. For
example, vendors from the central and most profitable markets tend to pay higher
bribes than vendors from peripheral markets because leaders and officials know that
people with central stalls make more money. Leaders may also charge large amounts
if they have monopolized access to a bureaucrat or have a particularly privileged
relationship. For example, Judith is an energetic young union leader who leads an
umbrella group. As a representative for thousands of members, Judith interacts with
the bureaucracy as an intermediary every day and maintains close relationships with
several officials. The new leader of Judith’s former association alleges that Judith,
now in a higher position, has used her privileged relationships with officials to lucra-
tive ends:
Judith was my association leader. And we found out that she was taking
a lot of money from people to change documents at the Markets Office. I
have receipts with her signature. She was charging 400, 600 [U.S.] dollars
for her signature.
Other street vendors report that bureaucrats and leaders occasionally manufacture
problems to shake down rank-and-file vendors. For example, bureaucrats and leaders
frequently decide which vendors can stay or move during construction projects. These
98
decisions can be worth thousands of dollars to vendors because those who stay face
less competition and maintain stalls in high-traffic areas. By contrast, the city sends
most of those who move to emptier and less profitable areas. Additionally, these tem-
porary moves frequently become permanent if the city never finishes the project or
refuses to reissue licenses after construction. Judith alleges that decisions are based
on which vendors pay the highest bribes, an accusation that came up several times
in conversations with other street vendors and union leaders:
"There are accusations against the leaders [of another organization]. Like
on Hidalgo Street, they did a project and moved many stalls, not all but
many, and it was the members who paid the most who stayed."
Vendors report that both street vendor leaders and bureaucrats survey who can pay
bribes and allow them to stay. If a vendor cannot afford bribes, the leader will alert
the city, which will then revoke the vendor’s license.
The city government campaigned on an anti-corruption platform, runs anti-
corruption publicity campaigns, and established transparency offices inside every city
department. Scholars and journalists hail the municipal government’s efforts as a
success (Zúñiga and Heywood, 2015). Nevertheless, corruption continues and col-
lusion between bureaucrats and civil society leaders keep vendors from denouncing
corruption. Silvia recounts a conversation with a street vendor whom a bureaucrat
had extorted:
"There is another vendor who asked me for help. I told her that she
should denounce this official, but she said no. And it’s true: the whole
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city hall could grab her and she could lose everything... They want us
to think that there is a Transparency Unit, but if we make anonymous
reports they don’t do anything and if we denounce in person, what will
happen? Who are we going to open our mouths to?"
Instead of publicly denouncing corruption to the Transparency Units, street vendors
complain to civil society leaders whom are themselves implicated in corruption. Some-
times, street vendors directly confront leaders who they have paid but who have not
delivered on their promises, as I witnessed several times. Like bureaucrats, leaders
place all blame on the bureaucrats they work with when members confront them.
More frequently, rank-and-file vendors denounce corruption to other leaders, like Ju-
dith: "Many come here, they don’t want to denounce publicly, they are afraid of
denouncing publicly or to the city, so they come and denounce to me."
Corruption enters into street vendors’ interactions with officials in La Paz.
However, vendors rarely bribe officials directly because they will not accept bribes
from just anyone. Instead, vendors bribe officials through their civil society represen-
tatives. Officials develop illicit relationships with specific leaders, who collect, bundle,
and deliver bribes. These relationships enrich and advance the careers of officials and
leaders at the expense of rank-and-file street vendors.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the history and development of La Paz’s active street mar-
ket organizations. It elaborates on the organizations’ strong structural foundations
and complex institutions. Extensive ethnographic data establish that the modeling
choices in chapter 2 are grounded in the reality of La Paz’s street vendors. The
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model’s mechanisms and implications help explain the variation that street vendors
and their unions experience across time and neighborhoods, and from person to per-
son. In the following chapter, case studies from El Alto, Bolivia and São Paulo, Brazil
examine additional geographic and individual variation.
La Paz’s street vendor organizations have a powerful union history that reaches
back to the 1800s. The artisan guilds and anarcho-syndicalist activists that gave rise
to contemporary unions contributed to today’s democratic standards, bylaws, and
consensus-based decision-making. As a result, street market organizations in La Paz
are not small voluntary groups begging for members; the organizations’ bylaws and
recruitment policies thoroughly screen potential new members, and demonstrate that
street vendor unions are selective organizations.
The model generates several observable implications that should exist in em-
pirical data if the model’s mechanisms are operant. The empirical evidence in this
chapter shows that street vendors in La Paz embody the model’s range of equilib-
rium outcomes, and do so in the ways that the model implies. As conditions have
changed over time and for individual vendors, the state has changed what it offers to
potential organizers and joiners, and individuals update their cost-benefit analyses in
predictable ways.
On paper, all of La Paz’s street vendor organizations have a strong commit-
ment to democratic practices and respect for consensus-based practices. In reality,
some organizations live up to deliberative democratic ideals, but many do not. Many
vendors benefit materially and politically from state intervention in street markets,
but the state’s involvement creates many opportunities for manipulation and corrup-
tion. As a result, the primary beneficiaries of La Paz’s impressive street vendor unions





Street Vending in La Paz, El Alto,
and São Paulo
This chapter compares La Paz and El Alto to show how low capacity pushes
governments to delegate to civil society, increasing participation among street ven-
dors. I then show how in São Paulo higher capacity than in La Paz enables increases in
enforcement, which reduces participation. Within each case, some people participate
and some do not; I compare individuals within cases to establish the role of resources
in individual participation decisions. State capacity is low in El Alto, higher in La Paz
and higher still in São Paulo; I compare city governments across cases to establish the
role of state capacity. I organize the discussion around the two mechanisms identified
in chapter 2’s theoretical model. The case studies provide additional evidence that
the mechanisms are operant by confirming the model’s observable implications.
In this project, the primary unit of analysis is the individual. Individuals are
then grouped in administrative units. For the purposes of this study, the most rel-
evant administrative unit is the city government, which in Bolivia and Brazil sets
local vending policy and oversees enforcement. National government is relevant but
secondary in the lives of street vendors; national governments set broad policy and
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distribute resources that impact enforcement. Therefore, a case in this study is a
municipality because municipalities have both a population of street vendors and a
government that vendors interact with.
The case studies in this chapter are a two-way paired comparison to La Paz:
first, pairing La Paz with neighboring El Alto holds many national-level variables
constant while adding useful variation on theoretically important variables (Seawright
and Gerring, 2008, p.296). In the La Paz-El Alto comparison, local city governments
differ in their administrative capacity. While demographic statistics in each city differ
(Lazar, 2007b, p.237), many of the street vendors in each case study work in both La
Paz and El Alto. This enables an imperfect most-similar comparison of subnational
cases (Seawright and Gerring, 2008, p.298).
Pairing La Paz and São Paulo adds a more representative case of street vendor
organization as well as additional variation on theoretically important variables (Sea-
wright and Gerring, 2008, p.296-297). Individuals in São Paulo come from a wider
range of backgrounds and bring a wider range of resources to their work than in La
Paz. São Paulo’s city government has more resources and options than La Paz’s gov-
ernment, as well as more administrative capacity, but is still far from being able to
enforce and regulate as well as its administrators would like. Street vending in São
Paulo is also more representative of street vendor experiences in Latin America, and
appears to be similar to street vending in large cities around the world (see Bhowmik
2010 for a global survey of street vendors and vending policy around the world, in-
cluding São Paulo on pages 256-274).
In this chapter, I look at local administrative capacity instead of state capacity
writ large because the cases are of cities instead of countries. I use several different
measures to approximate capacity in each city, because different data is available in
104
each place. At an estimated $388 billion a year, São Paulo has a higher GDP than
all but a few cities and many countries, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers.1 São
Paulo’s annual GDP is more than 10 times Bolivia’s GDP and its tax base is much
larger and much wealthier than La Paz or El Alto’s. Comparing La Paz and El Alto,
Arbona and Kohl (2004) claim that La Paz collects five times as much tax per capita
as El Alto (p.262). While these numbers have likely changed in intervening years,
the observable infrastructure, services, and new projects, as well as the partially ob-
servable corporate and real estate tax base, in each city imply that São Paulo has
considerably more money than La Paz, which in turn continues to generate more tax
revenue than El Alto. Turning to enforcement costs and law enforcement capacity in
markets, São Paulo has one military police officer per 50 vendors while La Paz has
one city guard per 400 vendors. I do not have data on how many city guardspeople
or other officers El Alto has, but I rarely saw any law enforcement in any market in
El Alto. Additionally, El Alto is infamous for vigilante justice, especially lynchings of
suspected lawbreakers. Community leaders attribute vigilantism to residents’ expec-
tations that the police will not respond to calls or investigate reported crimes (Derpic
and Ayala Ugarte, 2013; Rivas, 2016). By comparison, lynchings are rare in La Paz.
Throughout the cases, I use additional information, such as how often bureaucrats
showed up to work, to further establish the degree of local administrative capacity in
each case.
1Page 22: http://pwc.blogs.com/files/global-city-gdp-rankings-2008-2025.pdf. I found an unsub-
stantiated claim that São Paulo collected R$90 billion in taxes in 2015 and that the city budget was




In addition to research in La Paz from 2014 to 2015, I conducted interviews with
bureaucrats and street vendors in El Alto, and engaged in participant observation
in El Alto’s markets and during several parades and protests. Prior to my work in
Bolivia, I co-administered a survey to street vendors in São Paulo in July and August
2014.2 A collaborator and I supplemented the survey with 30 interviews. During
July 2015, I conducted additional interviews and a mini-ethnography with street
vendors in São Paulo. For the mini-ethnography, I sold electronics with unorganized
street vendors on a central market street. The following case comparisons use this
original data unless otherwise noted. I largely rely on the material in Chapter 3
when discussing La Paz. All names have been changed to comply with Internal
Review Board confidentiality requirements and interested readers can find additional
information in the methodological appendix.
I held different recruitment criteria for different groups of interviewees. For
the few academics that I interviewed, I snowball sampled by getting in contact via
email with the people whose work I had read and then asking for recommendations.
For bureaucrats, I went to the offices of everyone I could find in the El Alto city
governments that held bureaucratic decision-making positions over street vendors,
which is only about a dozen bureaucrats in each city. For street vendors, I approached
vendor leaders in person initially and then asked most people that I had developed a
rapport with by the end of fieldwork for interviews. In São Paulo, I asked academics
and activists to put me in touch with the street vendor leaders who they worked
2The La Paz survey has 204 responses while the São Paulo survey has 241. Both surveys had iden-
tical demographic questions but different participation questions and sampling strategies. Therefore,
I limit my use of the original survey data to descriptive statistics and compare them informally.
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with and then asked leaders to recommend others; I also asked a few academics to
put me in touch with unorganized street vendors. Additionally, I approached some
unorganized vendors on the street and asked for interviews after introducing myself
and the project. In all cities, I asked people in person for interviews; if they said no, I
left them alone, if they punted (typically by saying "maybe next week"), I asked up to
three times and then assumed the person did not want to interview. All interviewees
determined the place, time, and length of the interview.
While I tried to get a range of experiences and perspectives—organized and
unorganized vendors, vendor leaders, rank and file, older, younger, city managers,
lawyers, rank and file bureaucrats and police—I make no claims that I systematically
sampled interviewees. The interviews enabled me to discuss key themes in-depth;
because of that, I targeted people who knew me and were therefore more likely to
be forthcoming about potentially sensitive topics like conflicts within organizations,
breaking municipal ordinances, and bribes. Interview questions were largely pulled
from the survey instruments, though I often inserted questions specific to the person
I was interviewing. I gave people a list of interview questions beforehand if they
requested one. Interviews ranged from 10 minutes with very tight-lipped bureaucrats
to three hours with street vendors I knew well. A typical interview lasted 30-60
minutes.
In São Paulo, I conducted a mini-ethnography: I worked as an unlicensed
street vendor for one to two days a week for four weeks. In the cases, I rely heavily
on interviews and use ethnographic field notes sparingly to contextualize unlicensed
vendors’ working conditions. I contacted a vendor whom I had met previously who
had offered to teach me how to sell as an unlicensed vendor, and they enthusiastically
agreed to. I would meet them in the morning at 25 de Março, we would put roughly
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$15 into half a dozen phone chargers and selfie sticks from their wholesaler contact on
the street, we would buy a cardboard box and cheap cloth to make a mobile stall, and
then sell on the sidewalk. The vendor had a group of people who normally worked
on the same block close to each other, and we would typically sell around them. I
would sell until my partner decided to go home, typically after 4-6 hours of work. I
had a notebook with me where I would mark down initial investment, costs, sales,
and (frequent) police patrols, as well as notes. Military police frequently patrol; when
they started walking down the street, we would pack up in seconds and quickly walk
away. While selling in public space without a license is against municipal ordinances,
it is less than a misdemeanor: people cannot be arrested or even directly fined for it;
police impound wares and vendors can pay a fine to get them back. Again, I did not
make money doing this; I gave all profits, typically $10-$20, to my colleague.
For the survey, I collected 241 survey responses with a male, graduate student
collaborator in three districts of São Paulo. Both of us are white, have lived for
years in São Paulo, and are fluent in Portuguese. We each drafted questions specific
to our projects and used tested demographic questions from the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and a survey from Women in Informal Employment
Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO). Prior to administering the survey, we obtained
feedback on the questionnaire from academics in the U.S. and Brazil, and we pretested
the survey with street vendors in São Paulo.
São Paulo has 31 municipal districts, not all of which contain licensed street
vendors. We knew from government sources that the total number of licensed street
vendors citywide hovered around 1,500. An updated, centralized database was not
available; each district manages its own roster. Only the downtown district of Sé had a
publicly available updated list of its 479 registered street vendors. We contacted each
108
of the other 30 municipal districts. Most districts did not have licensed street vendors,
and some of those that did were reluctant to provide us with information about them.
The district of Lapa provided us with a list of its licensed street vendors and city
officials at the São Miguel Paulista district confirmed that all licensed street vendors
were clustered along one street where all stalls could be easily located. Hence, we
decided to carry out a census of the licensed street vendors in three districts: Sé, Lapa,
and São Miguel Paulista. In total we solicited responses from 761 stalls, roughly 50%
of the licensed vendor population in São Paulo. Moreover, the three districts surveyed
cover the spectrum of street vending in terms of the socioeconomic characteristics of
the neighborhood and the clientele. Sé is the main commercial zone. Its street vendors
practice retailing and wholesale of a wide range of products for customers from across
the city as well as salesmen from other parts of the country. By contrast, São Miguel
is a working-class residential area in the outskirts of São Paulo where traders cater
mostly to local residents, and Lapa is a middle-class residential neighborhood not far
from downtown. Based on information collected during preliminary fieldwork, these
three districts are the main sites of street trade.
4.2 El Alto
El Alto is a sprawling, indigenous, self-built city on the plains above La Paz (Arbona
and Kohl, 2004; Lazar, 2007a; Tassi et al., 2015). La Paz and El Alto differ in their
administrative capacity (Arbona and Kohl, 2004, p.255, 258, 260): the La Paz city
government has a clear organizational structure staffed by career bureaucrats who
keep the city functioning on a constrained budget, while the El Alto city government
struggles to convince employees to show up for work. Both cities rely on civil soci-
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ety organizations to enforce local laws but lower capacity El Alto delegates more to
groups like street vendor unions.
Hundreds of thousands of people work as street vendors in El Alto and vir-
tually all belong to one of 538 street vendor unions (Lazar, 2007a, p.12, 53). The
Confederation claims that 400,000 of El Alto’s roughly one million inhabitants work
as street vendors and that virtually all belong to unions affiliated with the Confed-
eration (de Bolivia, 2013). This would mean that most of El Alto’s adult population
and many of its teenagers work in the markets. The claim is likely inflated, but
not far off: all neighborhoods in El Alto have a neighborhood market where many
residents work a stall once a week3 and the city hosts the largest market in Bolivia.
Additionally, most teenagers and many smaller children in El Alto work at least part
time to supplement their households’ incomes (Rojas, 2014).4 The massive 16 de
Julio market, or jach’a qhatu, takes over the city center on Thursdays and Sundays,
with over 300,000 vendors covering most of the city center (Tassi et al., 2013, p.207).
4.2.1 History
El Alto sits over 4,000 meters above sea level on a plateau above La Paz. Both cities
are ringed by Andean peaks, but El Alto sprawls across the flat, windswept altiplano
while La Paz sits in a protected and considerably warmer river canyon below. For
3The Confederation, the city government, and many alteños claim that almost everyone works
a stall somewhere in the city. While I was not able to verify this for the entire city, every alteño
I know—from career street vendors to housekeepers to my rugby teammates to hip hop artists—
worked at a neighborhood market or 16 de Julio at least once a week.
4Bolivia passed a controversial child labor law in 2014 that legalized child labor for minors 10 and
older. Lawmakers and child labor activists—many of whom are unionized minors with the Union
of Child and Adolescent Workers, UNATSBO—support the law on the grounds that it legalizes
and regulates an economic reality that will exist as long as working parents cannot cover household
expenses with full-time jobs (Shahriari, 2014).
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much of La Paz’s colonial history, the city government prohibited the indigenous
population from living in the city center (Kohl and Farthing, 2006, p.41). Families
settled on the precarious slopes of the canyon, creeping upward toward the canyon
rim. Immigration from other parts of the altiplano, the train, and expanding wa-
ter services built communities on the plateau in the 1900s (Arbona and Kohl, 2004,
p.258). As internal immigration increased in the second half of the 20th century, El
Alto transformed into a booming satellite community and separated administratively
from La Paz in 1985 (Arbona and Kohl, 2004, p.262).
Long considered a ciudad dormitorio or bedroom community, El Alto became
a social, political, and economic powerhouse in the 1990s and 2000s (Arbona and
Kohl, 2004, p.258, 261). With cheaper land and labor, most of the La Paz metropoli-
tan area’s industry and manufacturing started in or moved to El Alto (Tassi et al.,
2013, p.5, 15, 226). Activists quickly learned that the city’s placement between the
capital, the international airport, and major highways made it possible to shut down
the capital city with a couple hundred people and a few barricades (Dangl, 2007,
p.139-140). Its neighborhood associations and unions, particularly the Federation of
Street Vendors of El Alto, played a major role in the 2003 gas war that barricaded the
capital, toppled the government, and is widely credited to have brought Evo Morales,
the country’s first indigenous president, to power (Farthing and Kohl, 2014; Madrid,
2012).
The Confederation of Street Vendors of Bolivia was founded by 70 street vendor
leaders in 1972 and now represents hundreds of thousands of workers. The Confed-
eration has its headquarters in El Alto, in a historic building above the offices of the
Central Obrero Regional, or the El Alto Regional Labor Central, and the Federación
de Juntas Vecinales, the neighborhood associations. Together, these three organiza-
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tions represent most of the city’s residents and El Alto’s social and political power
on the local and national stage (Lazar, 2007a, p.12, 53-56).
The Confederation has since its founding negotiated and worked with the city
government, alternating between amicable and openly hostile relations. After a par-
ticularly bitter end to one city administration (Lazar, 2007a, p.115), the Movimiento
al Socialismo backed Edgar Patana, a former Central Obrero Regional director and
Confederation leader who sold books in the 16 de Julio market. At the height of the
Confederation’s local and national power, Patana won two elections and served as
mayor until 2015.
4.2.2 Mechanism 1: Lower Capacity Increases Delegation to
Civil Society
The La Paz city government encourages street vendors to form and participate in
unions by offering licenses and bureaucratic access to organized vendors. Association
leaders frequently reported that they formed an organization when a bureaucrat or
colleague told them to, often after the city guard issued warnings for selling without a
license, as the champañeras association’s and Amelia’s union’s founding stories illus-
trated in chapter 3. Once organizations form, the La Paz city government delegates
enforcement and encourages street vendors to participate as union members in order
to boost compliance with local laws.
The La Paz city government does not have the resources, personnel, or po-
litical capital to enforce vending regulations on its own and works with the street
vendor organizations to achieve basic compliance or policy goals. Jorge, a former city
bureaucrat, details the extent of the city’s negotiations with street vendor organiza-
tions:
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To do these [infrastructure projects], we have to go to the federations and
lobby them... The other way is bottom up: We approach the vendors at
their stalls and see how everything is, what they are missing, to know
how we could frame something so that it’s favorable to them... And if
we reached an agreement with them, we would go to the federation with
the agreement so that the federation could approve it. From the smallest
thing, like moving a stall a meter to avoid blocking a garage, we have to
negotiate.
Jorge explains that the city government must negotiate with street vendor organi-
zations; it does not have the capacity to implement policy unilaterally. As a result,
the city government offers incentives to induce policy compromises with the organi-
zations. The city also offers individual members benefits like stall improvements for
participating in ways that benefit the city government.
In El Alto, the city government signed a ten year agreement (see Figures 1-
3) with the Federation of Street Vendors of El Alto that went much further. The
agreement codified monthly coordination meetings and low annual vending fees while
offering significant incentives for working with the government and internally enforc-
ing local vending laws. In the 19-point agreement, the city agreed to return 50% of
vending fees to the sector in the form of public works, finish infrastructure projects
that affect vendors within 60 days, and never remove stalls, among other things.
In return, civil society organizations like street vendor unions enforce dozens of
local laws. In El Alto, vendor organizations also finance and construct infrastructure
projects like roads that public sectors usually provide (Tassi et al., 2013, p.122-124).
Goldstein (2016) documented similar agreements in Cochabamba, Bolivia (p.76). Fig-
ure 1-3 show the main text of the agreement. Several of the agreement’s points were
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Figure 4.1: Ten year agreement between the El Alto city government and the Feder-
ation of Street Vendors of El Alto, p.1 114
Figure 4.2: Ten year agreement between the El Alto city government and the Feder-
ation of Street Vendors of El Alto, p.2 115
Figure 4.3: Ten year agreement between the El Alto city government and the Feder-
ation of Street Vendors of El Alto, p.3
never implemented, especially the ones that required more planning and resources
from the city government. In particular, the fourth article promises a new street
vendor headquarters and the seventh article reserves city land for a publicly funded
Guildsmen’s Hospital. These structures were never built. Likewise, the city routinely
spent years on dubious infrastructure improvements that displaced vendors, instead
of the agreed upon 60 days in article three. The fourteenth point in the agreement
freezes annual licensing fees for a decade and pledges that the city will return 50% of
those fees to the sector. The city collected the fees but how they were spent is part
of an ongoing and very public scandal and debate.
The city did implement many points in the agreement, to the material and
political benefit of the Federation, its leaders, and many of its members. Vendors had
much more success getting benefits from the city that required little action or pas-
sive nonenforcement; again, evidence of forbearance (Holland, 2016, p.232) but also
something more. As previously stated, the agreement froze licensing fees at pocket
change levels for ten years: the most profitable zone paid 20 bolivianos, or less than
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$3, a year while the peripheral zones paid less than $1.
Additionally, the city worked closely with the Federation and street vendor
leaders on a daily basis. The coordinating meetings between the city and the Federa-
tion set out at the end of the agreement happened on a mostly regular basis, according
to interviewees. Participant observation at the El Alto Markets Office and interviews
with vendors and their leaders demonstrated that the city did pass local ordinances
that the Federation requested and that streamlined and centralized requests at the
Markets Office.
However, by largely delegating street vendor requests and centralizing requests,
authorization, and representation in the Federation and its leadership, the El Alto
city government handed the Federation a monopoly over street vending in the city.
This centralized an incredible amount of authority in Braúlio Rocha,5 the leader of
the El Alto Federation and the National Confederation. For ten years, any street
vendor making any request to the city had to get a letter from Rocha. Rocha faced
constant accusations of corruption, and he has been arrested on corruption charges
several times over 15 years.
Bureaucrats at the El Alto Markets Office and the Collections Office volun-
teered examples of how they frequently worked with the Federation. The offices relied
on the Federation much more than the La Paz city offices. On multiple occasions,
bureaucrats recommended that I go to the Federation for information on local laws,
data, and vending practices because the Federation, not the city bureaucrats, was the
clearinghouse for information on the city’s street vending regulations. Additionally,
the Federation appeared to have more administrative capacity and certainly a longer
5I am considering him a public figure because he is an elected union representative and his name
and picture frequently appear in the newspaper.
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institutional memory and paper trail than the city government.
The El Alto Healers’ Association (see Figure 4) is one example of how the city’s
delegation to the Federation presents trade-offs for street vendors in El Alto. The
association of (self-identified) witches, healers, wisemen, and fortunetellers monitors
and regulates a high-traffic area in the center of El Alto. The association organized
decades ago to secure the area and now coordinates with the city and the Federation.
Members pay annual licensing fees to the city as well as association dues; in return,
the city maintains their licenses, which allow a cabin-like concrete stall where they
can store merchandise and conduct business. With this infrastructure, each member
of the witches’ union holds a license worth tens of thousands of dollars on secondary
markets. In this sense, the city pays potential violators to participate in civil society
organizations that regulate members and markets. While an association representa-
tive stated that they benefit from the organization and their licenses, he also stated
that they had to affiliate with the Federation in order to work with the city; unlike
La Paz, rank-and-file vendors and small organizations have little to no choice in who
they affiliate with in El Alto.
Both the La Paz and El Alto city governments turn to civil society organiza-
tions like street vendor unions to internally enforce local laws. Both city governments
compromise by offering incentives to organizations and their members in exchange
for self-regulation. Neither government has the capacity to unilaterally enact even
basic policy objectives. However, lower capacity El Alto delegates more power to civil
society than La Paz and sustains higher civil society participation.
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São Paulo is the largest city in the southern hemisphere. 12 million people live within
the city limits and another two dozen neighboring municipalities bring the metropoli-
tan area’s population to 22 million. The city sprawls out over central São Paulo state,
in southeastern Brazil.
The city has hundreds of market areas and tens of thousands of vendors (Pam-
plona, 2013). The most concentrated and important street markets sit in the historic
city center, though most boroughs have their own unofficial market center and nearly
every neighborhood has a roving, once-a-week household goods market, known as a
feira.
In the city center, thousands of vendors work from pre-dawn to well after
midnight. They sell consumer goods from around the world, a staggering array of
counterfeits, food, and artisan crafts. Two markets see the most activity and supply
the rest of the country with cheap consumer commodities, especially clothes: Rua 25
de Março (25 of March Street) and the Feira da Madrugada (the Dawn Market). Af-
ter a years-long battle with the city government, in which the government prevailed,
the Feira da Madrugada now sits in a hangar in Brás, a mile away from 25 de Março.
In the center of the old commercial zone of the city center, four blocks make
up most of 25 de Março. A block away, the historic São Paulo Market, the Mercadão,
is now a tourist attraction. The area is full of warehouses, wholesale stores, and
informal malls filled with stalls mostly selling counterfeits, and the stores are largely
owned by businesspeople from successive waves of immigration from Asia, the Middle
East, Europe, and other parts of Latin America. On the street, primarily Brazilian
vendors head the zone’s small retail businesses.
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4.3.1 History
Street vending has been a constant in São Paulo since the city’s founding. Historians
and travelers documented street vendors in São Paulo in the 1700s (Itikawa, 2010,
p.248). When São Paulo incorporated as a city in 1711, its few street vendors begin
to form more permanent markets and the city council first discussed street vending
policy in 1726 (Itikawa, 2010, p.249). The city council passed a comprehensive street
vending law in 1898 which regulated where, when, and how vendors could legally work
and set up the city’s first licensing scheme (Itikawa, 2010, p.249). Street markets grew
with the city over the decades, providing newcomers and professional vendors with
cash incomes. In 1953, Decree 2201 designated disabled vendors and older vendors as
demographic categories that the city should give preference to in licensing (Itikawa,
2010, p.250). Pressures started to increase in the street markets and on the city
council in the 1970s, as sustained urban migration pushed the city’s vendors to a
40,000-person workforce competing for one of 1350 licenses (Itikawa, 2010, p.250).
Increased pressures and rising unemployment led to a change in street vending policy
in 1991, which recognized vendors as workers with rights to city services and set out
criteria for obtaining a license, maintaining preferences for disabled and older workers
(Pamplona, 2013, p.230). While the law is still in force, later administrations have
maintained some rights for licensed vendors while restricting licenses and increasing
policing against unlicensed vendors. Thus, São Paulo has a three century-long history
of making and imperfectly enforcing street vending policy.
Street vending organizations are a recent and fragile phenomenon (Itikawa,
2006, p.342). Only a dozen organizations exist, representing 1-2% (Itikawa, 2006,
p.344-345) of the city’s 100,000 street vendors (Pamplona, 2013, p.226). Organiza-
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tions rise and fall with their founders, have a largely absent member base, nonexistent
bylaws, and infrequent meetings. Most street vendors do not participate in work-
based organizations (Itikawa, 2010, p.82). The few street vendors who are unionized
belong to the one small category that the state does negotiate with—disabled license
holders—or have exceptionally high resources relative to their colleagues (Cuvi, 2016,
p.396, 404-405). São Paulo has the resources and administrative capacity to imper-
fectly enforce its laws and it does, even against petty violators like street vendors; as
the city’s administrative capacity and financial resources have improved in the last
two decades (Pamplona, 2013, p.237), successive administrations have ramped up law
enforcement in street markets (Itikawa, 2010, p.254).
4.3.2 Mechanism 1: High Capacity Increases Enforcement
The São Paulo city government started a licensing program in the 1950s that granted
licenses to disabled street vendors (Itikawa, 2010, p.250). The city institutionalized
street vending in 1991 with Decree 11039 and periodically opened registration for new
licenses in the 1990s, coinciding with periods of low growth and high violent crime
rates, which suggests that city governments may have been more willing to distribute
licenses as enforcement capacity declined. As economic and administrative indica-
tors improved, both conservative and leftist administrations increased enforcement
and revoked licenses: in 2001, at the beginning of Marta Suplicy’s leftist Workers’
Party administration, 23,000 street vendors had licenses but by 2004, only 6,000 li-
censed vendors remained (for Human Rights, 2014, p.35-37). Between 2006 and 2013,
José Serra and Gilberto Kassab’s conservative administrations revoked nearly 4,000
licenses and then declared the rest invalid. A court overturned the decision, but leftist
mayor Fernando Haddad attempted to revoke all licenses again in June 2015. Paulo,
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an older, articulate vendor leader with decades of union experience, links the state,
the economy, and vendor disorganization explicitly, "We will always have illegal ven-
dors because the state... the state is not interested in organizing them."
The Brazilian state’s interventions in street vending are largely punitive. The
federal government offers limited tax incentives for informal workers to formalize, but
few workers know about or are able to access these programs; the federal government
does not work with informal workers’ organizations to promote its formalization pro-
grams, nor does it conduct much outreach to educate workers about new programs.
On the other hand, the federal government has spent millions of dollars to cut off sup-
ply chains of counterfeit, off-brand, and improperly taxed consumer goods by sending
federal police into street markets and on supply routes throughout the country, with
mixed success (Pinheiro-Machado, 2011, p.290-292).
Pinheiro-Machado (2011, p. 27-34) conducts research in street markets and
along supply routes in Shenzen, China, Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and throughout
southern Brazil, including São Paulo. She finds that federal police successfully inter-
rupted supply routes across Brazil, following stricter tax compliance policies in the
2000s (2011, p. 290-292). However, they did not stop informal retail; some people
rerouted or charged higher prices to reflect a higher risk of confiscation. Many street
vendors turned from legal goods that lacked a complete paper trail to higher margin
counterfeits, reasoning that if all products faced higher scrutiny and a chance of con-
fiscation, they might as well sell more legally dubious but higher margin products;6
vendors that I interviewed in 2015 reiterated this logic.
The São Paulo city government employs thousands of military police and sev-
6Pinheiro-Machado presentation at the Latin American Studies Association annual conference,
May 30th, 2015 in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
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eral squadrons of city guards solely to police street vending. Mayor Gilberto Kassab
dramatically increased the number of police dedicated to street vending by signing an
agreement with the military police in 2009 (Cuvi, 2016, p.403). The agreement as-
signed 3,900 off-duty military police to patrol street markets throughout the city from
7am to 10pm every day (Cuvi, 2016, p.404). At the city level, heavy enforcement has
persisted across changes in power between conservative and leftist administrations:
despite campaign promises to social movements representing street vendors, the left-
ist Suplicy and Haddad administrations maintained levels of policing similar to their
conservative predecessors (Itikawa, 2010, p.254), though they backed off the conser-
vative administrations’ eradication policies (Cuvi, 2016, p.407).
São Paulo pays for one law enforcement officer per 50 vendors while La Paz
pays for one per 400 vendors. Despite years of heavy policing and the publicly stated
goal of removing unlicensed vendors from busy areas in São Paulo, tens of thousands
of street vendors still work in these areas, and many sell counterfeit, untaxed, or
uninspected goods. The Brazilian state and the São Paulo city government have the
resources and organizational capacity to sustain this level of enforcement across mul-
tiple administrations. Police-heavy enforcement with the stated goal of eliminating
at least some informal activity began under leftist President Lula da Silva’s national
administration and Gilberto Kassab’s conservative city administration, and then con-
tinued under leftist President Dilma Rousseff and mayor Fernando Haddad.7
Police attempt to deter newcomers and confiscate unlicensed vendors’ goods.
7During the writing phase of this dissertation, Rousseff was impeached and her more conservative
Vice President Michel Temer assumed the presidency. Shortly after, João Doria of the center-right
PSDB party won the São Paulo municipal elections, unseating Haddad as mayor. Since January
2017, he has signaled a continuation of punitive vending policies, potentially reviving Kassab’s
eradication campaigns in some neighborhoods.
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Licensed vendors report that the São Paulo city guard comes by once or twice a day
to verify licenses and ensure that vendors follow regulations. This is a high level
of policing; it means that even the 1-2% of vendors in full compliance with city law
must maintain that compliance daily. Even licensed, fully compliant vendors reported
during interviews that they were harassed on a daily basis by police looking for any
excuse to fine them or revoke a license.
Unlicensed vendors in residential neighborhoods—typically individuals selling
food on street corners—reported in interviews that military police or the city guard
came by once or twice a day as well, and that they run or hide when this happens.
One snack vendor admitted that she bribes a police officer monthly to call her ahead of
time and then hides in the shop where she stores her wares overnight; she suggested
that this is a common practice. An elderly fruit vendor on a quiet street corner
reported giving up his former, more lucrative spot to a younger vendor during the
Kassab administration because, at 70, he could no longer run away from the police on
a daily basis. He lamented that even in his new and quieter spot, he occasionally has
to run from the police while pushing a heavy fruit cart. He recounted one instance in
which a military police officer pulled a gun while chasing him and his 50 pound cart
of unlicensed guavas and pineapples.
Conversely, unorganized and unlicensed vendors working in busy commercial
areas contend with constant policing. For example, while working as an unlicensed
vendor on the city’s busiest commercial street, I hid from military police patrols with
other vendors an average of 7 times per hour, or every 8.5 minutes. The patrols
varied from groups of officers passing every two minutes to breaks between patrols of
20 minutes at a time. The vendors who I worked with had adapted their routine to
the constant policing.
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Figure 4.5: A vendor hiding merchandise in a tablecloth and carrying a cardboard
box stall as he heads away from police on a busy market street in São Paulo.
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One vendor taught me these strategies: buy a small amount of stock daily,
usually 5-10 pieces at a time, and buy more after half sells. Buy a cardboard box
and a cheap tablecloth for $1, and make a stand with them; this is your loja or shop.
Arrange the products carefully, so that the few pieces look crowded on the stand.
If the police come, grab the merchandise up in the tablecloth, pick the box up, and
run or walk away. The small amount of merchandise and infrastructure make it easy
to get away from police and minimize losses to about a day’s profits if a vendor is
caught.
Vendors noted that these strategies were recent developments and that, prior
to the increase in policing or in less policed areas, they invested in more product at
a time and more expensive wooden carts and tables to sell from. In the month that
I worked as a street vendor in São Paulo, only one of the 10 unlicensed vendors who
I worked with had merchandise confiscated, though I saw police confiscating wares
from less experienced vendors almost daily.
For most street vendors in São Paulo, stringent enforcement keeps their re-
sources low by discouraging those with other options from entering the sector and
draining persistent vendors’ resources through frequent confiscation and repression.
On paper, policing street vendors means confiscating excess, improperly documented,
or unlicensed goods, which inflicts financial losses on petty violators. In practice,
many military police use arbitrary force while confiscating merchandise. For exam-
ple, in 2014, a military police officer shot and killed a counterfeit CD vendor at point
blank range while confiscating merchandise (Globo, 09 September 2014).
While working as a street vendor in downtown São Paulo in June and July
2015, I regularly saw military police draw their guns while chasing vendors, and
several of the vendors who I worked with had scars from police beatings. Most ven-
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Figure 4.6: The author at her stall on a busy market street in São Paulo.
dors, licensed and especially unlicensed, had stories of police brutality. Additionally,
younger vendors told me about colleagues who had stopped working as vendors be-
cause the constant threat of confiscation and violence was too much for them. Older
vendors told of colleagues who had worked for years as vendors and left after the city
revoked their licenses or police confiscated a particularly large amount of product;
both actions can erase years of hard work and leave a vendor destitute. Cuvi (2016,
p. 410) documented similar accounts, including vendors who died after suffering men-
tal or physical breakdowns upon losing their licenses or wares.
Without state incentives, the vast majority of São Paulo’s street vendors do
not organize. Walter, a middle-aged street vendor in peripheral São Paulo, links the
majority’s lack of organization to the city’s refusal to delegate or negotiate, "Why
don’t unlicensed vendors organize? Because it’s very difficult to get anything out of
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the authorities." Talking about his unlicensed colleagues, Benedito, a licensed ven-
dor working in downtown São Paulo, agrees, "They don’t organize because the city
government won’t meet with them, it will never give them [licenses]." These quotes
explicitly connect the state’s actions and street vendors’ calculations about the poten-
tial costs and benefits of participating in work-based organizations. Vendors discuss
how licenses function as important incentives; Benedito suggests that if organizations
could secure licenses from the government, people would form or join vendor organi-
zations. In the absence of this state-supplied incentive, organizations have little pull
over vendors and most vendors remain unorganized.
São Paulo’s only enduring street vendor organization represents the one small
category of people, disabled vendors, that the city occasionally and reluctantly nego-
tiates with. The city’s largest vendor union began in the 1990s in part to maintain the
benefits extended to disabled license holders under the 1991 vending law. Today, it
primarily exists for that reason and its membership base of several hundred is largely
older, blind, deaf, or wheelchair-bound disabled license holders who have held licenses
for decades. The union maintains an alliance with a state politician, but other than
the occasional exchange of favors with this union in election years, the state does not
work with vendor organizations.
Vendors whom I interviewed attributed these limited negotiations to the bad
publicity that disabled activists create for the mayor whenever policies encroach on
their licenses, relative to the small number of licenses that those activists ask the city
to preserve. When Haddad attempted to revoke licenses in 2015, I attended a protest
outside city hall where 300 older street vendors in wheelchairs and with walking canes
gave speeches to the press about their right to work and their dependence on the in-
come that a licensed stall produces. The leftist mayor reversed his stance within a
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few weeks.
The Brazilian state has succeeded in curtailing unlicensed vending and deter-
ring many newcomers. However, it has not eliminated street vending and essentially
plays a massive game of whack-a-mole8 with unorganized vendors. The individuals
that these policies target are overwhelmingly poor and have little formal education.
As a result, few São Paulo street vendors participate in work-based organizations.
Across the border in Bolivia, the conditions reverse: weak city governments actively
encourage street vendors to participate in unions, and experienced vendors form and
maintain these organizations to capture state incentives. Chapter 5 establishes this
pattern with quantitative data from across the Americas: where state capacity is
lower, more workers participate in civil society organizations.
4.4 Mechanism 2: Who Organizes in Each City?
In La Paz, El Alto, and São Paulo, some vendors found multiple unions while others
are joiners and some actively refuse membership. What explains this individual-level
variation? In all three cities, workers with more resources—especially education—are
much more likely to participate in informal workers’ organizations than their col-
leagues with less. Additionally, the more education a vendor has, the more likely
they are to be licensed, and university-educated street vendors are particularly likely
to reach leadership positions. In other words, education appears to correlate with
deeper forms of participation.
Bolivian street vendors come from many demographic groups: vendors come
8Whack-a-mole is an old American arcade game where the player uses a mallet to hit plastic
moles that pop out at random from holes in a board.
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from different indigenous communities, speak multiple languages, and include children
and grandparents. While many vendors have only a few years of formal schooling,
others hold law degrees. Many vendors barely subsist on their earnings while others
have multiple cars and houses. In line with research that finds that people with more
resources participate more than people with less, vendor leaders tend to be better
off relative to other street vendors. In the La Paz survey, union members were twice
as likely as unaffiliated vendors to own a car, and also more likely to own a house.
Assets and income could be endogenous to leadership positions; education, however,
is not, as most vendors complete their education before working full time or before
moving into leadership roles.
Education is particularly important: in the La Paz survey, street vendors who
had attended college were three times more likely to be union members than peo-
ple who had not. Furthermore, rank and file vendors actively promote leaders with
a college education, and leaders are disproportionately male and mestizo (Hummel,
2016, p.340-344). Fabiana, a former vendor leader who works in both La Paz and
El Alto, points to education to explain why a federation leader will continue in his
post, "Jaime Santana is the only one with the academic background, the diplomatic
education, to do it." The federation leader in question has a social science degree
from a French university. Likewise, Lazar points to the founding of the Universidad
Pública de El Alto and its subsequent training of young leaders, many of them street
vendors, and support of social movements and civil society groups as a driving force
behind El Alto’s politics (Lazar, 2007a, p.52).
In São Paulo, organized vendors like Benedito are better off in terms of educa-
tion and income than their unorganized colleagues. Most street vendors in an original
survey (see appendix for survey protocol and instrument) and Pamplona’s city-wide
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study (2013, p. 237-240) make roughly minimum wage and did not finish high school.
From the 1700s until today, street vendors have primarily been migrants to the city
with low levels of education relative to other workers (Itikawa, 2010, p.249-250); in
fact, Pamplona (2013, p. 240) finds that as education levels for most Brazilians and
most categories of workers in São Paulo steadily increased over the second half of the
20th century, street vendors retained low levels of education and in some decades the
average level of education decreased.
However, I find that organized vendors often came to the profession with more
education and earn higher profits from their work. For example, Lourenço is blind
and from a poor family in rural Brazil. As a child, he was sent to São Paulo to attend
a school for the blind, where he completed schooling and initially found a formal office
job. When he was laid off during a recession, he became a vendor and, with more
experience than most of his new colleagues, a vendor union leader. Another union
leader, Augusto, attended university and used his advantages to start a union.
I took advantage of my secure situation... That’s where I went after more
information, investing time and money out of my pocket. I researched
and discovered [The Workers’ Trade Union Central] and started to get
involved. And, at the time, I started a union. –Augusto, quote from
interview transcription (for Human Rights, 2014, p19).
Unlike the La Paz and El Alto governments, the São Paulo city government and the
Brazilian state more broadly have the capacity to forgo dialogue with street vendors
and pursue an elimination strategy. São Paulo has a large population of Bolivians who
migrate to São Paulo to work in textile and construction jobs. Many Bolivians working
in São Paulo, including several that I interviewed, also work as street vendors, and
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many worked as street vendors in Bolivia before migrating. Most do not belong to a
street vendor organization in São Paulo, even if they belonged to one in Bolivia. Their
experiences as street vendors in both countries allow an assessment of one alternative
explanation: that Bolivians organize because they have a history and a culture of
civic participation, while Brazilians are less inclined to act collectively. However,
for Bolivians living in São Paulo, the main difference is in the state’s capacity and
resulting vendor policies, not their culture. For example, Eduardo, a street vendor
from La Paz working in São Paulo, contrasts the two environments:
Bolivia and Brazil are extreme opposites. In La Paz, any group can block
the highways and the city... The government gives too much power to
social organizations. But here? Nobody does anything.
Eduardo points to the states’ positions relative to the organizations and their will-
ingness to delegate as deciding factors between how civil society operates in Bolivia
versus Brazil. Interviews in Bolivia confirmed Eduardo’s experience: one street ven-
dor with relatives in São Paulo stated that her relatives and their associates did not
organize or participate in existing street vendor organizations, in contrast to La Paz.
Another vendor who had worked in São Paulo and Buenos Aires before returning to
La Paz stated that she had not joined any organizations in Brazil or Argentina, but
had quickly joined one in La Paz to get a license. Finally, in an interview, an aca-
demic who studies the Bolivian diaspora in São Paulo recounted that migrants form
cultural organizations and few if any work-based organizations, but that the diaspora
organizations are fragile compared to similar organizations in Bolivia.
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4.5 Conclusion
In summary, street vendors operate under vastly different conditions in La Paz, El
Alto, and São Paulo. In La Paz and El Alto, individual street vendors have sev-
eral options about how and where they work. To a certain degree, street vendors also
have choices about their legal status and relationship with the city and federal govern-
ments. Individuals typically join autonomous street vendor organizations that offer
services to members, represent their memberships’ interests to the state, and enforce
local laws. The cities delegate regulation to these organizations because the cities’
limited administrative capacities preclude adequate law enforcement. While the work
and organizations are far from ideal, street vendors benefit from having options and,
on average, from belonging to organizations that work with the government.
Conversely, street vendors in São Paulo face starker choices: work illegally or
find a different job. Street vendors can choose where they work and what they sell,
but their options end there. Ninety-eight percent of São Paulo’s street vendors work
without a license and under constant threat of being stopped by the military police.
The city has plenty of resources to spend on law enforcement and urban development,
and it has chosen a punitive strategy towards street vending, other types of informal
work, and the urban poor more generally. Most street vendors do not belong to a
union or other association and see participation as futile, precisely because the city
largely refuses to negotiate with street vendor organizations. Organizations occasion-
ally form, but without any benefits to offer members, they rarely grow or last very
long.
Across the three cities, individuals with more resources participate more than
their less well-off counterparts. Individuals with more education, time, and money
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use those attributes to access or create more options for themselves. For example,
street vendors with more money have more choices about what they sell, where they
work, and how much to formalize their business, because they have more money to
buy different types of products in bulk, pay stall fees in prime markets, or purchase a
license or a lawyer. Street vendors with more education and time more readily turn
to joining or starting a work-based organization. Street vendors with more education
and other experience see organizations as a powerful way to approach governments
and their agents. They are also more likely to know or learn the logistical and legal
steps necessary to establish an organization. More educated people are also more
likely to know how to navigate the bureaucracy and make politicians and bureaucrats
listen to their demands. Finally and crucially, officials are more likely to listen to
individuals with educational credentials and, in part because of that, other vendors
elect them to leadership positions.
The three cases demonstrate the different conditions that street vendors face
working with local governments of varying administrative capacity. The cases also
demonstrate that the options available to street vendors and, consequently, their
participation decisions, depend in part on the resources available to a given individ-
ual. The original research and secondary literature in these three cases demonstrate
considerable variation on the independent variables of interest, resources and state
capacity, as well as collective action outcomes. However, the three cases do not cap-
ture the full variation that we see across Latin America, or globally. The following
chapter examines these variables through quantitative data from the Latin American
Public Opinion Project, the OECD, and the World Bank, and finds similar patterns
in different types of data.
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Chapter 5
Quantitative Analyses of State
Capacity and Participation
Why do informal workers organize? Chapter 2 introduced a theory of state
delegation to civil society groups, where state incentives encourage informal workers
to form organizations. Chapters 3 and 4 presented ethnographic, case study, and sur-
vey data from La Paz, El Alto, and São Paulo. This chapter introduces and analyzes
survey data from across Latin America over 10 years. The data come from the Latin
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), the World Bank, and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and contain measures for state
capacity and individual resources. The quantitative analyses in this chapter establish
patterns in countries across the region that are analogous to the trends in the quali-
tative data from chapters 3 and 4.
This chapter’s quantitative analyses serve as preliminary evaluations of the
theory’s observable implications using out-of-sample data. I established the theory
and the qualitative trends before analyzing the quantitative data in this chapter;
therefore, these analyses serve as a preliminary test of the observable implications
from chapter 2. The chapter uses survey data from a subsample of self-employed
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respondents from the Latin American Public Opinion Project combined with World
Bank development indicators and OECD tax data. I use data on self-employment
instead of informal employment because LAPOP asks respondents if they are self-
employed but not if they are informal. There are sound survey methodology reasons
for this: "informal" is a loaded or complicated term in some Latin American coun-
tries,1 but "self-employed" retains a similar meaning in different contexts and overlaps
significantly with informal employment (Fiess et al., 2010, p.211-212). Globally, most
self-employed people are also informally employed (Fiess et al., 2010, p.211-212): most
make roughly minimum wage as domestic workers, day laborers, recyclers, or street
vendors and survey researchers often use self-employment as a proxy for vulnerable
or informal employment (Hussmanns, 2004, p.2-10).
I use two methods to analyze the data. First, logistic analyses establish a re-
lationship between proxy measures for state capacity, proxy measures for individual
resources, and measures of civil society participation. In the logistic models, lower
state capacity measures and higher individual resources are associated with increased
participation. This finding supports the theory and reflects the empirical patterns
from earlier chapters. However, the analyses assume but cannot establish that the
logistic models’ identifying assumptions are met. Unfortunately, the data do not have
features that allow for rigorous identification. I reanalyze the data with a machine
learning technique called random forests, which predicts outcomes without requiring
identifying assumptions. This nonparametric approach supports the logistic analy-
1For example, the few times that I called Bolivian street vendors trabajadores informales, I elicited
an angry reply from a vendor about how they were not ilegales, they were hardworking, taxpaying
workers whose right to work is guaranteed in the Constitution (there is a vaguely-worded right to
work in the Constitution that applies to all citizens, and few Bolivians pay income tax, but everyone
pays VAT and street vendors consider licensing fees a tax as well).
137
sis by finding similar and stronger patterns in the data without making any causal
assumptions or claims. Multiple data sources and analytic frameworks examine the
proposed theoretical process from different angles and point to the same conclusions,
which builds confidence in the theory and empirical results, despite barriers to rigor-
ous identification.
5.1 Self-Employment and Informality in Latin Amer-
ica
Rates of self-employment and informal labor vary significantly across the Americas
(Vanek et al., 2014, p.7-9). Self-employment and informal work are common in every
economy in the region and the two categories overlap extensively (Vanek et al., 2014,
p.34-35). The World Bank found that, in 2013,2 around 32% of people employed
in Latin America were self-employed. By country, Costa Rica had the lowest rate of
self-employment at 26% of economically active people while Honduras had the highest
rate at 56%.3 Figure 1 tabulates self-employment rates in Latin America by country.
The International Labor Organization recorded informal employment for 16
countries in Latin America in 2014 (Vanek et al., 2014). The ILO considers self-
employment to be one component of informal employment. Comparing the World
Bank and the ILO data, one of the ILO’s measures for informal employment is close
2The World Bank Data Bank does not have self-employment by country for all countries and
years. For the numbers in this paragraph and Figure 1, I took the most recent data. For the region
and most countries, the data is from 2013. Argentina, Paraguay, and Panama had information from
2014, Jamaica and Peru last reported in 2012, Chile’s most recent self-employment numbers are
from 2011, and Belize stopped reporting in 2005. Bolivia, Guyana, and Haiti are missing recent
self-employment data.
3The range may be truncated, since the World Bank is missing data for Bolivia, Guyana, and
Haiti, which are high informality countries.
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Figure 5.1: Self-employment in Latin America
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to but slightly higher than the World Bank’s self-employment data, while a broader
measure of informal employment shifts an additional tenth to a third of each coun-
try’s working population into informality. The ILO’s data suggests that, if anything,
using self-employment as a proxy for informality undercounts informal employment.
Schneider et al. (2010) found similar trends across the region when they esti-
mated the informal sector’s share of GDP in each country. Using a dozen economic
indicators from 1995-2007, they generate estimates of the size of the informal economy
(which they call the "shadow economy") for 162 countries, including most of Latin
America. The authors’ estimates for the region range from a low of 20% of GDP in
Chile to a high of 68% in Bolivia. Schneider et al. (2010) estimate share of GDP, not
number of people, and during a slightly different time period, but their data for the
region, summarized in Figure 2, shows similar trends to those in Figure 1.
5.2 Data, Measurement, and Operationalization
The analyses use a dataset from the Latin American Public Opinion Project with
44,184 self-employed respondents. The dataset has 26,304 complete observations
from 17 countries for nearly two dozen measures (see Figure 3). In-person inter-
viewers surveyed respondents in these countries every two years from 2006 to 2014. I
do not impute missing observations because most missingness comes from added or
discontinued questions over different waves, not nonresponses. The samples from each
country are nationally representative and LAPOP ensures that enumerators solicit
responses from rural areas and small towns and in multiple languages; unlike many
public opinion surveys, respondents are not just from large cities. While the samples
are random and nationally representative, the data is pooled cross-sectional data and
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Figure 5.2: Informal sector’s share of GDP in Latin America, from Schneider et al
2010
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Figure 5.3: Respondents by country
not panel data; administrators sampled new respondents for every wave and added
countries in later years.
I use tax and gross domestic product (GDP) measures from the OECD and
the World Bank to proxy state-level variables. The data come from government
statistics bureaus reporting national data to these international organizations. These
data are panel data, but are treated as pooled cross-sectional data when added to the
LAPOP dataset.
The dependent variable of this dissertation is informal worker organization. I
operationalize informal worker organization in this chapter as individual-level partic-
ipation in a professional association. Specifically, the analyses use a binary variable
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Costa Rica 84% 16%
Dominican Republic 74% 26%
Ecuador 78% 22%













for if a respondent reported attending professional association meetings in the last 12
months: 19% of the sample attended at least once. Table 1 tabulates participation
by country.
The descriptive statistics lend mixed support to the theory: some lower ca-
pacity countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic experience
nearly double the rates of participation than higher capacity countries such as Brazil,
Uruguay, and Costa Rica. Additionally, research on informal work indicates that
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru have considerably organized informal sectors while Brazil
and Costa Rica do not (Bhowmik, 2012). However, some low capacity countries with
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large informal sectors, like Paraguay and Venezuela, have little participation, while
some middling capacity countries with notable informal worker organizations, like
Argentina and Mexico, have low participation in professional associations. Thus, the
descriptive statistics suggest mixed support for the theory.
Note that professional association attendance is a conservative measure of in-
formal worker organization: if an individual reports attending an association’s meet-
ing, that implies that the association exists and the individual participates in organi-
zational activities. For example, in Brazil, many informal workers who I worked with
that consider themselves organized would report themselves as self-employed but may
not report attending a meeting in the last 12 months because meetings are infrequent
and not required. Based on similar information from Bhowmik (2012), p.210-211, on
six Latin American cities, Roever (2005), p.117-135, on Lima, and Itikawa (2006),
p.344-345, on São Paulo, I suspect that this association measure undercounts orga-
nized informal workers across the region.
I proxy state capacity with tax revenue per capita data from the OECD.
Comparing 15 common operationalizations of state capacity, Hendrix (2010), p.274,
recommends that researchers operationalize the concept with variables that measure a
state’s revenue-generating capacity, because revenue measures account for more vari-
ation than other options. I use tax revenue per capita because it measures a state’s
ability to collect the taxes it levies and the material resources that governments can
allocate to different policy areas. Additionally, tax revenue per capita data exist for
most countries and years in the dataset while other potential measures, like homicides
per 100,000 or statistical capacity, have severe missing data. The analyses do not use
composite measures or indexes of state capacity because most do not cover the years
in the public opinion dataset that supplies individual-level information. The OECD
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Table 5.2: Correlation between state capacity measures
Measure Tax per capita Social Security GDP per capita
Tax per capita 1 .90 .78
Social Security .90 1 .60
GDP per capita .78 .60 1
has tax revenue and social security data for all Latin American countries and years
covered by LAPOP, and I used World Bank population data to construct per capita
measures.
Table 2 is a correlation matrix for tax revenue per capita and two alternative
measures of state capacity: GDP per capita, a common and valid state capacity mea-
sure (Hendrix, 2010, p.283), and social security contributions per capita, a revenue
measure that captures the state’s revenue generating capacity in labor markets.
The three measures are highly correlated, with tax per capita and social se-
curity moving closely together, and tax and GDP per capita largely moving together.
GDP per capita and social security per capita are correlated but not as highly at .60.
To further allay concerns about how I operationalize state capacity and how sensitive
the analyses are to measurement decisions, I have included robustness checks with
two different proxies for state capacity. In fact, the imperfect correlation lends ad-
ditional support to the finding: even using measures for state capacity that are not
very highly correlated, like GDP and social security per capita, the analyses generate
similar results. All state capacity measures are continuous and I report descriptive
statistics in Table 3.
I operationalize individual resources with education in the quantitative anal-
yses. For individuals, education is one of several key personal resources that people
frequently leverage in political participation (Fischer and Qaim, 2012, p.1258). This
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for continuous variables
Variable Mean Median Standard devia-
tion
Education (years) 8.34 9 4.37






Age 40.42 39 13.71
Children 2.53 2 2.31
Vehicles 1.31 1 .58
project uses education because people reliably report their education levels in surveys,
unlike other important resources such as income or social networks. Importantly, most
people complete formal education before they enter the workforce; unlike income or
social networks, education is a personal resource that is causally prior to civil society
participation for many individuals. Additionally, I can trace education across the case
studies and the large n data. LAPOP’s educational variable is an ordinal scale that
records the number of years a person spent in formal education.
In some models, I include alternative measures for individual resources, in par-
ticular, household assets and age; other studies also use age as a measure for social
capital (Fischer and Qaim, 2012, p.1258). Household assets are binary variables: did
a respondent have a telephone, TV, or refrigerator or not, except in the case of vehi-
cles, which is measured as a short ordinal scale. Age is a continuous variable starting
at 18.
In addition to the two independent variables connected to my theory, I include
a battery of controls that the literature on civil society participation has identified as
potential confounders. I include important demographic information, in particular,
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children and gender, as well as other forms of political participation. Children is a
continuous variable while gender is measured as a binary variable.4 Church atten-
dance, community association participation, political meetings, and school committee
participation are measured as binary: did a respondent attend a meeting in the last
12 months or not. Voting is also a binary variable that measures if the respondent
voted or not in the last election. I recoded political interest from a scale to a binary
variable where the cut point was some interest. Finally, I include a binary control for
whether respondent lives in an urban or rural area, as workers in urban areas and ru-
ral areas have different social networks and infrastructure to pull on when organizing,
and have different employment and educational opportunities not captured by other
variables. Table 4 lists binary variables’ proportions.
While an important literature exists on how individuals use ethnicity as a
resource in collective action (Madrid, 2012; Varshney, 2001), I do not include controls
for ethnicity because LAPOP’s ethnicity questions change by country, and the result-
ing 27 categories have significant missing data. I include ethnicity as a robustness
check in the appendix and the fixed effects results do not change significantly, though
the variable prevents the random effects model from converging.
5.3 Logistic Regressions
I use logistic models because the outcome is measured as binary categories. I use
fixed effects for years because the data do not have a long or consistent enough time
series to make a time series model appropriate. The analyses feature fixed effects for
4In the São Paulo survey, where a minority of street vendors identify as gender nonconforming,
we included multiple gender categories. However, no respondents identified as gender nonconforming
to us, and for analyses we used a binary variable.
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81% Nonparticipants 19% Participants
Gender 68% Men 32% Women
Urban 61% Rural 39% Urban
Voter 81% Voter 19% Nonvoter
Interested in Politics 33% Uninterested 67% Interested
Religious Meetings 42% Nonparticipants 58% Participants
School Meetings 56% Nonparticipants 44% Participants
Community Associa-
tion
67% Nonparticipants 33% Participants
Political Meetings 86% Nonparticipants 14% Participants
Television 10% Do not own 90% Own
Fridge 28% Do not own 72% Own
Landline 61% Do not own 39% Own
countries because we should expect different countries to have different trajectories
that shape individuals’ organizing decisions and country fixed effects capture some of
this variation (Putnam et al., 1994, 182). The appendix includes models with ran-
dom effects for countries as well; these analyses are not consistently significant, likely
because several countries have small numbers of self-employed respondents and the
analyses do not have sufficient power within countries when I include full controls.
With that exception, results are generally consistent across specifications and estima-
tors.
Table 5 reports the results of two fixed effects logistic regressions with different
specifications. The first column reports results from a sparse model with the effects
of the independent variables of interest—education and tax revenue per capita—on
professional association participation, and includes country and year fixed effects.
The second model includes full controls as well as country and year fixed effects. One
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star connotes significance at the .05 level.
The estimates are in line with the theory’s observable implications. Tax rev-
enue per capita—a revenue-based proxy for state capacity (Hendrix, 2010, p.274)—is
consistently negative and significant, suggesting that self-employed workers in lower
capacity states are more likely to participate in professional associations than their
counterparts in higher capacity states. Similarly, living in a rural area, where states
tend to have less control relative to urban areas, increases the chance that a worker
participates. Both results support the expectations of the first theoretical mechanism:
lower capacity states encourage informal workers to organize.
Individual-level resources also matter: the more educated a worker is, the more
likely they are to participate. Likewise, owning vehicles, a proxy for wealth, boosts the
likelihood of participation. These results support the expectations of the second the-
oretical mechanism: people use preexisting resources to participate. Supporting past
work on civil society participation (Putnam et al., 1994, p.172-174), people who are
more interested in politics are more likely to participate in work-based organizations
and participation in any other type of organization greatly increases the likelihood of
engaging in a professional association.
The graphs in Figure 4 plot the predicted probabilities of participation as tax
revenue per capita (top) and years of education (bottom) increase. Looking at the
graph on the left, Figure 4’s first takeaway is that as tax revenue increases, the like-
lihood of participation decreases. For example, a person who lives in a country with
very low tax revenue per capita has a 22% chance of participating in a professional
association in a given year. By contrast, a person who lives in a country with high
tax revenue has a 11% chance of participating. In other words, a person in a high
capacity country is 50% less likely to participate than a person with the same level
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Table 5.5: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation
in Latin America, 2006-2014


































N = 28,184 N = 26,304
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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of education in a low capacity country.
Looking at the graph on the bottom, Figure 4’s second takeaway is that the
more education a person has, the more likely they are to participate at any revenue
level. For example, a person with no schooling has a 15% likelihood of participation
while a person with a graduate degree has a 25% chance of participation, an increase
in likelihood of 63%.
Figure 5 combines these predicted probabilities and plots the predicted prob-
abilities of participation at different levels of education as tax revenue per capita
increases. Figure 5’s first takeaway is that as tax revenue increases, the likelihood of
participation for people at all education levels decreases.
Figure 5’s second takeaway is that as tax revenue increases, all respondents
converge towards nonparticipation and the differences between more or less privileged
people shrink. Combining the education and tax revenue results, a person without
formal education in a high capacity country has a 5% likelihood of participating,
compared to the 30% likelihood of a highly educated person in a low capacity coun-
try; in other words, the second individual is six times more likely to participate in
civil society. Combining these dimensions, one in 50 people with no formal education
participate in high revenue countries, but in low revenue countries, the least educated
workers are just as likely to participate as the most educated workers in high revenue
states: one in six in each condition participate.
Considering the lively debate on state capacity and how to measure it, one
concern is that the results are sensitive to differences between state capacity mea-
sures. Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that proxying state capacity with GDP and social
security per capita does not change the results by much: the sign and significance
remain the same. Table 6 reports results from the sparse model and the main model
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Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities of participation
Tax revenue per capita
Years of Education
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Figure 5.5: Predicted probabilities of participation
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with full controls, using GDP per capita instead of tax revenue per capita.
As another robustness check, Table 7 reports results from a sparse model
and the main model with full controls, using social security contributions per capita
instead of tax revenue per capita. Again, the results are consistent with analyses that
use different measures of state capacity. Additional robustness checks on subset data
are in chapter 5’s appendix. Results from subsetting the data on urban population,
gender, and country are mixed: the results are similar in direction, magnitude, and
significance for men and rural workers, and when Bolivia and Brazil are excluded
from the sample, but tax revenue loses significance on female and urban subsamples.
However, subsetting the data greatly restricts the sample and the mixed results may
be an artifact of a different and smaller sample See Appendix D for tables with results
on different subsets of the data.
The logistic analyses suggest that the patterns identified in the case studies
are present in other Latin American countries. However, the results are far from
conclusive and we currently lack more specific measures or longer time series which
could help distinguish between confounders, clearly identify the data, or model time
and levels more appropriately. Further analyses in the appendix demonstrate that
the relationships are robust to many but not all common objections and checks. In
the following section, I use a nonparametric machine learning framework to reanalyze
the dataset without making strict assumptions about the data.
5.4 Machine Learning Models
The machine learning approach adds to and supports the logistic regression analyses
by demonstrating that proxies for state capacity and individual resources matter more
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Table 5.6: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation,
GDP per capita.
Fixed Effects Logit Fixed Effects Logit
(Full Controls)
































N = 29,646 N = 27,672
Year and country fixed effects suppressed.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table 5.7: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation,
social security contributions per capita.
Fixed Effects Logit Fixed Effects Logit
(Full Controls)
































N = 28,184 N = 26,304
Year and country fixed effects suppressed.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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than most other variables in predicting participation, even without the assumptions
necessary for the logistic models. Importantly, the technique uses complex condi-
tional relationships to make predictions; these conditional relationships are closer to
the proposed theoretical process than the additive effects of the regression models.
Finally, prediction can be a valuable endeavor in and of itself; for example, govern-
ments that want to delegate to civil society may need to predict future participation
to assess if a policy is worth the time and effort.
In a frequentist statistics approach, researchers specify a model and then eval-
uate it with data, as in the previous section’s logistic regressions. In a machine
learning approach, researchers feed data into an algorithm that learns patterns to
predict output (Breiman, 2001b, p.199). To nonparametrically analyze the dataset,
I use a random forest classifier, which generates predictions from n decision trees.5
Random forest is one technique in the field of machine learning methods (Breiman,
2001a, p.5). Machine learning methods like random forest classifiers typically outper-
form OLS and logistic regression in making predictions, but machine learning methods
make no causal assumptions or claims (Muchlinski et al., 2016, p.88).
Random forest classifiers create decision trees to partition the data (Breiman,
2001a, p.5). As the stylized example in Figure 6 illustrates, decision trees partition
data to classify observations, creating conditional relationships between the variables.
Random forest classifiers are particularly useful for social scientists because, unlike
several other machine learning methods, they can handle continuous and discrete
variables, missing data, and unbalanced classes, and produce useful metrics like error
5Specifically, I use the off-the-shelf random forest classifier in R’s caret package. Details in the
replication code and caret documentation. See Muchlinski et al. (2016) for an excellent comparison
of random forests and logistic regression in R using the caret and randomForest packages.
157
Figure 5.6: Stylized example of a decision tree classifying participants and nonpar-
ticipants






rates and variable importance measures (Muchlinski et al., 2016, p.89).
Decision trees are analogous to flow charts: the highly stylized decision tree
in Figure 6 illustrates how a decision tree partitions data into increasingly smaller
groups in order to make a prediction. Each terminal node in the decision tree is a
prediction. In this example, if a respondent lives in a place where tax revenue per
capita is less than $1,532 a year (Figure 6’s first split, to the left) but the respondent
is younger than 35 (Figure 6’s second split to the left), the tree ends in 0, which
means that it predicts that the respondent did not participate. Conversely, if tax
revenue per capita is less than $1,532 a year, but the respondent has more than 10
years of schooling, the tree ends in 1, in other words, the tree predicts that the re-
spondent did participate. Variables further up in the decision tree carry more weight
because they contribute to more partitioning. For instance, tax revenue per capita
partitions all observations in this example and is therefore more important to the
model than education, which partitions many but not all observations. Again, Figure
6 is a highly stylized example; the decision trees that preliminary analyses grew for
this project frequently had dozens of distinct conditional relationships between two
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dozen variables.
5.4.1 Random Forest Results
Random forest techniques grow a large number of decision trees—this project used
1,000, which is the point at which additional complexity does not increase the pre-
cision of this analysis’s results—from randomly selected variables in a dataset. The
model randomly samples variables at every node, making each decision tree different.
The model learns by finding the optimal local split or value of the sampled variable
at that node that most clearly separates all remaining participants from nonpartici-
pants. After growing a forest of decision trees, the random forest technique bundles
and averages decision tree predictions to generate results (Breiman, 2001b, p.205).
Selecting parameters like the number of trees to grow is an iterative process
that relies more on guidelines than formulas (Muchlinski et al., 2016, p.94). To select
parameters, I compared dozens of models with different threshold values for different
parameters and selected the values that maximized precision without adding unnec-
essary computational complexity. For example, a model with 1000 trees takes several
more hours to run than a model with 100 trees, but the results are much more con-
sistent across models. A model with 2000 trees generates very slightly more precise
results and adds considerably more computing time.
Random forests models generate several types of results, which are largely
distinct from the results that most social scientists expect from regression models.
First, random forest models generate error matrices, which are categorized predic-
tions. Logistic and other regression models can generate these matrices, and some of
the comparisons later on in the section rely on these results. Second, random forests
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models can back out which variables contribute most to the predictions, which we ex-
amine in the variable importance plot below. Finally, with current methods, random
forest models cannot generate coefficients, confidence intervals or other measures that
social scientists typically use in causal inference.
Figure 7 plots each variable’s contribution to the random forest model. The
measure on the x-axis is the mean decrease in GINI score for each variable. The
GINI score measures predictive accuracy by assessing how the model worsens when a
given variable is removed (for a more thorough discussion, see Muchlinski et al. 2016,
p. 97-98. Note that the GINI score is unrelated to the Gini index of inequality).
Therefore, the higher a variable’s decrease in GINI score, the more important it is to
the model’s accuracy.
Again, random forest models predict data but make no causal claims. Figure
7 supports the logistic results and the theory by showing that education and tax
revenue per capita remain strong predictors of professional association participation
patterns even without making any strong assumptions about the data.
Additionally, Figure 7 has interesting implications for collective action re-
search. The variable importance plot confirms some established findings: the country
a person lives in greatly impacts their collective action decision, as does year of sur-
vey, education, experience, operationalized as age, and other types of participation.
However, the graph runs counter to many established findings. For example, number
of children, a variable that researchers rarely discuss, strongly predicts participation
patterns, suggesting that family structure greatly impacts civil society participation.
While the results do not reveal how the number of children impacts participation, re-
search in the American context finds, unsurprisingly, that children reduce adults’ free
time, which reduces forms of political participation that require significant amounts
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Figure 5.7: Variable importance in the random forest model, ranked from highest to
lowest predictive power, as measured by GINI score
GINI Score
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of time (Brady et al., 1995, p.285). Surprisingly, several indicators of political engage-
ment and participation, like voting in past elections and reported interest in politics,
do not contribute much to the model.
5.4.2 Comparing Predictions from Logistic and Random For-
est Models
The random forest model readily predicts nonparticipation: the model correctly clas-
sifies a person as a nonparticipant 89% of the time. On the other hand, it correctly
predicts participation in a professional association 41% of the time. Overall, it makes
a correct prediction for 79% of the data. In comparison, the logistic model in Table 5
with full controls correctly predicts nonparticipation 97% of the time, at the expense
of participation, which it correctly predicts 15% of the time.
ROC plots visualize the models’ utility. The ROC plot in Figure 8 shows the
random forest and logistic classifiers’ true positive rates as the prediction threshold
changes. In other words, the ROC plot shows how well each classifier predicts both
classes.
The ROC curves show that both models perform well, reliably separating
and classifying respondents as participants and nonparticipants. However, the ran-
dom forest model performs better at predicting both classes while the logistic model
primarily predicts nonparticipation.
Separation plots visualize the models’ utility by plotting how well models sort
classes within the data (Muchlinski et al., 2016, p.94). The separation plots in Figure
9 contrast Table 5’s full logistic model with the random forest model’s classification.
Participants appear as black lines and nonparticipants appear as white lines. The
horizontal black line plots predicted probability. The triangle indicates the number
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Figure 5.8: ROC plots of true positive performance of logistic and random forest
models
163
Figure 5.9: Separation plots for models predicting participation, where black lines




of participants that the model predicts. A model that perfectly classifies the data
would have all white to the left of the triangle and all black to the right. Any black
lines to the left of the triangle are participants misclassified as nonparticipants and
vice versa.
Figure 9 shows that both models separate the data but that the random forest
classifier performs better in both classes and accurately predicts more participation.
In the random forest plot, most participants are correctly classified to the right of
the triangle, but a number of participants are misclassified as nonparticipants (any
black lines to the left of the triangle represent misclassified participants). Conversely,
the logistic plot shows that the model sorts nonparticipants to the left of the trian-
gle. However, the random forest model performs better because it accurately predicts
both participation and nonparticipation, instead of excelling at one.
To summarize, the logistic regressions suggest that more education and a lower
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capacity state encourage self-employed workers to participate in work-based organiza-
tions. Moving away from parametric data assumptions, the machine learning analysis
supports the theory by showing that conditional relationships between education and
other individual-level proxies for resources and tax revenue per capita as a proxy for
state capacity predict self-employed people’s participation in work-based collective
action.
5.5 Conclusion
Globally, most adults work and most are poor. Available jobs tend to be informal,
precarious, and bring in low wages with few if any benefits (Neuwirth, 2012, p.27-28).
Many workers experience poverty, informality, and precariousness in other parts of
their lives as well: in informal housing, transportation, and unregulated health care
(Desmond, 2012; Holland, 2014; Goodfellow, 2015). Existing theory predicts that
informal workers rarely organize and participate in civil society (King and Rueda,
2008, p.292-293). Scholars and policymakers assume that informal or self-employed
workers rarely participate because of additional barriers to collective action like high
turnover and uncertain legal statuses (Perry, 2007, p.xi). Contrary to this assumption,
informal workers around the world participate in civil society and frequently improve
their working and living conditions when they do (Agarwala, 2013; Bhowmik, 2012;
Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001).
I argue that states and informal workers interact to encourage civil society
participation in some places but not others. I suggest that where states do not
have the capacity to enforce regulations, they offer incentives to workers to form
and join civil society organizations that regulate daily life. Workers who have the
165
education and other resources to harness these incentives may then opt to participate
and negotiate collectively with the state. By contrast, states with more capacity
enforce laws against activities like street vending, and these punitive strategies take
resources away from workers (Holland, 2016, p.233). Punitive enforcement strategies
create considerable barriers to organizing and as a result, informal workers participate
less in high capacity contexts. In support of the theory, I have presented out-of-sample





Half of the world’s workers labor in informal jobs (Ronconi, 2010, p.719). Most
informal workers do not join unions or other civil society organizations, and they are
more likely to withdraw from political participation than formal workers (King and
Rueda, 2008, p.292-293). However, in countries like Bolivia, India, and South Africa,
massive informal workers’ organizations represent millions of people and make their
members’ livelihoods more secure (Agarwala, 2013). In cities across the globe, from
São Paulo to Lagos to Bangkok, sizable city-wide workers’ associations represent
thousands of informal workers and frequently lobby local governments to improve
their members’ working conditions (Bhowmik, 2012; Grossman, 2017). Why do some
informal workers join and form organizations even as the majority do not?
The preceding chapters advance the argument that where enforcement costs
are high, governments benefit from encouraging violators to organize self-regulating
groups. The project demonstrates that governments can offer private incentives to
informal workers who organize self-regulating associations, which helps workers over-
come barriers to collective action. Aspiring leaders use state-supplied incentives to
convince their colleagues to join and participate in informal workers’ organizations.
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Governments negotiate with established organizations about legalization, regulation,
and enforcement, and the organizations enforce rules in markets.
If membership brings clear benefits like Agarwala (2013) and I claim, why
don’t more workers organize? In line with past research on informal economies, this
study demonstrates that informal workers face significant barriers to organizing. Most
workers are poor and work long, grueling hours in order to support their families on
low and unpredictable incomes. Every hour spent organizing is an hour of lost in-
come or rest, and most workers do not have experience organizing or extra resources
to dedicate to activism. Additionally, in many typically informal jobs, such as street
vending, unlicensed transportation, or recycling, workers compete with their closest
colleagues. An informal worker’s coworkers are fierce competitors, not natural allies,
in contrast to many types of formal employment. With these significant barriers to
collective action, many informal workers never form or join a workers’ organization,
even when they know they could benefit.
Chapter 2 introduced the theory and then formalized the argument with a
game theoretic model. First, unorganized informal workers create problems for local
and national governments. Informal workers typically do not pay taxes and ignore
dozens of health and safety laws, which decrease governments’ potential resources and
make public health and safety crises more likely. Many informal workers, like street
vendors, scavengers, gypsy cab and mototaxi drivers, work on public land or use pub-
lic infrastructure in the course of their business, leading to conflicts over public space
with other workers, formal business owners, and residents. Most governments would
probably prefer if informal work did not exist and are reluctant to engage informal
workers and their representatives. However, the problems and conflicts that informal
workers create can push governments to intervene.
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In chapter 2’s formal model, a government can choose to intervene with posi-
tive incentives in informal workers’ collective action decisions. The model establishes
conditions under which governments intervene or not: first, where workers can orga-
nize without external incentives, the government free rides on their efforts and does
not offer any additional help. Second, if incentives cost more than the problems that
unorganized workers create, the government does not intervene. However, if the gov-
ernment can save money by providing an organizing incentive, it will make an offer.
The model also establishes conditions under which workers organize: where
workers do not see private or collective benefits from organizing, they do not, nor
do they organize where incentives are lower than the costs of joining. Second, where
workers get something from the organization, they form one even without government
help. Finally, if the government offers an incentive that covers a worker’s organizing
costs, she acts. The model endogenizes selective incentives and partially endogenizes
collective action to political negotiations. Depending on the parameter values, work-
ers and the government interact to create a range of outcomes in equilibrium, from no
organization, to small organizations, to massive groups. The model leads to outcomes
where people who would not organize on their own choose to organize in anticipation
of policy input or legal benefits. The equilibrium outcomes reflect the range of orga-
nizational outcomes that we observe in informal markets across the globe.
The theoretical model contributes to collective action theory by demonstrating
when and why a simple state intervention can influence people who will not overcome
collective action problems on their own. The model replicates canonical findings by
Olson (1965) and Ostrom (1990) while adding novel equilibrium results. Most im-
portantly, where unorganized people create problems for the government and will not
overcome barriers to collective action on their own, governments benefit by stepping
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in with organizing incentives. Where possible, governments will free ride on indi-
viduals’ contributions: if citizens can produce public goods without external help,
governments readily free ride on those efforts.
The theory relies on two mechanisms that suggest implications for the empir-
ical record. In the first mechanism, enforcement costs put pressure on low capacity
governments to offer incentives for self-regulating groups. If this happens, the cases
should show that officials in low capacity areas report that they give incentives and
delegate enforcement to civil society groups because of cost and capacity pressures.
Conversely, officials should not report this in higher capacity areas and should be
more likely to increase enforcement against informal workers. The qualitative data in
chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate just that: city governments in La Paz and El Alto del-
egate enforcement to large civil society groups and report that they cannot regulate
sufficiently without these organizations. Lower capacity El Alto delegates more than
La Paz. Civil society groups in both cities regulate their members remarkably well—
and much more effectively than the police force could hope to—and attract members
with incentives like licenses and government access, which the groups receive from
the state.
Local and national governments that have the administrative capacity and
law enforcement resources to enforce laws against informal work often choose to do
so. For example, the United States has one of the lowest rates of informality in
the world. This is in part because robust labor markets and clear self-employment
regulations give workers many employment options and clear paths to formalization.
However, the U.S.’s powerful enforcement agencies also discourage informality and
are relatively successful at catching people who persistently skirt the law. Unlicensed
street vendors spend much of their time dodging police and getting caught can have
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fatal consequences. Police across the country kill street vendors during on-the-job
altercations, from Amadou Diallo’s death in 1999 and Eric Garner’s death in 2014 in
New York, to Alton Sterling’s death in 2016 in Louisiana (Baker et al., 2015; Cooper,
1999; Fausset et al., 2016).
Chapter 4 covers street vendor policy in São Paulo and El Alto. In Brazil over
the last decade, local and national decision-makers used increasing levels of resources
and capacity to ramp up enforcement against informal markets. The enforcement
campaigns have dedicated thousands of federal and military police to patrolling mar-
kets and successfully disrupted supply routes along the Paraguayan border as well
as unlicensed markets throughout the country (Pinheiro-Machado, 2011, p.287-312).
Studies document significant decreases in the number of informal workers following
the campaigns: for example, Cuvi (2016), p.404-406, found that tens of thousands
of street vendors in São Paulo left vending after the economy improved and the city
government started an eradication campaign.
Chapter 4 discusses how the São Paulo city government has dramatically in-
creased enforcement against informal workers as its capacity and resources have in-
creased, and refuses to regularly discuss, much less delegate, anything with the few
informal workers’ organizations that do exist. Chapter 5 establishes similar coun-
terintuitive patterns in the regional survey data: self-employed respondents in states
with lower tax revenue, which is the project’s measure for state capacity, participate
in civil society organizations more than workers in high revenue states. The pattern
is generally robust to changes in the operationalization of state capacity, model spec-
ification, and estimator.
In the second theoretical mechanism, informal workers use preexisting personal
resources—in particular, education as a proxy for income—to take advantage of any
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state incentives. If this happens, the cases and the quantitative data should show
that informal workers with more education form and join organizations more than
their less privileged colleagues. While the project primarily operationalizes individ-
ual resources with education, I supplement the data with information on experience
and material resources where available. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 all demonstrate that
workers with more resources, especially education, are more likely to start and lead
organizations, and are also more likely to join existing groups, than their colleagues
with less education and other resources.
This project contributes to research on collective action, civil society, and in-
formal economies by demonstrating that governments can encourage informal workers
to organize and regulate each other. Where unorganized people create problems that
an organization could resolve, governments can intervene with incentives that pro-
mote organization. In places like Bolivia, where national and local agencies do not
have many resources to increase enforcement, governments have implemented positive
and negative incentive structures to encourage informal workers to form, join, and
participate in civil society organizations that enforce local laws.
The incentives that governments use to encourage self-regulating civil society
groups are much cheaper than increasing law enforcement, and can often be imple-
mented within existing administrative structures and without additional budgetary
allocations. For example, in La Paz and El Alto, Bolivia, local authorities use licenses
as a positive incentive to encourage informal workers to organize. Only organization
members can receive licenses, and if an organization does not exist in the area that a
person works in or if they do not like existing groups, they must form a new one. Li-
censes give workers certainty and enable investment and planning, and can be resold
on unofficial secondary markets for thousands of dollars. This valuable incentive only
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costs the government the time it takes a bureaucrat to review and grant an applica-
tion. Governments also encourage organization by only granting organized workers
access to the bureaucracy; access can be a powerful incentive for individuals, and it
has no direct impact on the city’s budget. Street vendors in La Paz report that the
city government has paid street vendor leaders in the past to work with it, and even
cash payments can be cost-effective compared to additional police salaries.
6.1 Policy Recommendations
The theory’s major policy-relevant implication is that delegation to civil society can
increase compliance with local laws while also promoting political engagement, par-
ticularly within vulnerable groups. However, this strategy could also increase oppor-
tunities for corruption. Conversely, increasing enforcement for minor laws increases
alienation and decreases local resources. Many lower capacity governments already
delegate to civil society; policymakers in higher capacity contexts may want to con-
sider following their lead as a way to increase engagement, decrease incarceration,
and save money.
Policymakers can use the logic of state intervention in informal workers’ or-
ganizations to help workers formalize and incorporate them into policy processes.
Officials around the world frequently launch formalization programs for informal and
self-employed workers, but these programs rarely hit their enrollment targets (Bruhn
and McKenzie, 2014). Yet this study and others document informal workers going
to extensive lengths to acquire documents or resources for formalization, such as
licenses and loans, and flocking to easier opportunities for either. For example, Agar-
wala (2013) documents informal workers’ unions that successfully demanded health
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cards from the state and ID cards certifying them as informal workers (p.3-4, 16).
Agarwala (2013) claims, "As a result of this strategy, informal workers are ironically
pulling the state into playing an even more central role in their daily lives than it has
traditionally done for members of formal workers’ movements (p.15)." Street vendors
in La Paz echo these demands; for all of their frustrating experiences with the bureau-
cracy, most vendors that I worked with seek out officials and demand more attention
from officials and more state resources.
With this level of interest from informal workers, why do bureaucrats struggle
to enroll workers in formalization programs? I learned from conversations with street
vendors and bureaucrats in Bolivia and Brazil that officials rarely design programs
that match the needs of informal workers because many officials do not coordinate
with informal workers or their representatives. As a result, existing programs often
put a heavy burden of proof and documentation on informal workers while providing
delayed or unnecessary benefits. In contrast, when cities or national governments set
up formalization programs in consultation with informal workers’ organizations and
take their needs and resources into account, demand can quickly outstrip supply. For
example, any licensing program typically has more applicants than licenses, as La
Paz and São Paulo experience. New York City, which has a street vending sector
that is smaller but in many ways similar to São Paulo’s, has a licensing program for
5,000 licensed vendors, a years-long waiting list, and faces pressure from vendors to
increase the number of licenses (Schmidt, 2016).
In designing effective formalization policies, policymakers should recognize
that, like most individuals, informal workers have many competing demands for their
time and resources. Policymakers should approach informal workers and any existing
organizations, not wait for workers to approach them or find programs on their own.
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Policymakers should seek out and incorporate the input of informal workers and their
organizations multiple times during the policy process. Policymakers should also
design programs with quick, clear, and simple enrollment guidelines and concrete,
immediate benefits. Any formalization measure—for example, business registrations
or micro-business tax brackets—should minimize paperwork and offer clear, material
incentives. For example, a micro-business tax should require minimum proof of in-
come for individuals to enroll and governments should assume the responsibility for
investigating businesses that might hide in the lower tax bracket. Requiring individu-
als to provide extensive proof that they run a micro-business at the outset discourages
those individuals and does not remove the incentive for larger businesses to hide in
a lower tax bracket. Additionally, informal workers are much more likely to partici-
pate in formalization policies if they receive concrete incentives like licenses, business
loans, or health care for participation.
For a mixed success example, Bolivia has a simplified low tax bracket for
self-employed people and micro-enterprises, virtually all of which are informal in the
country. The Régimen Tributario Simplificado started in 1987 as part of a tax reform
package and in 2015 had 49,452 enrolled contributors.1 In an interview, an official
stated that the program’s purpose is to slowly formalize the sector, not to extract
significant revenue.
Of the hundreds of street vendors that I spoke with in Bolivia, I met one who
was enrolled, one who had tried, and many who did not know about the RTS. The
vendor who tried to enroll said she gave up because the proof of income and other
required documentation was more than she had and because she realized that the reg-
1These numbers are from the official I interviewed, who pulled them from an internal database.
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ulations attached to complying with the RTS once enrolled were too onerous. The one
who was enrolled was an older, prosperous street vendor who had enrolled with help
from a lawyer to receive additional documentation proving her business’s legitimacy.
To her, the incentive for enrolling was not a lower tax bracket, but documentation
that she could use in dealing with the state and banks.
On one hand, the RTS is a success because tens of thousands of informal
workers have voluntarily enrolled in the tax system through it. The program’s suc-
cess appears, in part, to come from providing an incentive that informal workers
seek out—official documentation—and RTS officials know this. The RTS falls short
by enrolling a small minority of the country’s microbusinesses, partially because the
bar for enrollment is too high for many, but also because many eligible people are
unaware that the program exists. The RTS and other simplified tax programs for
informal workers could potentially expand much further if they lowered barriers to
documentation and actively coordinated with informal workers’ organizations.
The case of La Paz’s street vendors comes with a dark side that policymakers
should guard against: state delegation to civil society groups may have increased op-
portunities for corruption. Importantly, relationships between bureaucrats and civil
society leaders—which are necessary if a government works closely with civil society—
appear to hide and perpetuate bribery. The ethnography in Chapter 3 demonstrates
that leaders become intermediaries between bureaucrats and rank-and-file members
who need a problem solved. As intermediaries, leaders bundle and deliver bribes to
bureaucrats, and benefit by taking a cut in the process. This practice advances the
careers of bureaucrats and civil society leaders at the financial and political expense
of rank-and-file members. By mediating corruption, leaders develop working relation-
ships with bureaucrats, which makes them indispensable to their members—even as
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leaders make money off their members’ problems. Additionally, when leaders bribe
bureaucrats, members do not witness the transaction and cannot make an eyewitness
denunciation later. This protects bureaucrats’ careers by reducing their accountability
to the people they serve. Governments interested in adopting a delegation strategy
should create independent monitoring systems to catch corruption and reduce the
incentives for engaging in it.
6.2 Broader Implications
This project develops a state intervention theory of collective action to explain in-
formal worker organizations. States offer organizing incentives to civil society actors
in many contexts. State delegation may be one of the main avenues for poor citi-
zens to overcome collective action problems, since effective selective incentives tend
to demand significant resources. The state—as a large, established, and resource-rich
organization—can provide selective incentives where individual activists cannot. This
project argues that where governments cannot directly enforce, they are more likely
to incentivize and delegate to civil society groups that can. The theory has implica-
tions for corporatism and contentious politics. First, the process of state intervention
in unorganized markets could launch a process of corporatist state-building. Second,
delegation to self-regulating groups carries risk for governments: by empowering civil
society groups to develop strong organizational structures and enforcement capacity,
governments can inadvertently build organizations strong enough to oppose the state,
make onerous demands, and disrupt other projects.
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6.2.1 Corporatism
Corporatism is seen as an older state-building process that brought together guilds,
communities, the state, and the church over decades or centuries in western Eu-
rope (Iversen and Soskice, 2009). Soskice and Iversen (2009, p.446) theorize that
the timing of state development led those that developed before the industrial rev-
olution to be more egalitarian than those that developed afterward, in part because
early developers built corporatist structures that employ centralized wage bargaining.
There is evidence that some early state-building tactics relied on bringing informal
businesses into the state’s regulatory system through legalization and limited self-
regulation (Andreas, 2013). These businesses were key to the success of early political
projects because they gave crucial monetary and in-kind resources to a weak state
and held valuable knowledge, like trade routes and locations of foreign operatives.
Neo-corporatism extends further to include some non-European countries (Streeck
and Kenworthy, 2005). Part of the intervention and delegation process that Bolivia
and India have followed reflects early corporatist state-building projects and is part
of what Streeck and Kenworthy call neo-corporatist: organized social groups with po-
litical representation that recognize the supremacy of the state (2005, p.441). Calling
attention to the organized interaction between emerging neo-corporatist states and
citizen groups, (Schmitter, 1985) calls for the neo-corporatist literature to examine
how states intervene in citizens’ collective action. Similar to the dynamics that we
see in Bolivia, Streeck and Kenworthy (2005, p.441, 447) claim that neo-corporatism
helps states handle conflict in modern democracies, and these social groups moderate
conflict in areas that the state is ill-equipped to fully reach, like workplaces.
Delegation to civil society groups can make sense for weak states, as this
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project has argued. Elaborating the microfoundations of the theory further, suc-
cessful delegation helps politicians and bureaucrats achieve medium-term governance
goals. Voters reward order and predictability and demand deliverables like lower
crime, improved traffic, and adequate services, particularly in local elections. The in-
dividual politicians and especially bureaucrats tasked with reaching those deliverables
face budget constraints and professional rewards that strongly encourage improving
governance without large expenses. Cheap or non-monetary incentives and delegation
to civil society is one route to improving governance without straining the budget.
Additionally, delegation builds ties with politically active community groups, yet an-
other deliverable that politicians and bureaucrats alike can point to, particularly to
their superiors. Returning to the neo-corporatism literature, delegation builds neo-
corporatist structures by giving organized social groups durable representation in
state systems. Additionally, this representation does not necessarily depend on par-
ties and is not limited to election cycles or elected officials.
State actors will only step in if they have a reason to intervene. Chapter 2
suggested that unorganized people can create costs for the state, while organizations
reduce costs. Unorganized people can create costs in many ways: for example, unorga-
nized neighbors can strain infrastructure and increase policing costs, while organized
neighbors can reduce crime through monitoring, intervention, and mediation and sup-
ply public goods like clean parks (Sampson et al., 1997, p.918). Similarly, reaching
individual voters is a challenge for political campaigns around the world, and citizen
groups make targeting voters easier and more efficient (Auyero, 2001, p.26, 84). As
previously suggested, local officials can take credit for the order and services that or-
ganizations provide, as Boulding and Gibson found with NGOs in Bolivia; the same
may happen with other types of civil society organizations, like business associations
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(Boulding and Gibson, 2009, p.480).
Broadly participatory civil societies may return resources to the state over time
(Amengual, 2013, p.528), in the form of tax revenue, savings on law enforcement, and
trained personnel. Governments across the world delegate to NGOs and private con-
tractors, often with the stated goal of saving money and improving service delivery
(Besley and Ghatak, 2001, p.1363-1365). Larger nongovernmental entities, like the
United Nations and the World Bank, frequently encourage delegation to NGOs and
contractors because they save money, improve outcomes, and reach poorer citizens
more than most state bureaucracies (Besley and Ghatak, 2001, p.1365). If delegation
increases revenues while decreasing law enforcement costs, then delegation returns
resources to the state. Successes with NGOs documented elsewhere and the workers’
associations documented here suggest that states can build capacity over time by
making investments in civil society instead of state-based enforcement mechanisms.
6.2.2 Contentious Politics
Delegation to civil society raises other governance issues for states. By providing re-
sources and empowering civil society, governments can encourage broad-based mecha-
nisms of social control (Ostrom, 1990). However, by building up powerful social orga-
nizations instead of state enforcement agencies, governments run the risk of building
strong opponents. Civil society groups will have preferences that diverge from govern-
ments, bureaucracies, and officials (Migdal, 1988). Delegating enforcement to these
groups sets up a principal-agent problem: the government, as the principal, wants
groups to monitor their members and enforce regulations, and provides incentives to
build and strengthen groups that can do so. The organizations, as the agents, benefit
from increased resources but may prefer to enforce some regulations and not others,
180
and enforce against some people more than others.
Civil society organizations may also use their power to demand more from
the government. Demands from powerful organizations can put resource-poor gov-
ernments in a bind: administrations need the support of these groups, but they have
limited political and material capital to expend appeasing them (Huntington, 1968).
Governments can threaten to cut off incentives, but the groups can also threaten to
stop enforcing or actively break laws, quickly creating large and expensive enforce-
ment problems for governments—which civil society groups do on a regular basis in
Bolivia. For example, a common protest tactic is to block highways to stop trade or
access to politically important areas (Dangl, 2007). Additionally, government incen-
tives may be crucial for starting and building organizations but less central as groups
develop their own bases of support.
Resource-strapped governments stand to improve order, compliance, and en-
gagement with civil society by incentivizing organized groups and delegating enforce-
ment roles to them. However, the tactic presents a risky trade-off: by giving money
and power to social groups, local governments empower external actors instead of
building up in-house enforcement capacity. Delegation over time could create power-
ful social groups beyond the government’s control.
6.2.3 Accountability and Corruption
Palmer-Rubin (2016), and Auyero (2001) find that parties in Argentina and Mexico
target resources to strong civil society organizations and their members for electoral
support, instead of dispensing loans and subsidized food programmatically to all cit-
izens (Palmer-Rubin 2016, p.97). Similarly, Agarwala (2013) documented organized
informal workers in India lobbying the state for expanded social programs like health
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care and scholarships, but only for organization members (2013, p. 59-60). These
efforts create new groups of privileged workers instead of improving the lives of all
workers. Additionally, citizen groups are accountable to members, not a broader group
of voters, and citizens may struggle to hold civil society service providers accountable
for corruption or poor performance. Future research could test these implications,
and more thoroughly investigate if the civil society groups that emerge from these
processes build or undermine democratic institutions.
Raising further accountability concerns, the ethnographic evidence in chapter
3 suggests that selective incentives may fuel rent-seeking. In La Paz, leaders use
diverse selective incentives to start and maintain organizations. However, leaders
with the power to enforce rules also have the power to extort (Grossman, 2017, p.4).
Rent-seeking may be one of reasons why people become leaders, and one union leader
quoted in chapter 3 suggests that she became a leader to illegally acquire more stalls
and licenses. In many of these organizations, extra but illicit incentives for lead-
ers encourage people to take on the considerable responsibilities of union leadership.
Rent-seeking then becomes members’ main conflict with the organizational leader-
ship. Bhowmik (2012) and Grossman (2017) document similar dynamics in market
organizations in Asia and Africa. This phenomenon suggests that rent-seeking could
help overcome initial barriers to collective action by giving individuals a reason to
take on additional roles and costs. Rent-seeking rewards leaders who manipulate col-
lective action for private gain, and may limit what the group can deliver in the future.
Rank-and-file members in Bolivia also suspect that their civil society repre-
sentatives often rally large demonstrations and then take payments from government
officials to stop pushing the issue. If leaders manipulate collective action for private
gain, why do people join and participate in their groups?
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Future research could examine if leaders take side payments to call off con-
tentious collective action. If they do, future research could look at the moral hazard
issues that the government offering the payment faces, the strategies that they use to
control protest, and how this behavior has changed over time. Additionally, if leaders
successfully call protests and then use this mass collective action to pocket private
payments, why do ordinary citizens participate? How do leaders convince people that
protesting is in their best interest or how do leaders compel members to attend? Can
citizens distinguish between protests used for leaders’ private gain and protests that
could lead to real policy change?
Preliminary research suggests that civil society leaders use a complex array
of positive and negative selective incentives to produce essentially sham contention,
but that many protests and other forms of action produce real benefits for ordinary
participants. The experiences of vendors in Bolivia and Brazil provide two reasons
why people participate in groups where leaders manipulate collective action for pri-
vate gain. First, vendors accepted some rent-seeking from leaders, provided that it
was not excessive and rank-and-file members also received benefits. Second, estab-
lished groups develop an array of positive and negative selective incentives. In La
Paz and El Alto, many vendors who joined established groups stated that they would
face negative consequences if they did not participate in events or left the group and
continued to sell in the same area. For example, some associations fine members who
do not attend protests or meetings, or try to evict members and nonmembers who do
not follow their rules.2
2Conversely, some union leaders state that their biggest headaches come from unorganized vendors
who harass them. I observed both dynamics and it appeared much more common for leaders to
mobilize evidence and members against a few nonconformists than for independent vendors to harass
organized ones.
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6.2.4 Enforcement and Incarceration
The argument suggests that states with lower capacity can encourage participatory
civil societies while higher capacity states may track informal and other poor workers
into law enforcement systems. The theory implies that higher capacity states track
informal workers into the criminal justice system more frequently than their lower
capacity counterparts, precisely because higher capacity states can effectively enforce
even minor laws. This implication supports recent reports in the U.S. on modern
debtors’ prisons (DOJ, 2015) and ethnographic work in urban sociology which finds
that heavy enforcement for minor infractions like driving without a license or falling
behind on payment plans can trap people in poverty and the justice system (Desmond,
2016; Goffman, 2015). Additionally, the case studies support research in the American
context which finds that increased interaction with criminal justice systems decreases
political engagement (Weaver and Lerman, 2010, p.818).
Agarwala (2013), Auyero (2001), Holland (2016) and others argue that poor
people’s votes matter, and as a result, parties and governments try to secure those
votes with pro-poor policies, goods, and discretion in the run-up to elections. This
project demonstrates that between elections, citizens’ compliance matters. Noncom-
pliance can create large and expensive problems for governments, from lost tax rev-
enue to epidemics to spiking crime rates. In contrast to wealthier citizens, many poor
people experience the government’s interest in their compliance as policing and repres-
sion (Scott, 1969, p.1142). Bolivia may offer a less repressive alternative: the govern-
ment pays attention to poor citizens between election cycles and in some cases works
proactively with individuals and groups to achieve compliance. Bolivia’s national
and local governments increase compliance by materially and politically encourag-
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ing self-regulating groups and delegating enforcement to them. Delegation strategies
incorporate citizens into communities instead of policing them and improve lives by
channeling resources to local organizations while increasing compliance with health,
safety, and quality of life regulations.
6.2.5 Concluding Remarks
Poor governments around the world delegate state roles and responsibilities to civil so-
ciety actors. Delegation incorporates individuals and communities into state projects.
Delegation can also bring previously hidden or illegal activities into state regulatory
structures. In Nicaragua, the Supreme Court of Justice designated a sex worker col-
lective as a judicial facilitator (Telesur, 2017). The collective’s members are licensed
community mediators and the stated goal of the program is to reduce the police and
judicial system’s backlog of minor conflicts while integrating sex workers into a regula-
tory system. The collective has organized over 2,000 of Nicaragua’s estimated 14,000
sex workers and has affiliated with national union organizations (Telesur, 2017). In
this example, a government with problems tracking and enforcing community con-
flicts has enlisted a semi-legal group, designated them as intermediaries between the
judicial system and their communities, and increased the reach of the regulatory sys-
tem without large budget increases. In doing so, the government has encouraged a
semi-legal and largely unregulated group of citizens to increasingly organize and be-
come part of the state’s regulatory system.
Local governments with shoestring budgets enlist similar tactics in creating
new mass transportation, waste disposal, and housing policy. In Kigali, Rwanda,
local mass transportation was a hodgepodge of privately-owned vans, trucks, gypsy
cabs, and mototaxis, many organized into loose cooperatives or business associations
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that would fight over routes (Goodfellow, 2015, p.132). The local government insti-
tuted a new mass transportation policy that banned all mototaxis until every taxi
driver agreed to join an association. The association enforces local laws and all moto-
taxists are now licensed, trained, and wear vests marking them as such (Goodfellow,
2015, p.137). Goodfellow (2015, p.137) states that the government approached the
policy with the "rationale of ’if you understand something then you will do it better
than if someone were to police you.’" In the example of Kigali, a local government
without the resources to institute major mass transportation infrastructure opted to
reorganize mass transport in the city by requiring informal transportation workers
to organize and regulate themselves. The policy professionalized informal trans-
portation, brought the sector in line with local regulations, and, through licenses,
gave thousands of citizens a strong stake in the local government’s city development
project.
Most examples of government delegation to informal workers or other civil
society actors come from low capacity contexts and more examples exist in the areas
of informal housing and municipal waste management (Holston, 2008; Wilson et al.,
2006). I suggest that this is because lower capacity local governments face extreme
budgetary pressures as well as pressure from voters who demand improvements in
governance by the next election. Higher capacity governments can respond to gov-
ernance demands by hiring more police, training more bureaucrats, or building new
infrastructure and governments retain more control over these initiatives when they
choose not to delegate. On the other hand, lower capacity governments have fewer
options, and delegation is cheap, making it more attractive to highly constrained local
governments.
Local governments with more capacity can use delegation policies to improve
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enforcement and community engagement. Delegation policies may increase citizen
buy-in with local administrations, and therefore bolster parties’ electoral success at
the local level. For example, several municipalities in the United States have limited
delegation policies to integrate particularly marginalized residents into the commu-
nity. Los Angeles fast-tracked a plan to license and legalize street vending across
the city after concerns that increased immigration enforcement could sweep up street
vendors cited for minor public space infractions (Branson-Potts, 2017). In another
example, Oakland and Washington D.C. started pilot programs that pay high-risk
young people not to commit crimes, and to attend leadership classes (Workman,
2016). Both programs give potential lawbreakers incentives to follow local laws, while
integrating them into the cities’ regulatory systems. The programs also increase the
cities’ legitimacy and engagement with the Hispanic and Black communities that
the street vendors and young people disproportionately come from. Additionally,
higher capacity governments may find it easier to avoid some of the pitfalls from La
Paz’s and El Alto’s delegation policies. Higher capacity governments are less likely
to encourage corruption by delegating because they are more likely to have effective
anti-corruption monitoring systems in place. Likewise, higher capacity governments
run a lower risk of empowering civil society groups that can threaten to create larger
governance problems because higher capacity governments can resort to direct en-
forcement if necessary.
In conclusion, governments can solve governance problems by delegating en-
forcement to civil society actors. Civil society actors can use delegation policies to
grow powerful organizations and gain political influence. Delegation policies present
a trade off for governments: they have the potential to increase compliance cheaply
and bring new populations into the state regulatory structure, building the state in
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the process. Furthermore, where delegation increases participation and services and
decreases crime, the administration in power may increase its vote share and take
credit for improved governance without committing to expensive and divisive tough
on crime policies. However, delegation can reduce accountability and create opportu-
nities for corruption in civil society. Delegation policies can also build organizations
that can threaten to shut down a city or create larger problems if the government does
not give into its demands. Governments face a trade off when delegating. However,





Appendix to Chapter Two
A.1 Game Theoretic Model with Proofs
A.1.1 Set-up, Players, and Moves
In this finite and complete information game, n street vendors decide whether or not
to organize and bargain with the state. The vendors move first by playing a public
goods game where the moves are organize or defect. The vendors need k organizers
to provide the public good, g > 0, and all organizers pay a private cost ci > 0. Every
vendor that defects generates a negative externality, −e < 0, for the state. Any
organized vendors move to a bargaining stage, where the state makes some offer x,
where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Finally, the organized vendors accept or reject the offer. If the
organized vendors accept the offer and there are at least k of them, each organized
vendor receives g+ x− ci and unorganized vendors receive g, while the state receives
g−xm−e(n−m), where m is the number of organized vendors. If the vendors do not
meet the k threshold but still accept the deal, each organized vendor receives x− ci
and unorganized vendors receive 0, while the state receives −xm − e(n −m). If the
vendors reject the deal, all vendors receive a status quo payoff of 0, while the state
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Table A.1: Model notation
vi a given vendor; vendor i.
s the state.
x the state’s offer, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
n total number of vendors.
k the number of vendors needed to provide
the public good, where 0 < k ≤ n.
m the number of vendors that organize.
g the public good that each organized vendor
generates, where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1.
e the state’s cost of enforcement where 0 ≤
e ≤ 1.
ci the cost of organizing to vendor i, where
0 ≤ ci ≤ 1.
receives −en.
The vendors face two choices: Organize or defect, and then accept or reject
the state’s offer. The state makes one choice: how much x to offer.
A.1.2 Equilibrium Analysis
The game has a unique pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium, meaning that for
a given set of parameter values, all actors choose the same strategy set in equilibrium.




organize, accept when ci ≤ x and m 6= k
organize, accept when ci ≤ x+ g and m = k
defect, reject otherwise
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offer x∗ = cm when e > cm and m 6= k
offer x∗ = cm − g when e > cm − g and m = k
offer x∗ = 0 otherwise
A.1.3 Proof
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a set of strategies that represents a Nash equilib-
rium of every subgame in the model. In other words, a set of strategies constitutes
a subgame perfect equilibrium if no player has an incentive to change their strategy
at any point in the game. In the final stage of the game, organized vendors decide to
accept or reject. In doing so, a given vendor i compares g+x− ci > g if m > k. Solv-
ing for ci, a given vendor i will accept when ci ≤ x and reject otherwise. If m < k, a
given vendor i compares x− ci > 0 and will accept when ci ≤ x and reject otherwise.
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In the special case where m = k, a given vendor i compares g+x− ci > 0 will accept
when ci ≤ g + x and reject otherwise. No vendor has an incentive to deviate from
this strategy: Accepting when costs are higher than the benefit requires the vendor
to accept an avoidable loss, and rejecting when benefits are more than costs requires
the vendor to forgo a sure gain.
At the second node, the state chooses an offer x∗. In making its choice, the
state compares its payoff for an accepted offer to a rejected one, and makes a positive
offer if g−xm > −em which can be rewritten as x < e+ g
m
. When making a positive
offer, the state sets x at the highest organized vendor’s reservation value, which is cm
(and in the special case where m = k, cm − g). The state has no incentive to set x
higher because the previous step demonstrated that vendor i will accept any offer at
ci = x or above, thus setting x above the highest reservation value lowers the state’s
payoff (note that the vendor with the highest cost is vendor m, so if the state sets x at
her cost, x is above the reservation values for all other vendors). Likewise, the state
has no incentive to set x lower than cm because lowering x even slightly below vendor
m’s reservation value triggers vendor m’s rejection, saving the state x but adding −e
to the state’s payoff.
At the first node, vendors decide to organize or defect. Vendors know the pa-
rameter values and payoffs of other players. Therefore, they can anticipate the value
of x and base their organizing decisions on it. Vendor i organizes where x > ci (or
in the special case where m = k, x > ci − g) and defects otherwise. Vendor i has no
incentive to deviate from this strategy: If she organizes where x < ci, she receives a
negative payoff when she could choose to lose nothing. If she defects when x > ci and
at least k other vendors organize, she receives g and saves ci, but forgoes a larger x.
The equilibrium strategies lead to several different equilibrium outcomes, de-
193
pending on the values of the parameters.
Proposition 1a: Under the conditions e < cm and ck < g, the strategy profile below






offer x∗ = 0
Where e < cm and ck < g, resulting in m < k and x∗ = 0, no vendors organize
and the state does not intervene. A given vendor i in the final node of the game
compares −ci to 0 and opts to reject. The vendor has no reason to deviate because
accepting an offer of 0 and no public good incurs a negative payoff instead of rejecting
and taking 0. At the second node, the state offers x∗ = 0. The state has no incentive
to make a higher offer because setting x at vendor m’s reservation point costs more
than accepting the externality e. At the first node, vendor i chooses not to organize
because her participation will not generate g and the state will not offer the x∗ = ci
that would change her calculation.
Proposition 1b: Under the conditions e < ck and ck ≤ g, the strategy profile
below constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
Vendori :
{




offer x∗ = 0
Where e < ck and ck ≤ g, resulting in m = k and x∗ = 0, exactly k vendors
organize and the state does not intervene. In this case, we look at vendor k’s decisions
because she is the pivotal vendor whose actions decide if the public good is provided
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or not. At the final node, vendor k accepts the offer x∗ = 0 because g + 0 − ck > 0
or g > 0. At the second node, the state sets x∗ = 0 because g provides enough of
an incentive to the organized vendors to accept in order to keep g. The state has no
incentive to increase x∗ above ck and attract additional vendors because e < ck. At
the initial node, vendor k organizes because g − ck > 0; deviating from this strategy
would require her to forgo this gain in favor of 0.
Proposition 1c: Under the conditions e > cm<k and ck ≥ g, the strategy
profile below constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
Vendori :
{




offer x∗ = cm
Where e > cm<k and ck ≥ g, resulting in m < k and x∗ = cm<k, less than k
vendors organize but only with state intervention. Vendor i < m accepts x∗ = cm<k
in the final node because x∗ − ci<m > 0. She has no incentive to reject the offer
and take 0 over a positive payoff. In the second node, the state sets x∗ = cm<k to
incentivize vendors to organize in the absence of a public good, by offsetting their
organizing costs. The state has no incentive to set x∗ < cm<k because lowering x∗
below any vendor i < m’s reservation point adds an e to the state’s payoff and in this
case e > x∗. In the initial node, vendor i < m organizes because x∗ − ci<m > 0, even
though vendor i < m anticipates that the public good will not be provided.
Proposition 1d: Under the conditions e = ck and ck ≤ g, the strategy profile








offer x∗ = cm − g
Where e = ck and ck ≤ g, resulting in m = k and x∗ = ck − g, exactly k
vendors organize and the state subsidizes them. In this case, we look at vendor k’s
decisions because she is the pivotal vendor whose actions decide if the public good is
provided or not. At the final node, vendor k accepts the offer x∗ = ck − g because
it is set at her reservation value (she compares payoffs g − ck + ck − g > 0). At the
second node, the state sets x∗ at vendor k’s reservation value: x∗ = ck− g. The state
has no incentive to increase x∗ above ck − g and attract additional vendors because
e = ck. At the initial node, vendor k organizes because g − ck + ck − g = 0 and we
assume that she organizes at her reservation value.
Proposition 1e: Under the condition e > cm=n, the strategy profile below
constitutes the unique subgame perfect equilibrium:
Vendori :
{




offer x∗ = cm
Where e > cm=n, resulting in x∗ = cm=n and m = n, everyone organizes. At
the final node, the vendor with the highest costs (vendor m = n) accepts the deal
because it is set at her reservation value (she compares payoffs g− cm=n+ cm=n > g).
All other vendors with lower costs accept and have no incentive to deviate and take
0 over a positive payoff. At the second node, the state sets x∗ at vendor m = n’s
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reservation value: x∗ = cm=n. Because e > cm=n, the state has no incentive to lower
the offer and substitute x∗ with a more expensive e. At the initial node, vendor
m = n organizes because g − cm=n + cm=n > g, and we assume that she organizes at
her reservation value.
A.1.4 Discussion
Overall, equilibrium outcomes depend on the size of g relative to other parameters. If
g is large relative to the kth vendor’s costs, the state free rides when k people organize.
The intuition behind this is that once organized, the vendors will not reject any offer
because they do not want to lose g; as a result the state offers 0. Consequently, the
state may want to pay vendors more to always organize, but it cannot commit to
changing that offer once vendors pass the k threshold. On the other hand, if g is
small relative to the kth vendor’s costs, the state makes a positive offer to all vendors
and that offer is based on k’s costs. Once vendors organize, the state will make an
offer that will keep everyone organized who has orgaizing costs that are lower than the
externality they generate (there is some nonlinearity here if that number passes the
k threshold, because then g offsets how much the state needs to offer when m = k).
A.1.5 Comparative Statics





partial derivative is positive because negative numbers of participants cannot exist.
Therefore, the state’s cut point is increasing in g. This means that as g increases, the
state’s indifference point for making a positive offer also increases; therefore, there is
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a larger range of parameter values for which the state will make a positive offer. Note
that this is because the state and the vendors enjoy g; therefore a larger g allows the
state to spend more on x. Additionally, where m = k, the state can discount its offer
by g.
The partial derivative of vendor i’s reservation value x′ with respect to ci is
∂x′
∂ci
= 1. As costs increase, a given vendor requires a higher offer to offset increasing
costs and make organizing worth their while.
The partial derivative of the state’s cut point x′ with respect to e is ∂x′
∂e
= 1.
Therefore, the state’s cut point increases as the externality increases. This means
that as the number of organized vendors m increases, the state’s indifference point
for making a positive offer increases and there is a larger range of parameter values
for which the state will make a positive offer. In other words, as e increases, the state
is willing to accept more values of x in order to avoid e.
A.2 Robustness Checks and Extensions
How much do the model’s results depend on individual modeling choices? The model
produces equilibrium strategies and comparative statics that, as with any model, are
a function of its assumptions. Many of these assumptions are critical and directly
model the strategic interaction that the case illustrates: For example, linking unor-
ganized vendors to the state’s payoff with −e captures the negative externality and
gives the state an incentive to intervene in the vendors’ collective action decisions.
Likewise, modeling the initial step as a group decision to contribute or not captures
the dynamic that many vendors face when deciding to band together with vendors
around them and found a union, as discussed in the case study. While the case study
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grounds many of the model’s assumptions in empirical evidence, it also suggests a
plethora of other factors that the model either simplifies or ignores. In this section,
I discuss how relaxing assumptions or extending the model to include new features
affects the results.
A.2.1 Robustness
Here we examine two assumptions in more detail: Private versus public costs and the
k threshold. For private costs, we will think through the change but not solve a new
game, whereas we will walk through the k threshold example in more detail.
The model assumes that organizing costs are public information, meaning that
all players know each others’ costs. Empirically, this is not strictly the case. Vendors
may have an idea of the free time, money, education, contacts, and past organizing
experience that other vendors have, but they almost definitely do not have a complete
picture of every potential organizer’s situation. We can also think of situations or
personalities that may want to misrepresent their costs. For example, someone who
does not want to contribute may pretend to be busier than they are or pretend that
they have less disposable income than they actually do. We can model private orga-
nizing costs by giving all vendors beliefs about what others’ costs are. In a private
information set up, each vendor knows their cost, and knows the distribution of other
people’s costs but not exactly what every individual has. This is much more realistic:
People are generally aware of their resources and have some idea of their colleagues’
that allows them to estimate. We will not solve the model with private costs in this
appendix because the result for n-person public goods games is well established and
used as an example in many game theory textbooks (the example I am working off of
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is from McCarty and Meirowitz 2007, pages 140-145). In the complete information
game presented above, we see a low contribution equilibrium outcome in which no-one
contributes and a high contribution equilibrium outcome in which exactly k people
contribute. If we move to private costs, we see a similar low contribution equilibrium
in which less than k people contribute and the good is not provided, and a high con-
tribution equilibrium in which at least k people participate and the good is provided.
In the chapter’s model, I assume a k threshold, which means that if a cer-
tain number of people participate, the good is provided and if that number is not
reached, the good is not provided. This assumption has empirical grounding in the
case: In Bolivia, a group needs a minimum of 24 members to register as a union. If
we conceptualize the union as a public good, then k = 24 in this case. However, we
can conceptualize the public good in other ways: For example, if the organization
provides market security and internal regulation, we might think of the public good
as incremental, where every vendor who participates and pays dues incrementally
increases the value of the good by contributing to security and following laws.
We can also try a different cost assumption. For example, we can assume that
everyone has the same cost. This is realistic if we take a much stricter view of what
constitutes a cost and conceptualize costs as dues, which are the same for everyone,
or other material costs for founding an organization, which many union founders split
between them. I adopt this cost assumption in the example below. The following
game has the same set up as the main model, except there is no k threshold and costs
are the same for everyone:









offer x∗ = c− g when e > c
offer x∗ = 0 otherwise
Proof
In the final stage of the game, organized vendors decide to accept or reject. In doing
so, a given vendor i compares gm + x − c > gm − g. Solving for c, a given vendor
i will accept when c ≤ g + x and reject otherwise. No vendor has an incentive to
deviate from this strategy: Accepting when costs are higher than the benefit requires
the vendor to accept an avoidable loss, and rejecting when benefits are more than
costs requires the vendor to forgo a sure gain.
At the second node, the state chooses an offer x∗. The state sets x at the
minimum that all organized vendors will accept, provided that minimum is less than
e, which is what the state receives if it offers 0 and a given vendor defects or rejects.
To achieve this, the state sets x at the organized vendors’ cost minus the public good,
c − g. The state has no incentive to set x higher because the previous step demon-
strated that vendor i will accept any offer at c = g+x or above, thus setting x above
the reservation value lowers the state’s payoff. Likewise, the state has no incentive
to set x lower than c because lowering x even slightly below the vendors’ reservation
value triggers rejection, saving the state xm but adding −em to the state’s payoff.
At the first node, vendors decide to organize or defect. Vendors know the pa-
rameter values and payoffs of other players. Therefore, they can anticipate the value
of x and base their organizing decisions on it. Vendor i organizes where c < x + g
and defects otherwise. Vendor i has no incentive to deviate from this strategy: If she
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organizes where c > x + g, she receives a negative payoff when she could choose to
lose nothing. If she defects when c < x+ g, she accepts 0 over a positive payoff.
These simplifications in the public good and cost terms lead to similar equi-
librium outcomes. Three of the five equilibrium outcomes in the main game remain:
These strategy profiles contribute to an outcome in which no one organizes under the
conditions that e < c and g < c, that all vendors organize without state intervention
under the condition that g > c, and finally, that all vendors organize with state inter-
vention under the conditions that e > c and g < c. Importantly, players reach these
outcomes for the same reasons in each model; therefore, the insight does not change
but the simplification reduces the explained variation.
Extension: Club goods
Empirically, organizations often provide club goods to their members as an additional
selective incentive to recruit members and sustain participation. For example, street
vendor unions can offer dispute resolution or legal services for their members. We
can introduce a term, h, for association club goods into organized vendors’ payoffs
and see if and how the overall results change:
Proposition 3: The strategy profiles below constitute the subgame perfect
equilibrium: Vendori :

organize, accept when ci ≤ x+ h and m 6= k




offer x∗ = cm − h when e > cm − h and m 6= k
offer x∗ = cm − g − h when e > cm − g − h and m = k
offer x∗ = 0 otherwise
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Proof
In the final stage of the game, organized vendors decide to accept or reject. In doing
so, a given vendor i compares g + x + h − ci > g if m > k. Solving for ci, a given
vendor i will accept when ci ≤ x+ h and reject otherwise. If m < k, a given vendor i
compares x− ci > 0 and will accept when ci ≤ x and reject otherwise. In the special
case where m = k, a given vendor i compares g + x + h − ci > 0 will accept when
ci ≤ g + x+ h and reject otherwise. No vendor has an incentive to deviate from this
strategy: Accepting when costs are higher than the benefit requires the vendor to
accept an avoidable loss, and rejecting when benefits are more than costs requires the
vendor to forgo a sure gain.
At the second node, the state chooses an offer x∗. In making its choice, the
state compares its payoff for an accepted offer to a rejected one, and makes a positive
offer if g− xm > −em which can be rewritten as x < e+ g
m
(note that the club good
only enters the state’s payoff through its effect on x∗). When making a positive offer,
the state sets x at cm − h (and in the special case where m = k, cm − g − h). The
state has no incentive to set x higher because the previous step demonstrated that
vendor i will accept any offer at ci = x+h or above, thus setting x above the highest
reservation value lowers the state’s payoff (note that the vendor with the highest cost
is vendor m, so if the state sets x at her cost, x is above the reservation values for
all other vendors). Likewise, the state has no incentive to set x lower than cm − h
because lowering x even slightly below vendor m’s reservation value triggers vendor
m’s rejection, saving the state x but adding −e to the state’s payoff.
At the first node, vendors decide to organize or defect. Vendors know the pa-
rameter values and payoffs of other players. Therefore, they can anticipate the value
of x and base their organizing decisions on it. Vendor i organizes where x + h > ci
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(or in the special case where m = k, x > ci − g − h) and defects otherwise. Vendor
i has no incentive to deviate from this strategy: If she organizes where x + h < ci,
she receives a negative payoff when she could choose to lose nothing. If she defects
when x + h > ci and at least k other vendors organize, she receives g and saves ci,
but forgoes a larger x and h.
In summary, adding a club good leads to the same equilibrium outcomes as
the main model. Importantly, players reach these outcomes for the same reasons in
each model. Introducing h to account for club goods adds an additional benefit to
organized vendors’ payoffs and lowers the state’s offer by h, but does not lead to
different equilibrium outcomes or explanations.
A.2.2 Extension: Joiners
In this extension, we add a final step to the original model, where a group of j joiners
can choose to join the established organization or go it alone. A given joiner receives
the public good regardless of their decision, since it has already been provided earlier
in the game. If the founders chose not to form an organization in earlier stages, the
joiner does not have the choice to join a nonexistent organization and the game ends.
If they choose to join, they pay a cost cji, which we can think of as a due plus any
opportunity cost for participating as opposed to abstaining, and receive any state-
provided selective incentive x.
Proposition 4: The strategy profiles below constitute the subgame perfect
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organize, accept when ci ≤ x and m 6= k








offer x∗ = cm when e > cm and m 6= k
offer x∗ = cm − g when e > cm − g and m = k
offer x∗ = 0 otherwise
Proof
In the final stage of the game, joiners decide to join or abstain. In doing so, a given
joiner i compares g + x − cji > g. Solving for cji, a given joiner i will accept when
cji ≤ x and reject otherwise. No joiner has an incentive to deviate from this strategy:
Accepting when costs are higher than the benefit requires the joiner to accept an
avoidable loss, and rejecting when benefits are more than costs requires the joiner to
forgo a sure gain.
At the third node, organized vendors decide to accept or reject. In doing so,
a given vendor i compares g + x − ci > g if m > k. Solving for ci, a given vendor i
will accept when ci ≤ x and reject otherwise. If m < k, a given vendor i compares
x−ci > 0 and will accept when ci ≤ x and reject otherwise. In the special case where
m = k, a given vendor i compares g+x−ci > 0 will accept when ci ≤ g+x and reject
otherwise. No vendor has an incentive to deviate from this strategy: Accepting when
costs are higher than the benefit requires the vendor to accept an avoidable loss, and
rejecting when benefits are more than costs requires the vendor to forgo a sure gain.
At the second node, the state chooses an offer x∗. In making its choice, the
state compares its payoff for an accepted offer to a rejected one, and makes a positive
offer if g−xm > −em which can be rewritten as x < e+ g
m
. When making a positive
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offer, the state sets x at the highest organized vendor’s cost, cm (and in the special
case where m = k, cm − g). The state has no incentive to set x higher because the
previous step demonstrated that vendor i will accept any offer at ci = x or above, thus
setting x above the highest reservation value lowers the state’s payoff (note that the
vendor with the highest cost is vendor m, so if the state sets x at her cost, x is above
the reservation values for all other vendors). Likewise, the state has no incentive to
set x lower than cm because lowering x even slightly below vendor m’s reservation
value triggers vendor m’s rejection, saving the state x but adding −e to the state’s
payoff.
At the first node, vendors decide to organize or defect. Vendors know the
parameter values and payoffs of other players. Therefore, they can anticipate the
value of x and base their organizing decisions on it. Vendor i organizes where x > ci
(or in the special case where m = k, x > ci − g) and defects otherwise. Vendor i has
no incentive to deviate from this strategy: If she organizes where x < ci, she receives
a negative payoff when she could choose to lose nothing. If she defects when x > ci




Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 Ethnography
I quickly learned during preliminary fieldwork in 2012 that Bolivian street vendors
are very distrusting of outsiders, and extremely guarded around foreign researchers.
Vendors who I cold-called for interviews either refused to speak to me or refused to an-
swer many of my questions. Researchers like Sian Lazar and Nico Tassi had resolved
these issues by building up trust and relationships through ethnographic fieldwork; I
took the same approach.
I found the federation offices by asking street vendors on the street where they
were. Anthropologists who had worked with street vendors had told me that it is
crucial to get permission from organization leaders before starting a research project.
Therefore, I approached one of the federation leaders at their office with verbal and
written descriptions of the project, letters of support from the university I was affil-
iated with, and assurances that I would not interfere with anyone’s work. I selected
the federation with the sophisticated approach of asking the first person I saw at a
desk in the office.
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I asked to work with the federation for 6-12 months, observe meetings, inter-
view leaders and members at their convenience, and visit vendors at their work sites.
The federation leaders agreed and asked me to contribute something in exchange for
the time and access I was asking for. We consulted a larger group of vendor leaders,
who asked for workshops on street vendor policies and organizations in the Americas,
which I gave in October. From Monday to Saturday (Saturday is the busiest work
day for most street vendors) from September 2014 to May 2015, I went to the fed-
eration offices, the Markets Office, or a market to spend time observing and talking
with vendors and bureaucrats. I had a notebook with me at all times but tried not
to take notes in it in front of people very often because many people, especially older
women, would start to self-censor once they saw me writing. I also learned basic
Aymara once I noted that people would switch to Aymara to gossip about me while
I was in the room. Basic Aymara is an excellent icebreaker; many people, especially
indigenous women, who were extremely wary of me in the first few months became
suddenly very talkative after hearing me stumble out a few sentences.
To my surprise, I received several unsolicited job offers from vendors who
needed an assistant. I did not plan to work as a street vendor, but figured it was a
quick way to get a better understanding of people’s work conditions and stressors.
It was, and I highly recommend actually doing the activity you study if possible,
not just asking people about it. A contact asked me to work their stall while they
weren’t there one day a week, which I did for three months. This involved arriving
at 5:45am every Saturday morning, finding the manager of the warehouse, carrying a
30-50 pound bag of clothes and metal grids to the market space, setting up the stall
on the sidewalk in exactly the right place (to the 10th of a centimeter), unpacking
and displaying wares, answering customer questions and finding the right items in
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stock, haggling, keeping track of change and what types of wares sold, and prevent-
ing robberies. I had a notebook with me where I would mark down all sales, types
of items, costs, and notes. I typed up all notes that afternoon. I did not make any
money doing this in La Paz or São Paulo; I gave the money I made—which was never
more than $50 in profit, and more typically $20—to the vendors at the end of every
day that I worked.
B.2 Original Survey Methods, Instruments, and
Results
Over a week in April 2015, I collected 207 survey responses with a team of five admin-
istrators. The five survey administrators work for a survey firm started by graduates
from the Universidad Mayor de San Andres (UMSA) Sociology Department. All are
current or recent sociology students in their 20s, are from La Paz, and have worked
with street vendors in prior projects. There were two women and three men, and all
identified as either mestizo or white. We conducted all surveys in Spanish; however,
we had an Aymara version available and two administrators spoke enough Aymara to
administer it.
No viable sampling frame exists for street vendors in La Paz. This is a common
stumbling block with research on the informal sector anywhere. The city maintains a
database of the 31,906 street vendors with licenses, but this only accounts for 50-70%
of street vendors in La Paz, depending on who’s estimate one uses. Additionally, the
city is extremely resistant to granting database access. Finally, bureaucrats illicitly
grant extra licenses for favors and bribes, which results in (allegedly) fake names in
the database.
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To address this problem, I took a city map with a grid superimposed and num-
bered the 61 squares that contained city streets. I then randomized the squares by
randomizing 1-61 on random.org’s list randomizer. We then went down the list until
we had 200 respondents, which was a predetermined sample target. When we went
to an area, we would go with a map and walk down every street in the grid’s square,
approaching every other vendor (we flipped a coin every morning to determine if we’d
start with the first or second vendor we saw). We went through 21 grid squares rep-
resenting 16 neighborhoods before reaching the target. The neighborhoods are fairly
representative of the city, are in all geographic regions, and range from a high density
of vendors—100 vendors, 49 approached, mostly on one street—to a low density of
three vendors, one approached.
B.2.1 Results
While there is no way to know, given existing data, if the sample is truly representa-
tive of street vendors in La Paz, the descriptive statistics from the survey match the
estimates that vendor leaders and bureaucrats reported in interviews: the average
street vendor has worked at their stall for 23 years, is 45 years old, and attended 8
years of formal schooling. 80% are women and 45% are indigenous, while 75% belong
to a street vendor organization and 72% have a license.
The survey had an embedded experiment designed to prime anger about work
in the treatment, and mildly positive feelings about work in the control. We used
a bottom up prime, where we asked respondents to tell us an experience that they
had at work that made them angry or that they liked. Most respondents complied
but about 15% of respondents did not answer the question, responded to the control
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Table B.1: Survey experiment results
Measure All Responses
(n=207)
Excluding NR and Fail-
ure to Treat (n=177)
Pay dues next year p=.99 p=.52
Ask official for help next
year
p=.81 p=.60
Attend protest next year p=.90 p=.71
Run for office next year p=.55 p=.53
Donate to fund p=.78 p=.64
Letter to mayor word
count
p=.07 p=.03*
prime with a negative experience, or responded to the treatment with a positive ex-
perience. Following the prime, we asked a series of questions about future political
participation (for example, will you participate in a protest in the next year?) and
included behavioral measures (for example, we are starting a street vendor health
fund, would you like to donate?). When we look at the differences in means between
treated and control responses, we see null results whether we drop or include that
15%, with one exception, as we can see in the following table:
B.3 Survey Instrument
Below is the survey instrument for the original survey conducted in La Paz, Bolivia,
first in English and then in Spanish and Aymara. In the main text, I draw descriptive
statistics from the surveys where official statistics are not available.
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B.3.1 English Translation
Good morning/afternoon. My name is X and I am conducting a survey. The survey
takes 15 minutes and we give you a pound of quinoa for your participation. The
survey is part of an academic study to understand why street vendors organize and
is by a [redacted for blind review]. The survey has questions about your work, your
opinions, and your political participation. We are academic researchers and we are
not affiliated with any NGO or political party. The survey is completely anonymous
and you can choose not to respond to any question or stop the survey at any time.
If a customer comes, I can wait.
Do you want to participate? [If yes, give a bag of quinoa]
The first questions are about your participation in the last 12 months, your par-
ticipation in the past.
1. In the last 12 months, did you go to a meeting at any association, union, or other
organization?
2. In the last 12 months, did you ask for help from a local official?
3. In the last 12 months, did you pay dues to an association, union or other organi-
zation?
4. In the last 12 months, did you participate in a protest march?
5. In the last 12 months, did you participate in a campaign?
6. In the last 12 months, did you participate in an organized dance event?
7. In the last 12 months, did you run for election in an association, union or other
organization?
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Good. Now [ask 1 or 2 at random—flip coin]:
1. Can you tell me about an experience that you’ve had working here that you liked?
2. Can you tell me about an experience that you’ve had working here that made you
angry?
The next questions are about your participation in the next 12 months, your par-
ticipation in the future.
1. In the next 12 months, will you go to a meeting at any association, union, or other
organization?
2. In the next 12 months, will you ask for help from a local official?
3. In the next 12 months, will you pay dues to an association, union or other organi-
zation?
4. In the next 12 months, will you participate in a protest march?
5. In the next 12 months, will you participate in a campaign?
6. In the next 12 months, will you participate in an organized dance event?
7. In the next 12 months, will you run for election in an association, union or other
organization?
We are starting a small fund to help with the cost of medication and that any street
vendor can use. As part of the survey, we want to see if people want to help out with
the fund. To see if people want to help, we are asking if you want to give part of your
pound of quinoa to the fund. We will give the money that we would spend on buying
more quinoa to the fund. This is a free choice, contributing is not obligatory.
Do you want to give some of the pound of quinoa to the fund?
How much?
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Also, at the end of the study we will write a formal letter to the mayor asking for
changes for street vendors. Do you want to add something to the letter? We will not
put your name in the letter.
The next questions are about imaginary money.
1. To make an application go faster, would you definitely, maybe, or never pay a
bribe to an official?
2. Would you prefer to win 1000 bolivianos now or 1500 bolivianos in a year?
3. And now the opposite. Would you prefer to lose 1000 bolivianos now or 1500
bolivianos in a year?
The next questions are demographic.
1. How old are you?
2. How old were you when you started selling?
3. Do you consider yourself mestizo, Aymara, Quechua, white, Afro-Bolivian, or part
of another ethnic group?
4. What was the last year of school you completed?
5. Before vending, did you have another job?
a. What?
b. In this other job, were you part of a union?
6. Currently, do you have a vending license?
7. At this stall, do you work all day, part of the day or only on market days?
8. Have you been a leader in an association, union or other organization?
9. Are you currently affiliated with a street vendor association, union, or federation?
a. How long have you been a member?
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b. Are you a leader or a member in the organization?
10. Currently, do you like any political party?
a. Which?
The next questions are about people you know.
1. Do you know anyone who can:
a. Organize a protest?
i. What is your relationship with this person?
b. Resolve bureaucratic problems?
i. What is your relationship with this person?
c. Start an organization?
i. What is your relationship with this person?
2. Do you have good friends that you feel close to?
a. How many?
3. In a normal day, approximately how many people do you have contact with? In-
clude your customers, everyone you greet, and anyone you talk to face to face or over
the phone.
4. Some people have friends that know each other. Other people have friends that
don?t know each other. Do you think that all your friends know each other, most
know each other, some know each other, or none know each other?
The next questions are about your health.
1. Do you have health insurance or free access to a doctor?
2. In the last three months, have you had a health problem?
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o What?
3. When you have a health problem, do you go to the doctor, a hospital, the phar-
macy, an acquaintance, traditional medicine, herbs, or do you do something else?
4. If you belong to a vendor organization, what is your association doing to address
the health problems of its members?
1. Finally, to get an idea of the economic situation of Street vendors in general,
can you tell me if you own the following things? Cell phone, television, refrigerator,
internet at home, more than one stall, a car, your own house.
We are at the end of the survey, thank you for your participation. You can find copies
of the results of the survey at the CIDES-UMSA office at the end of May, Av. 14 de
Septiembre 4913, Obrajes, next to the Catholic University [give my business card].





6. Gender of person surveyed
7. Mobile or fixed post
8. Type of goods sold
B.3.2 Spanish
All but one survey was administered in Spanish. Buenos díÂŋas/buenas tardes! Soy
(nombre) y estoy haciendo una encuesta. La encuesta dura 15 minutos, y le dará una
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libra de quinua por su participación. La encuesta es parte de un estudio académico
para entender por qué los gremialistas se organizan y fue hecha por [redacted for blind
review]. La encuesta tiene preguntas sobre su trabajo, sus opiniones, y su partici-
pación gremial y política. Somos investigadores académicos y no estamos afiliados a
ninguna ONG o partido político. La encuesta es totalmente anónima y usted puede
responder o no a cualquier pregunta o parar la encuesta en cualquier momento. Si
llega un cliente puedo esperar.
Usted quiere participar? [Si tiene preguntas, responda.]
Las primeras preguntas son sobre su participación en los últimos 12 meses, partic-
ipación pasada: 1. En los últimos 12 meses usted asistió a una reunión de alguna
asociación, sindicato, u otra organización? [Dar ejemplos: puede ser de una asociación
gremialista, una junta vecinal, comité escolar o de la iglesia o cualquier organización.]
[S/N]
2. En los últimos 12 meses, usted pidió ayuda de algún oficial municipal? [S/N]
3. En los últimos 12 meses, usted pagó aportes o cuotas a alguna asociación, sindi-
cato, u otra organización? [S/N]
4. En los últimos 12 meses, usted participón en una marcha? [S/N]
5. En los últimos 12 meses, usted participón en una caminata? [S/N]
6. En los últimos 12 meses, usted bailó en una entrada folclórica? [S/N]




Bueno. Ahora [pregunta 1 o 2 al azar y nota cual estás preguntando]:
1. Usted puede contarme de una experiencia que ha tenido trabajando aquíÂŋ que le
gustó? [Si necesita clarificación: Una buena experiencia que ha tenido en el puesto]
2. Usted puede contarme de una experiencia que ha tenido trabajando aquí que le
molestó? [Si necesita clarificación: Una mala experiencia que ha tenido en el puesto]
Las siguientes preguntas son sobre su participación en los próximos 12 meses, partic-
ipación futura. Usted puede responder síÂŋ, tal vez, o no.
8. Este año, usted va a asistir a una reunión de alguna asociación, sindicato u otra
organización? [S/T/N]
9. Este año, usted va a pedir ayuda de algún oficial municipal? [S/T/N]
10. Este año, usted va a pagar aportes o cuotas a alguna asociación, sindicato, u otra
organización? [S/T/N]
11. Este año, usted va a participar en una marcha? [S/T/N]
12. Este año, usted va a participar en una caminata? [S/T/N]
13. Este año, usted va a bailar en una entrada folclórica? [S/T/N]
14. Este año, usted va a candidatear en alguna asociación, sindicato, u otra organi-
zación? [S/T/N]
Estamos empezando un pequeño fondo para ayudar con el costo de medicamentos que
cualquier gremialista o vendedor pueda usar. El fondo sería financiado por aportes
voluntarios.
15. Usted aportaríÂŋa a un fondo así? [S/N]
16. Cuánto por mes?
219
También, al final del estudio vamos a escribir una nota formal a la alcaldía pidi-
endo cambios para el sector. Usted quiere adicionar algo a la nota? No pondremos
su nombre. [S/N]
Las próximas preguntas son sobre dinero imaginario.
1. Para hacer un trámite más rápido, usted pagaría, tal vez o no una coima a algún
oficial? [S/T/N]
2. Esas preguntas son sobre dinero imaginario. Usted preferiríÂŋa tener 10 boli-
vianos ahorita o 20 bolivianos en la próxima semana? [Si necesita clarificación: Es
imaginario, imagine que usted tendría que escoger entre 10 ahorita o 20 la próxima
semana] [10/20/NR]
3. Y ahora lo opuesto: Usted preferiríÂŋa perder 10 bolivianos ahorita o 20 bo-
livianos la próxima semana? [Si necesita clarificación: Es imaginario, imagine que
usted tendría que escoger entre dos pérdidas: 10 ahorita o 20 la próxima semana.
Si todavíÂŋa necesita: O imagine que usted tendría que pagar un monto y podría
escoger entre pagar 10 ahora o pagar 20 en una semana.] [10/20/NR]
Encuesta
Las siguientes preguntas son demográficas:
4. Cuántos años tiene usted?
5. Cuántos años tenía usted cuando empezó a vender?
6. Usted se considera mestizo, Aymara, Quechua, blanco, afro-boliviano o parte de
otro grupo étnico?
7. Cuál fue el último curso escolar que usted completó?
8. Antes de vender, usted tenía otro trabajo? [S/N]
220
a. Cuál?
b. En ese trabajo anterior, usted perteneció a algún sindicato? [S/N]
9. Actualmente, usted tiene patente? [S/N]
10. En este puesto, usted trabaja todo el día todos los díÂŋas, parte del día, o en
díÂŋas de feria?
11. Usted ha sido un dirigente de alguna asociación, sindicato, u otra organización?
[Dar ejemplos: puede ser de una asociación gremialista, una junta vecinal, comité
escolar o de la iglesia o cualquier organización.] [S/N]
12. Usted está afiliado a alguna asociación, sindicato, o federación gremialista actual-
mente? [S/N]
a. Hace cuántos años que usted pertenece a una asociación, sindicato, o federación
gremialista? [Estaban afiliados pero ahora no: ]
b. Usted es dirigente o de base en la asociación o sindicato?
13. Actualmente, a usted le gusta algún partido político? [S/N]
a. Cuál?
Las próximas preguntas son sobre las personas que usted conoce:
14. Usted conoce a alguien que pueda:
a. Organizar una marcha? [S/N]
i. Cuál es su relación con esa persona? [lee las opciones: familiar, amigo, compañero,
conocido]
b. Solucionar trámites? [S/N]
i. Cuál es su relación con esa persona? [lee las opciones: familiar, amigo, compañero,
conocido]
c. Formar una asociación? [S/N]
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i. Cuál es su relación con esa persona? [lee las opciones: familiar, amigo, compañero,
conocido]
15. Usted tiene buenos amigos con quienes usted se siente muy cercano? [S/N]
a. Cuantos?
16. En un día normal, usted con cuantas personas aproximadamente tiene contacto?
Incluya todos sus clientes y a todos que usted saluda cara a cara o por teléfono, a
todos.
17. Algunas personas tienen amigos que se conocen. Otras tienen amigos que no se
conocen. Usted piensa que todos sus amigos se conocen entre ellos, la mayoría se
conocen, algunos se conocen, o ninguno se conoce?
Las próximas preguntas son sobre su salud.
18. Tiene usted un seguro o acceso a médico gratuito? [S/N]
19. Usted ha tenido un problema de salud o enfermedad en los últimos tres meses?
[S/N]
a. Cual?
20. Cuándo usted tiene un problema de salud, usted: va al médico, a un hospital,
a la farmacia, a un conocido, o a la medicina tradicional, se cura con medicamentos
caseros, o hace otra cosa? Cuál?
21. [Si es afiliado] Qué se está haciendo desde su asociación para atender los proble-
mas de salud de los afiliados?
22. Finalmente, para tener una idea de la situación económica de los gremialistas
en general, usted me puede decir si tiene algunos de las siguientes cosas? Celular,
televisor, refrigerador, internet en casa, más de un puesto (contando puestos en fe-
rias), auto, casa propia.
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Estamos al final de la encuesta. Muchas gracias por su participación. Usted puede
encontrar copias a fines de mayo de un informe con los resultados de la encuesta en
la oficina de CIDES-UMSA [dirección: Avenida 14 de Septiembre 4913, Obrajes, a
lado de la Universidad Católica]. [Dar mi tarjeta y una bolsa de quinua]
Preguntas que el administrador debe llenar:
23. Nombre del administrador:
24. Número de encuesta:
25. Fecha:
26. Calles:
27. Género del encuestado: M/H/otro
28. Ambulante o puesto fijo









One survey was administered in Aymara. Nayajj X sutinitwa. Mä encuesta luraskta.
Aka encuestajj tunka pesqan minutotakiwa. Uka layku mä libra quinua churí . Aka
encuestajj mä estudio académico yatjjatañatakiwa kunalaykutej gremialistanaka sum
223
wakichasisipki. Aka encuestajj má [redacted for blind review] luratawa. Encues-
tajj jisk’tawinakaniwa, lurawinakamata ukhamaraki amuyatanakamata ukhamaraki
gremialista toquet politicata. Nanakajj investigadores academicópjjtwa. Janiw kuna
ONG jan uka partido políÂŋticonakanipkti. Encuestajj janiw jumanakajjat jisk’atañ
munkiti, jumanakatejj munapjjasmajja jaysapjjasmawa kuntej munapkta uka. Jan
ukajj amukatapjjasmawa. Mä aliritej purispajja nayajj suytairistwa.
1. Jumajja iyawsasmati? [Si tiene preguntas, responda. Si acepta, dar una bolsa de
quinua] Nayraqat jisk’aäwinaka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakatawa.
1. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja tantachasiwir saririyätati sindica-
tor jan ukajj yaqha tantachaswiru? Sañäni: gremialista toquenakata, junta veci-
nalanakaru, comité escuelata, jan ukajj iglesiata. [S/N]
2. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja oficial municipalat yanapawi may-
tati? [S/N]
3. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja qollque churtati sindicatoru, yaqha
asociacionakaru? [S/N]
4. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja marchanakar saririyätati? [S/N]
5. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja sarnaqawinakar saririyätati? [S/N]
6. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja thoqoyätati entradanakana? [S/N]
7. Aka qhepa tunka payan phajjsinakan jumajja candidatjam asociacionan, sindica-
ton, jan ukajj yaqha tantachasiwin candidatjam saririyätati? [S/N]
Waliki, jichhajj: [pregunta 1 o 2 al azar y nota cual estás preguntando]
8. Mayat payakam ukhamak lurañani. Jumajj sitasmati kunjamänsa akan trabajasa,
kunas walínwa? [Uka lurawin kunajamäns jumataki puestomana]
9. Jumajj sitasmati kunanakas trabajoman jan walína?
(Pregunta cuando para de hablar: Juk’ampinaka utjiti?)
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Jutir jiskt’awinaka jutir tunka payan phajjsinakatakiwa. Jumajj jis sasma, jan ukajj,
janiwa. 10. Aka mara jumajj sindicatot, yaqha organizacion tantachasiwir sarätati?
Sañäni: gremialista toquenakata, junta vecinalanakaru, comité escuelata, jan ukajj
iglesiata] [S/T/N]
11. Aka mara jumajj oficial municipalat yanapt’awi maytati? [S/T/N]
12. Aka mara jumajj sindicator, yaqha organizacionakar qollque churätati? [S/T/N]
13. Aka mara jumajj marchanakar sarätati? [S/T/N]
14. Aka mara jumajj sarnaqawinakar sarätati? [S/T/N]
15. Aka mara jumajj entradanakan thoqtati? [S/T/N]
16. Aka mara jumajj asociacionan, sindicaton, organizacionan candidatjam sarätati?
[S/T/N]
Nanakajj ma jisk’a fondo monetario lurañ qallqasipkta qollawinakataki gremialis-
tanakaru jan ukajj aljerinakaru churañataki. Jichha jumanakajj aka encuestar iyawsañ
munapjjtati, ukhamaraki jumanakajj mä libra quinua aka fondor churapjjasmati.
Nanakajj Confederacionar qollque churapjjë qollanaki alañataki. Take aka luraw-
inakajja jumanakatawa.
17. Jumajj quinua fondor churañ munasmati? [S/N]
18. Qhawka?
19. Ukhamaraki tukuñataki alcaldiar qellqañani. Jumajja juk’amp saña munasmati?
Janiw sutim uskuñaniti. [S/N]
Jutir jiskt’awinaka amuyut qollquetawa.
20. Mä tramite juk’am ratuk lurañatakej jumajj pagasmati, inas, jamasat pagasma?
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[S/T/N]
21. Qhawka qollques katokañ munasma, anchispacha waraq boliviano jan ukasti
waranq phesqa patakan bolivianonaka mä marana? (Jumatawa ajlliña, jichha waranqa
jan ukajj mä maran waranq phesqa patakani) [1000/1500]
22. Jichha mayja jiskt’awiwa. Jumajja waranq boliviano anchispacha chhaqañ mu-
nasmati, jan ukajj waranq phesqa patakani bolivianonaka chhaqañ mä marana? (Ju-




24. Qhawkha maranïyatasa kunapachatej aljan qallktajja?
25. Jumajj mestizótati, jan ukajj aymar jaqe, quechua jaqe, janqäo jaqe, Afro-
Boliviano jaqe, yaqhätacha?
26. Escuelan kuna cursokamas yateqta?
27. Janir aljjkhasajj yaqha trabajoniyätati? [S/N]
a. Kunänsa?
b. Uka trabajon jumajj sindicatonkhayätati? [S/N]
28. Jichha jumajj patentenitati? [S/N]
29. Aka pueston, jornarpachat trabajta, sapurut trabajta, horasanakakich trabajta,
jan ukajj feria urunakaki?
30. Jumajja asociacionan, sindicaton, jan ukajj yaqha organizacionan dirigentéy-
atati? Sañäni, gremialista toquen, junta vecinalan, escuel comiten, iglesian, yaqha
organizacionanakana. [S/N]
31. Jumajj mä asociaciónanktati, sindicaton tonqtati, federación gremialistanakank-
tati? [S/N]
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a. Qhawkha maras uka asociación, sindicato, jan ukajj federación gremialistanakankta?
b. Jumajj basenqtati jan ukajj dirigentétacha?
32. Jichhurunaka kuna partidonktasa? Qhawkniri?
Jutir jiskt’awinaka khitinakarutej uñt’ätajja ukhatawa.
33. Jumajja uñt’äati má jaqeru mä marcha wakichiri? [S/N]
a. Kunas jupajj jumataki? Familiarati, masimati, jan ukajj uñt’äatamacha?
34. Jumajja uñt’äati mä jaqeru tramitenak askichiri? [S/N]
a. Kunas jupajj jumataki? Familiarati, masimati, jan ukajj uñt’äatamacha?
35. Jumajja uñt’äati mä jaqeru mä asociación luriri? [S/N]
a. Kunas jupajj jumataki? Familiarati, masimati, jan ukajj uñt’äatamacha?
36. Jumajja jaq’äamasinakanïtati? [S/N]
a. Qhawkha?
37. Mä urun jumajj qhawkha jaqenakakampis parlirita? Clientenakata, jupanakar
arumtiritati jan ukajj teléfonot parlirita?
38. Yaqep jaqenaka uñt’äat masinakanipjjewa, yaqepanikasti, jan uñt’äat masinipj-
jewa. Jumajja masinakaman yaqha jaqenakamp uñt’äasipjjatap amuytati? Waljaniw
uñt’äasipjje, yaqhepanakakiw uñt’äajasipjje, jan ukajj janiw khitis uñt’äaskiti?
Jutir jiskt’awinaka qollasinjjatawa.
39. Jumajja mä seguronitati jan ukajj inak mä mediconitacha? [S/N]
40. Aka qhepa kimsa phajjsinakan, jumajj usutayatati? [S/N]
a. Kuna usënsa?
41. Kunapachatej jumajja usutätajja, kawkirus sarta, medicor sartati, hospitalar sar-
tati, farmaciar sartati, mä uñt’äatama masimar sartati, jan ukajj kallawayanakar sar-
tati, jumajja ali qollanakampit qollasta, jan ukajj yaqha kollawinakampicha? Qhawkniri?
42. Asociacionatamat qollañatakejj kuns lurasipki?
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43. Mä suma amuyuniñatakejj gremialistanakan qolque utjatapat, jumajj sitasmati
celularaniti, televisoraniti, refrigeradoraniti, utan internetaniti, mayat juk’amp puestoniti,
autoniti, utaniti?
Qhepa toque encuestanktanwa. Yuspagarpuni jutatamata. Jumajja jiqjjatasmawa
aka informenakat CIDES-UMSA oficinanakan. Ukajj jiqjatasi Avenida 14 de Sep-
tiembre 4913, Obrajes. Universidad Catolica jaqhana. Aka informenaka mayo pha-
situkusin jiqhatasma. [Dar mi tarjeta]
Preguntas que el administrador debe llenar:
1. Nombre del administrador:
2. Número de encuesta:
3. Fecha:
4. Calles:
5. Género del encuestado: M/H/otro
6. Ambulante o puesto fijo










Appendix to Chapter 4:
Supplementary Information for the
Case Studies
This section includes official documents referenced in the main text as well
as a summary of how I conducted fieldwork in El Alto, and São Paulo. It also
describes interview and original survey protocols and the IRB’s confidentiality guide-
lines. Anonymized field notes and interview transcripts are available on request.
C.1 Interview and Confidentiality Protocols
Example interview script for a bureaucrat:
How did you get this job?
What are the street vending regulations that you deal with?
How do you work with street vendor organizations? Individual street vendors?
There seem to be a lot of street vendor organizations. What are the advantages to
having a lot? What are the disadvantages?
How do you manage conflicts between the city and vendors? Between vendors?
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What things do you think this office does well? What could be improved?
Example interview script for a street vendor association leader:
How did you start selling?
When and how did you get a license?
How did you become a leader?
(Follow up questions depending on what they say)
What are your interactions with the (Markets Office/city government/mayor) like?
How have they changed?
(Solicit opinions on relevant current events: national elections, municipal elections,
threats to revoke licenses)
(Sensitive questions, depending on person: Have you paid a bribe? Why? What are
the problems in the federation? How was the federation divided? What happens
when someone breaks the rules in your association?)
All interviewees were briefed verbally on informed consent, the project, and
the confidentiality procedures. IRB granted verbal instead of written consent because
many street vendors are illiterate and wary of official documents (particularly if a
foreigner asks them to sign anything). IRB prohibited me from recording interviews
because I asked about illegal activity, though the regulations that the people I worked
with break are typically minor local ordinances. I took notes in a notebook during
interviews and typed them up within 24 hours. I have made up pseudonyms for all
interviewees and removed identifying information.
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C.2 Survey Administration
We divided each district included in the survey into areas that could be covered in a
day, randomized the order in which we would visit these areas, and then randomized
which researcher would take which streets within these areas (Torangeau and Smith
1996). Once in the designated area, each researcher approached vendors with the
same script, and if the vendor consented to participate, proceeded to read out the
survey questions and recorded answers on a tablet. We interviewed one person at
each stall and we did not inquire whether the respondent was the license holder or
the owner of the stall so long as she worked as a vendor.
Basic demographic data such as gender, approximate age, and race, as well as
merchandise on offer, were filled out directly by the survey administrator. We opted
for this method because it shortened the number of questions for each respondent
and because questions on some topics, such as gender or age, could lead to bias or
negative reactions on the part of respondents. Perhaps the most sensitive item is the
attribution of respondents’ race by the survey administrator. For the purposes of our
study, other people’s perceptions are as or more important than self-identification
because others? perceptions should significantly affect their decisions to buy from,
license, extort from, or harass, the vendor. Additionally, race statistics in Brazil are
extremely complex, subjective, and there is no best practice or established protocol
(Telles and Lim 1998).
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C.2.1 Unforeseen Issues
Three versions of the questionnaire (extended, main, and short) were used in the
administration of the survey. The main version is reproduced in English at the end of
this document followed by the original questionnaire in Portuguese. Prior to starting
the survey, we decided to administer the short version to vendors on the city’s busiest
commercial street, 25 de Março, and its immediate surroundings. This decision was
based on information gathered during preliminary fieldwork regarding the intensity
of trade in this area, which diminished the availability of respondents, as well as the
sensitivity of some questions on associative membership. In retrospect, the relatively
high response rate obtained in this area suggests a slightly longer version of the survey
would have been desirable. The questions used in the short version are indicated in
the questionnaire below. Two days after beginning the survey in mid-July, we had
covered one third of the first district. The response rate was 15% and many vendors
told us that they would not take the 20-30 minute survey because they felt it was too
long. Consequently, we cut out follow-up questions but we did not change the order
or wording of the remaining questions. Most of the questions eliminated were toward
the end of the survey.
C.3 Survey Instrument
Items used or recorded in the short version are marked with a (*).
Introductory script
Hello, my name is X and I’m [name and university]. A colleague and I are doing a
survey of street vendors in Sao Paulo. The survey asks questions about your work and
your experiences during the World Cup. It takes about 15-25 minutes. The survey is
232
anonymous. We are independent researchers and we are not associated with any part
of the government or any NGO. You can choose not to answer any question and you
can stop the survey at any time. Would you like to take the survey? (If yes) Here is
my card. Do you have any questions before we begin?




Answer if No is selected for Q1:
2. Why did you not work as street vendor during the World Cup? (Do not read the
options)




Answer if No is selected for Q1:












5. During the month of the Cup, did you make:
More money (1)
Less money (2)
Or the same as before the Cup? (3)
NR (4)
Answer if "More money than" is selected for Q5:




More than half (4)
NR (5)
Answer if "Less money than" is selected for Q5:





More than half (4)
NR (5)




Or remained the same? (3)
NR (4)




Answer if "Yes" is selected for Q9:
10. When was the last time that happened?





Answer if "Yes" is selected for Q11:
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12. When was the last time that happened?
13. For how long have you worked as a street vendor?




Answer if "Yes" is selected for Q14:
15. What was your job?
Answer if "Yes" is selected for Q14:




Answer if "Yes" is selected for Q14:





18. What is the highest level of education that you completed?










20. What are the two most important things that the city did for street vendors
in the past year?
(1)
(2)
3. NR, cannot think of anything (3)
4. Nothing (4)
21. Can you tell me if you are affiliated with any of the following groups?
Yes (1) No (2) NR (3)
Neighborhood association









Answer if "Yes" is selected for Q22:
23. In what year did you enter this association or union?









26. In the last twelve months, did you request help or send a request to any politician,





27. In the last twelve months did you participate in any meeting or public hear-




28. Finally, to get an idea of the economic status of street vendors in general, could
you tell me if you have/own any of the following items?
Yes (1) No (2) NR (3)
1. Cellphone
2. T.V.
3. More than one bathroom at home
4. Personal computer
5. Internet at home
6. Car
7. House
29. We have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation. You
can finish the survey now, or answer one last question. [If the subject agrees] If we
were to write a letter to the city council about the problems that street vendors face,









32. Age (NR: estimated 20, 40, 60)*
Less Than 20 (1)
Between 21 and 30 (2)
Between 31 and 40 (3)
Between 41 and 50 (4)













South American (not Brazilian) (2)
African (not Brazilian) (3)
Other (4)
35. Any visible physical disability?*
Yes (1)
No (2)
36. Merchandise sold at the stall: *
Fresh / homemade food (1)
Packaged Food (2)
Cigarettes / drinks (3)
Electronic and accessories (4)
Clothing (including bags) (5)
Clothing accessories (including shoes, watches, jewelry, belts, wallets) (6)
Tools (7)
Toys / gadgets (8)
Other (9)
Brazil / World Cup-branded items (10)
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C.3.1 Original Survey in Portuguese
Oi. Meu nome é X. Sou [name and university]. Junto a um colega, estamos fazendo
uma pesquisa sobre o que aconteceu com os ambulantes durante a Copa. Demora
5 minutos. A pesquisa é totalmente anónima. Não pedimos seu nome nem nen-
huma informação sobre sua identidade. Somos pesquisadores independentes. Não
trabalhamos para nenhuma ONG, orgão do governo, sindicato ou associação. Todas
a perguntas são voluntárias. Voce pode interromper a entrevista em qualquer mo-
mento. Também pode não responder qualquer pergunta que não quiser responder.
Nosso objetivo e avaliar os problemas que os ambulantes tiveram durante a Copa.
Aceitaria participar? Obrigado/a




Answer If O/a senhor/a trabalhou como ambulante durante a Copa? Não Is Se-
lected 2. Por que não trabalhou como ambulante durante a Copa? (Não leia as




Answer If O/a senhor/a trabalhou como ambulante durante a Copa? Não Is Se-
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lected
3. Como fez o/a senhor/a para pagar as contas durante a Copa?
Poupança (1)




If Poupança Is Displayed, Then Skip To Durante a Copa, o/a senhor/a acredita




5. Durante o mes da Copa, o/a senhor/a ganhou:
Mais dinheiro (1)
Menos dinheiro (2)
Ou igual que antes da Copa (3)
NR (4)
Answer If Durante o mes da Copa, o/a senhor/a ganhou: Mais dinheiro Is Selected
6. Quanto aumentou sua renda durante a Copa? (If not understood: Quanto dinheiro





mais da metade (4)
NR (5)
Answer If Durante o mes da Copa, o/a senhor/a ganhou: Menos dinheiro Is Se-
lected
7. Quanto diminuiu sua renda durante a Copa? (If not understood: Quanto dinheiro




mais da metade (4)
NR (5)
8. Durante a Copa, o/a senhor/a acredita que a repressão contra os ambulantes:
Aumentou (1)
Diminuiu (2)
Ou ficou igual? (3)
NR (4)






10. Quando foi a ultima vez que isso aconteceu?
11. O/a senhor/a ja recebeu alguma multa por trabalhar como ambulante ou pagou




12. Quando foi a ultima vez que isso aconteceu?
13. Quantos anos faz que o/a senhor/a trabalha como ambulante?




If Sim/Qual Is Not Selected, Then Skip To Qual foi o Ãžltimo ciclo de ensino que




















19. Quais são as duas coisas mais importantes que a prefeitura fez pelos ambu-
lantes no último ano?
1. (1)
2. (2)
Se mais de 5 segundos 5s, NR otherwise (3)
Nada "n" (4)
20. O/a senhor/a pode me dizer se esta afiliado com algum dos seguintes grupos?
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Sim (1) Não (2) NR (3)
Associação de moradores (1)








Answer If O/a senhor/a esta afiliado a alguma associaÃğÃčo ou sindicato de am-
bulantes? Sim Is Selected
22. Em que ano o/a senhor/a entrou nessa associação/sindicato?










25. Nos últimos doze meses, o/a senhor/a solicitou ajuda ou enviou um pedido a




26. Nos últimos doze meses o/a senhor/a participou de alguma reuniÃčo ou au-




27. Finalmente, para ter uma ideia da situação economica dos ambulantes em geral,
o/a senhor/a poderia me dizer se o/a senhor/a possui algum dos seguintes itens?
Sim (1) Não (2) NR (3)
Celular (1)
Televisão (2)
Mais que um banheiro (3)
Computador (4)




28. Chegamos ao final da pesquisa. Obrigado por sua participação. O/a senhor/a
pode terminar a pesquisa agora, ou responder a uma última pergunta. [If the subject
agrees] Se a gente for escrever uma carta para a prefeitura sobre os problemas que os








31. Que idade o/a senhor/a tem? (NR: estima 20, 40, 60)
menos de 20 (1)
entre 21 e 30 (2)
entre 31 e 40 (3)
entre 41 e 50 (4)
entre 51 e 60 (5)












Sudamericano não brasileiro (2)
Africano não brasileiro (3)
Outro (4)








Clothing (including bags) (5)





Brazil/World Cup-branded items (10)
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 5
The Appendix includes supplemental coding, descriptive, and procedural in-
formation for the data and analyses presented in the main text. It also includes
robustness checks for the regressions
D.1 Robustness and Coding for Quantitative Anal-
yses
D.1.1 Data
The data comes from the 44,184 respondents that responded as self-employed to the
"ocup1a" question in the merged dataset publicly available from LAPOP. Note that
as of May 2016, the merged LAPOP data did not include data for all years from Bo-
livia, Argentina, Chile and Venezuela; I merged those into the LAPOP file to make
a full dataset. For the state capacity measure, I used the publicly available OECD
tax percentage data for Latin America and per capita indicator data from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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D.1.2 Coding
I recoded ordinal participation variables cp6, cp7, cp8, cp9, cp10—attended once in
the last 12 months, attended once a month, attended once a week, didn’t attend—
into binary participant (1 for attended at all) or nonparticipant (0) variables. Binary
variables are denoted with a "b" in the dataset—e.g., cp9b. I recoded interest in
politics, pol1, from a four category binary variable into expressed any interest (1) or
not (0). All other LAPOP variables follow LAPOP coding.
For the tax measures, the OECD has data on the percentage of overall tax
revenue and social security contributions as a percentage of GDP. I used World Bank
population and GDP data to get overall revenue and contributions in constant dollars
and then divide by population to get a yearly per capita measure. I also included
a World Bank GDP per capita measure as a robustness check, which I did not modify.
D.1.3 Country and Year Estimates
The coefficients below are from the full controls model reported in Table 3 in the main
text. For year, 2006 is the reference category, while Mexico is the reference category
for country; these are the LAPOP reference categories, not mine.
D.1.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, I report several alternative models, including specifications with two
alternative measures for state capacity, GDP per capita and social security contribu-
tions per capita, as well as ethnicity controls and mixed effects models with random
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All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table D.2: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation,
with ethnicity in the specification.
Fixed Effects Logit
(Full Controls)

















Ethnicity, year and country fixed effects suppressed.
All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
effects for countries. The estimates are generally consistent across specifications and
estimators and for the most part stay significant. Tax revenue per capita is insignifi-
cant in one model; all other results discussed in the main text stay significant and do
not change direction in any of the robustness checks.
The following tables report the full control fixed effects model in the main text
but with LAPOP’s ethnicity variable added. The first table reports all other variable
coefficients while the second table reports the ethnicity categories.
The following table presents the coefficients for the ethnicity categories when
255















All other variables suppressed.
All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p ≤ .001
LAPOP’s ethnicity variable ("etid") is included in the full control fixed effects model.
The etid variable is a 27-category one; however, most of those categories have fewer
than 100 people (9 have less than 10) and the logistic analysis ends up dropping most
of those categories due to missing data. White is the omitted reference category;
again, this is LAPOP’s designated reference, not mine. All category names are as
listed in LAPOP’s codebook. Please note that LAPOP uses the most prevalent term
in a given country, even if it is perceived as offensive in another.
The following tables report the two specifications presented in the main text
but with random effects for countries instead of fixed effects.
The following section presents results with the data subset on different vari-
ables. First, results appear stronger for rural populations than urban populations.
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Table D.4: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation.
Mixed Effects Logit Mixed Effects Logit
(Full Controls)

















Year fixed effects and country random effects suppressed.
All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Second, results are stronger for men than for women. Finally, results are robust to
excluding Bolivia and Brazil separately or together. I suspect that a large part of the
mixed results comes from reducing the sample.
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Table D.6: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation
in rural Latin America, 2006-2014
































N = 11,014 N = 10,273
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table D.7: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation
in urban Latin America, 2006-2014
































N = 16,570 N = 16,031
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table D.8: Individual and state-level effects on male professional association partici-
pation in Latin America, 2006-2014
































N = 19,080 N = 17,809
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table D.9: Individual and state-level effects on female professional association par-
ticipation in Latin America, 2006-2014
































N = 9,104 N = 8,495
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table D.10: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation
in Latin America excluding Bolivia, 2006-2014


































N = 24,884 N = 23,196
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
Standard errors in parentheses below coefficients. All tests are two-tailed.
*p ≤ .05
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Table D.11: Individual and state-level effects on professional association participation
in Latin America excluding Brazil, 2006-2014


































N = 26,976 N = 25,171
Year and country fixed effects suppressed; reported in appendix.
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